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Abstract
Policy-makers face an uncertain world. One way of getting a handle on
decision-making in such an environment is to rely on evidence. Despite
the recent increase in post-fact figures in politics, evidence-based policy-
making takes centre stage in policy-setting institutions. Often, however,
policy-makers face large volumes of evidence from different sources. Robust-
ness analysis can, prima facie, handle this evidential diversity. Roughly, a
hypothesis is supported by robust evidence if the different evidential sources
(such as observations or model results) are in agreement. In this thesis, I
strengthen the case for the use of robustness analysis in evidence-based policy-
making by answering open research questions about this inference technique.
First, I argue that existing taxonomies miss a fruitful category of robustness
reasoning, that is predictive stability. Second, I claim that derivational ro-
bustness analysis – the investigation of whether the results of different models
are in agreement – can yield interesting insights even if not the entire relevant
model space is covered by available models or if the model results are only
partially in agreement. Third, I claim that expert knowledge is necessary to
address questions that arise when one applies measurement robustness analy-
sis – the investigation into whether multiple means of measurement yield the
same result. Finally, I argue that, in situations where evidence from different
measurements is not in agreement, it can be advisable to no longer take all of
the evidence into account. This can be done in a rationally defensible way by
choosing the most adequate theory or model underlying parts of the evidence
set. I discuss examples from climate, medical, and economic policy-making
to establish my claims.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Types and Value
of Robustness Analysis
Having to go to a hospital for treatment during the Middle Ages in Europe
would have been a very different experience from today. Setting aside differ-
ences in levels of hygiene and infrastructure, the contrast in care one would
have received is stark. A leading tool of diagnosis of that period was Galen’s
concept of the four humours, which was based on metaphysical beliefs from
antiquity about the composition of matter. According to this view, the hu-
man body consists of four humours, namely blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and
black bile. Health was marked as a state in which these four humours were
in balance. An excess of blood, phlegm, yellow bile, or black bile made a
person sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, or melancholic (Hajar 2012, p. 159).
Physical illnesses were said to be caused by imbalances in the four humours
and, bloodletting in particular was seen as a common treatment to restore
these imbalances (Hajar 2012, p. 159; Greenstone 2010, p. 12). Bloodletting
remained a crucial treatment until the 19th century (Greenstone 2010, p. 12).
Famously, George Washington was treated by having a significant amount of
blood drawn after he had developed a fever and respiratory distress. He died
the next night after this bloodletting (Greenstone 2010, p. 13). In hindsight,
Washington’s medical history does not come as a surprise. Amongst many
others, studies by Pasteur, Koch, and Virchov in the 19th century showed
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the harmful effect of bloodletting on patients (Greenstone 2010, p. 13) and
eventually debunked the concept of the four humours.1
Elsewhere, in the 19th century, a large part of urban Britain was filled with
what was called Victorian slums (Matthews 2010, p. 2). These slums were
unplanned, densely populated areas with buildings in close proximity and no
sanitary infrastructure. They were a product of population growth and rapid
urbanisation due to the advancing industrialisation of Britain (Matthews
2010, p. 2). The growing awareness of the role of sanitary installations and
the importance of hygiene towards the end of the 19th century led the UK
government to intervene in the hitherto unregulated housing market (Johnson
2005, p. 20). The key interventions consisted in establishing minimal building
standards (Boelhouwer and Hoekstra 2012, p. 363) and giving local councils
the power to build homes (University of the West of England 2008, p. 3).
However, the shortage of affordable houses was only slightly reduced by the
council housing scheme since the councils built too few homes and the private
sector did not jump in to fill this gap. Since the demand for housing was so
high, private sector companies had no incentives to offer space at affordable
prices (University of the West of England 2008, p. 3). The effectiveness of
the council housing schemes of the late 19th century was curbed due to the
market power of private sector construction firms. Hence, taking into account
evidence about the market power and incentives of these private sector firms
would have allowed the government to implement a more effective policy, for
example, by building more governmental homes and by offering special rent-
ing schemes for the construction firms that would have allowed a reasonable
payback period on their investments.
These two episodes from medicine and housing reveal that the use of evi-
dence is crucial in designing effective interventions. But what kind of evidence
should be gathered? And if evidence is gathered, how should this information
be used to inform recommendations for interventions? These questions are
particularly pressing if one looks at interventions at a larger scale such as pol-
icy interventions. These questions are the foci of an emerging field that has
1For an excellent in-depth treatment of the failures of medicine that followed Galen see
Wootton (2007).
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been named aptly evidence-based policy-making (see Cartwright and Hardie
2012; Montuschi 2009).
The March for Science movement, which calls on scientists and members of
the public to speak out for a central role of science in policy-making, illustrates
the idea behind evidence-based policy-making. Their mission statement reads
as follows:
The March for Science champions robustly funded and publicly
communicated science as a pillar of human freedom and prosper-
ity. We unite as a diverse, non-partisan group to call for sci-
ence that upholds the common good and for political leaders and
policy-makers to enact evidence-based policies in the public inter-
est. (March for Science 2017, p. 1)
According to this mission statement, policy-makers who, for example, sug-
gest a change to income taxation should pay attention to economic data on
the effect of the taxation level on the government budget. The US Food and
Drug Administration should consider the outcome of randomised control trials
on the effectiveness of a new vaccine against measles. If school administrators
want to change the cap on the number of students per class, they should con-
sider educational research on the effect of teacher-student ratios on students’
learning behaviour. Industrial policies that curb the rise in the global average
temperature to two degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels should
originate from a careful understanding of the mechanics of the global climate.
The evidence-based medicine movement is another example that illustrates
the idea of evidence-based policy-making. It is particularly illustrative since
there is a high degree of self reflection amongst evidence-based policy-makers
in medicine about their approach. Here is Sackett et al. (1996, p. 1)’s defini-
tion of the approach:
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and ju-
dicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about
the care of individual patients. The practice of evidence based
medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the
best available external clinical evidence from systematic research.
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This view of policy-making as an evidence-based activity contrasts con-
siderably with narratives regarding two recent political events: The United
Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union and Donald Trump’s elec-
tion. These two events have been described as signs of the West having entered
a post-truth world (The Economist 2016). This post-truth world is charac-
terised by a declining effort to relate policy proposals to shared facts and to
engage in open, reason-based exchanges. This thesis aims at strengthening
evidence-based approaches to policy-making by addressing epistemological is-
sues that surround evidential claims.
One such key issue is the fact that a large amount of potentially conflict-
ing evidence from different sources can be relevant to a problem or hypoth-
esis. Consider the case of class size regulation. Prima facie, evidence from
psychology on the learning behaviour of children, economic evidence on cost
implications on staffing levels, and sociological evidence on the correlation be-
tween access to private vs. public schools are relevant. Evidence often stems
from multiple disciplines and supports conflicting hypotheses (Stegenga 2009).
Douglas (2012, p. 139) coined the term ‘complex evidence’ for information of
this sort. How should one go about policy-making in the face of such diverse
evidence?
Looking at the discussion within the evidence-based policy domain, one
tool emerges to address this issue of evidential diversity: robustness analysis.
Robustness analysis is the investigation into how robust one’s evidence is,
that is, whether multiple ways of determining the truth of a hypothesis (e.g.,
different experimental techniques or model assumptions) are in agreement.
Here are three examples of the view that robustness considerations are a
valuable tool in assessing evidence for policy-making.
In an analysis of the relationship between trust and economic performance
of a country, Beugelsdijk et al. (2004, p. 132) state the following:
Our overall conclusion is that despite the variation in the size of
the effect of trust on growth (...), our extensive robustness anal-
ysis further adds to the empirical evidence that trust matters for
explaining variation in economic performance.
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – an organisa-
tion that synthesises state-of-the-art knowledge on the causes and effects of
climate change – emphasises the centrality of robustness for the prediction
and explanation of climate phenomena. To start, robust bodies of evidence
are supposed to vindicate “high confidence” in explanations and predictions
(Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 3). More specifically, agreement amongst differ-
ent climate models, which is a form of robustness, is viewed as a contributing
factor to increased confidence in climate predictions. The following is an ex-
ample involving statements on changes in monsoon circulations (IPCC 2013,
p. 1219, italics in the original):
There is growing evidence of improved skill of climate models in
reproducing climatological features of the global monsoon. Taken
together with identified model agreement on future changes, the
global monsoon, aggregated over all monsoon systems, is likely to
strengthen in the 21st century (...).
In setting out the new research field of computational sociology – the
attempt to understand social processes with the help of agent-based models
– Macy and Willer (2002, p. 162-163) comment on the centrality of looking
for robust results:
Although simulation designs should use experimental rather than
post-hoc statistical controls to identify underlying causal processes,
that does not mean researchers should avoid statistical analy-
sis. On the contrary, ABMs [Agent-based models], especially
those that include stochastic algorithms, require replications that
demonstrate the stability of the results.
In this introduction, I review the philosophical literature on robustness
analysis. This literature has focussed on the use of robustness analysis in
science, hence, the discussion might appear to the reader somewhat removed
from the policy-making domain. However, the aim of this literature survey is
threefold: First, this chapter introduces the conceptual resources on which I
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will rely in this thesis. In particular, it will allow me to introduce the distinc-
tion between measurement and derivational robustness analysis. Second, it
states clearly what I take to be the main arguments for the value of measure-
ment and derivational robustness. This is a necessary step before I can turn
to the application of robustness reasoning to questions in the policy-making
domain. Third, I outline the specific research questions and the main claims
of this thesis.
1.1 The starting point: Levins’s and Wim-
satt’s discussion of robustness
In many contexts, scientists face an object of study that exhibits great com-
plexity. Consider again the UK housing market. The dynamics in this market
are dependent on the actions of current home owners, prospective buyers, the
UK government and local councils, as well on a host of additional factors such
as the health of the UK economy. These factors moreover influence each other
in multiple ways. How should a scientist proceed when she faces the task of
investigating such a complex system?
A natural suggestion would be to build a model that is maximally faithful
to the complexity of the system. If one sought to predict the outcome of a first-
time buyer support scheme, one would construct a model that captures the
various interactions between actors in this market. Levins (1966, p. 421) calls
this the brute force approach. Unfortunately, problems arise when one tries
to build such maximally faithful models. To start, one faces a measurement
problem. It is practically impossible to gather all the data to determine the
parameters of the vast number of equations needed to specify the interactions
between units in these complex systems (Levins 1966, p. 421, Weisberg 2006a,
p. 629). Furthermore, these models will not have analytical solutions which is
potentially detrimental for their use in explanations. An analytical solution is
an explicit description of the dependencies between parts of the model. These
dependencies allow for the identification of explanatory factors (Levins 1966,
p. 421, Weisberg 2006a, p. 630).
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Instead, Levins suggests using multiple, inaccurate models to explore a
phenomenon.2 However, this multi-model approach faces an immediate ques-
tion: Since all of these models are inaccurate, how does one know which
models make trustworthy predictions and which can be used in explanations?
(Weisberg 2006b, p. 731)
Levins suggests examining the robustness of model results instead of se-
lecting a single best model. Although his by now classic paper The Strategy of
Model Building in Population Biology marks the starting point of a systematic
treatment of robustness analysis, the notion of robustness had already been
discussed earlier by philosophers of science.
Pierce (1868, p. 141) remarked the following about the philosophical
method (my emphasis):
Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods,
so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be
subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude
and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one.
When Whewell introduces the notion ‘consilience of induction’, he remarks
that consilience
takes place when one induction, obtained from one class of facts,
coincides with an induction, obtained from a different class of
facts. This consilience is a test of the truth of the theory in which
it occurs. (as quoted in Laudan 1971, p. 369)
Implicit reference to a notion of robustness can also be found in Ayer (1956,
p. 39), who discusses the belief formation process of a historian regarding past
events (my emphasis):
2The two additional claims in Levins (1966) are that three modelling aims, generality,
realism, and precision, cannot be maximised simultaneously and, hence, different modelling
strategies are observable, depending on whether one aims at predicting or explaining a
phenomenon. In the interest of the brevity of the introduction, I am setting these claims
aside.
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(...) if these sources are numerous and independent, and if they
agree with another, he [the historian] will be reasonably confident
that their account of the matter is correct.
Now, according to Levins (1966, p. 423)
(...) even the most flexible models have artificial assumptions.
There is always room for doubt as to whether a result depends on
the essentials of a model or on the details of the simplifying as-
sumptions. (...) Therefore we attempt to treat the same problem
with several alternative models each with different simplifications
but with a common biological assumption. Then, if these mod-
els, despite their different assumptions, lead to similar results we
have what we can call a robust theorem which is relatively free
of the details of the model. Hence our truth is the intersection of
independent lies.
Several points are worth noting. First, this account of robustness is for-
mulated in terms of models. In fact, Levins (1966) discusses the issues of
robustness exclusively in the context of population biology and its use of
mathematical models. Second, Levins connects robust model results with
truth. This led to a debate about how such a seemingly non-empirical form
of confirmation can work. This debate will be taken up below. Third, Levins
does not provide an argument for the link between robustness and truth. In-
stead, he provides examples of robust and non-robust theorem. He shows
that the statement “in an uncertain environment, species will evolve broad
niches and tend toward polymorphism” (Levins 1966, p. 423) is robust since
it follows from three different models, that is, from a fitness set model, a
calculus of variation argument, and a model specifying the genetic system.
As an example of a non-robust theorem, he discusses the claim that “a high
intrinsic rate of increase [the productivity of a population] leads to a smaller
average population” (Levins 1966, p. 427).
Taking Levins (1966) as a starting point, Wimsatt (1981, p. 128) offers
a characterisation of robustness analysis, or, what he treats as synonyms,
methods of multiple determination or triangulation:
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(...) the variants and uses of robustness have a common theme in
the distinguishing of the real from the illusory; the reliable from
the unreliable; the objective from the subjective; the object of
focus from artifacts of perspective; and, in general, that which is
regarded as ontologically and epistemologically trustworthy and
valuable from that which is unreliable, ungeneralizable, worthless,
and fleeting.
According to Wimsatt (1981, p. 128), four steps characterise robustness
analysis. First, a variety of independent derivation, identification, or measure-
ment processes is conducted or analysed. Second, features that are invariant
under these different processes are identified. Third, conditions are searched
under which these invariances prevail. Fourth, failures of invariance are ex-
plained.
Wimsatt discusses a broader notion of robustness than Levins. In partic-
ular, additional modes of derivation (sensory modalities, measurement tech-
niques, experimental procedures) enter the scene. Furthermore, he goes some
way towards specifying the elements of robustness analysis by hinting at fea-
tures that are shared by all types of robustness analysis.
In the next section, I review taxonomies of robustness analysis. The goal
is to identify and characterise more precisely distinct types of inference rules
falling under the broad umbrella of robustness analysis.
1.2 Types of robustness analysis
To the best of my knowledge, Woodward (2006) and Weisberg (2013) provide
the most refined taxonomies of robustness analyses. As I argue below, the
two taxonomies are complementary. According to Woodward (2006, p. 219),
one must distinguish between four types of robustness analysis. I introduce
these four types in this section. In Section 1.3, I discuss the conditions which
need to be in place such that these techniques yield sound inferences. In these
17
two sections I report the state of the discussion in the literature.3
1.2.1 Inferential robustness analysis
Inferential robustness analysis comes into play when one faces an inference
problem of the following kind (Woodward 2006, p. 219): There is a fixed
body of data D and a conclusion S about the truth or falsity of a hypothesis.
Inferences from D to S are only possible given background assumptions Ai.
Background knowledge does not provide strong reasons to choose between
different background assumptions. Inferential robustness analysis assesses
whether S follows under the different Ai. Accordingly, inferential robustness
analysis gives a sense of the evidential warrant of a hypothesis.4 Woodward
(2006, p. 221-222) distinguishes between two ways of making this statement
more precise. Using propositional logic, one can express the task of inferential
robustness analysis as assessing the soundness of the following inference:
A1 ∨ A2 ∨ ... ∨ An
∀i : (Ai&D)⇒ S
S
Using a Bayesian framework, which allows ascribing probabilities to propo-
sitions, one can express the task of inferential robustness analysis as assessing
the soundness of the following inference: Given the background assumptions
Ai contain all relevant assumptions and given that every background assump-
tion from this set implies, together with the data D, that the hypothesis S
should be accepted (i.e., the degree of belief in S is above a threshold level c),
then the hypothesis should be accepted. This can again be put as an inference
scheme:
3Note that this review does not cover the discussion of robustness in decision theory.
To keep the scope of the thesis manageable, I am setting aside this literature on robust
rules for decision making, that is, decision rules that deliver desirable outcomes even under
severe informational constraints (see Hanson and Sargent (2001)’s robust control theory for
an illustration).
4Orzack and Sober (1993, p. 541) discuss this form of robustness analysis under the
heading “robustness within data sets”.
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n∑
i=1
P (Ai|D) = 1
∀i : P (S|Ai, D) ≥ c
P (S|D) ≥ c
Let me now turn to derivational robustness analysis.
1.2.2 Derivational robustness analysis
According to Woodward (2006), derivational robustness analysis comes into
play when one investigates the stability of model derivations. A first sense
of derivational robustness analysis can be formulated with respect to a single
model M that allows the derivation of some claim P . The model contains a set
of assumptions A. Derivational robustness analysis investigates how sensitive
the derivation of P is given different assumptions Ai, that is, whether one can
still derive P given different Ai (Woodward 2006, p. 231). Using propositional
logic, one can express this sense of derivational robustness analysis as assessing
the soundness of the following inference: Given the set A contains all relevant
assumptions and given that every assumption from this set implies, together
with model M , the model result P , then P is the case.5 This can be put as
an inference scheme:
A1 ∨ A2 ∨ ... ∨ An
∀i : (Ai&M)⇒ P
P
Woodward (2006, p. 231) also points out that one can investigate the
stability of model derivations across different models. Instead of changing
the assumptions of a single model, one investigates a set of distinct models.
Models are distinct to the degree that their assumptions differ in a substantial
way, for example, models describe phenomena on different levels or highlight
5I assume that one can speak of the same model even if one has changed some of
the model’s assumptions. As the following discussion will make clear, this liberal way
of individuating models is in line with the discussion in the literature and the scientific
practice.
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different causal factors or mechanisms. In this case, one assesses the soundness
of the following inference: Given the set of models contains all relevant models
Mi and every model of this set implies model result P , then P is the case.
This can be put as an inference scheme:
M1 ∨M2 ∨ ... ∨Mn
∀i : Mi ⇒ P
P
Weisberg (2006b, p. 737) provides a general framework which details the
inference pattern of derivational robustness analysis. This framework allows
separating different phases of derivational robustness analysis. According to
Weisberg, four phases can be distinguished: i) Assessing whether a set of
models allows deriving the same result (named the robust property); ii) if so,
investigating whether the models share a common structure C that allows
deriving the robust property; iii) if so, combine steps i) and ii) to formulate
a robust theorem with the general form “ceteribus paribus, if a [common
structure C] obtains, then [robust property] will obtain”; iv) assessing under
what conditions the relationship between C and the robust property breaks
down.
Weisberg (2013, p. 160-166) allows specifying step iv) further. He elab-
orates that three different ways exist of assessing the stability between the
common structure C and the robust property. To start, one can perform
a parameter robustness analysis, determining if changes to a model’s value
of parameters changes the behaviour of a robust property.6 Furthermore,
structural robustness analysis involves changing the “mechanics of the model”
(Weisberg 2013, p. 161). For mathematical models this involves adding new
terms or altering interactions between existing terms in the model description.
For material models this amounts to physically altering the model. Finally,
representational robustness analysis holds the attributes of the models (i.e.,
its parameters and its structure) fixed but changes the way they are repre-
sented. This is the case when, for example, a material model is replaced by a
6This form of robustness analysis had already been noted by Orzack and Sober (1993,
p. 540). Raerinne (2013, p. 289) classifies this type of analysis as sensitivity analysis.
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mathematical model.
According to Woodward (2006, p. 233) derivational and inferential ro-
bustness analyses are distinct. In contrast to providing an assessment of the
evidential warrant of a hypothesis in light of data, derivational robustness
analysis starts not with data but with a well-defined model (or a set of mod-
els) and investigates the stability of deductions from this model (or set of
models). In my view, it is unclear what this distinction between derivational
and inferential robustness analysis amounts to in the case of the derivational
robustness analysis of a single model. To start, it is unclear from a semantic
point of view, since inferences and derivations subsume the same practices.
Furthermore, looking at the formal representations of derivational and infer-
ential robustness analysis provided by Woodward (2006) shows that the two
patterns imply each other if one replaces the notion ‘data’ D with ‘model’ M :
A1 ∨ A2 ∨ ... ∨ An
∀i : (Ai&D)⇒ P
P
A1 ∨ A2 ∨ ... ∨ An
∀i : (Ai&M)⇒ P
P
Hence, derivational robustness analysis can be viewed as encompassing
inferential robustness analysis as a special case.
1.2.3 Measurement robustness analysis
Measurement robustness analysis comes into play when different measure-
ment results are available to ascertain the truth of a hypothesis. The differ-
ent measurement results are usually connected to questions about the reality
(or artificial nature) of properties. The classic example is Jean Perrin’s de-
termination of the Avogadro number (Woodward 2006, p. 233; Cartwright
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1991, p. 149). He determined the Avogadro number7 via thirteen different
methods, including the theoretical study of Brownian motion, the behaviour
of radioactive bodies, and the movement of ions.
According to Woodward (2006, p. 234-235), there is a crucial difference
between inferential and measurement robustness. In the case of measurement
robustness, there are ideally independent measurement techniques available.
These independent measurement techniques rely on assumptions which are
not conflicting, that is, all of them can be true simultaneously. In the case of
inferential robustness analysis, the different background assumptions usually
conflict.
1.2.4 Causal robustness analysis
Finally, Woodward (2006) introduces the category of causal robustness anal-
ysis. Causal robustness analysis investigates whether a relationship between
variables continues to hold if one manipulates a variable by intervention
(Woodward 2006, p. 235). The idea behind assessing the stability of a rela-
tionship under investigation is an assumption about the nature of causality:
causal relationships between variables, in contrast to mere correlations, re-
main stable under interventions on these variables (Woodward 2006, p. 235).
There are multiple ways of making this idea more precise but most attempts
share the view that the stability does not need to hold with respect to any
conceivable intervention but solely with respect to those interventions that
are relevant for manipulation and control (Woodward 2006, p. 235).
Woodward (2006, p. 235) gives an example from econometrics. Consider
the following regression equation that connects the dependent variable Y with
a set of independent variablesXi (with ai being the corresponding parameters)
and an error term (i):
8
7The Avogadro number is equal to 6.022140857 ∗ 102 atoms or molecules per mole of a
substance.
8I have slightly simplified Woodward’s example for the exposition of causal robustness
analysis.
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Y =
n∑
i=1
aiXi + i
Woodward (2006, p. 235) points out that if this regression equation cap-
tures a causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables,
then this relation should be invariant under some range of manipulation on
the independent variables Xi. The relation is invariant if the dependent vari-
able Y changes according to the regression equation given the manipulations
of Xi.
1.3 Value of robustness
The introductory remarks have made clear that the tool of robustness analysis
should be seen as valuable. However, there are prominent voices of criticism
of robustness analysis. In their stage setting critique of Levins (1966), Orzack
and Sober (1993, p. 539) put forward worries that derivational robustness
analysis is a suspicious form of non-empirical confirmation:
Should the fact that a given group is recognized within a vari-
ety of frameworks [species in a biological taxonomy] be grounds
for increased confidence in its reality? It is worth considering
the possibility that robustness simply reflects something common
among the frameworks and not something about the world those
frameworks seek to describe.
This exact worry is echoed by Sugden (2000, p. 22-23). He remarks the
following:
Notice how this mode of reasoning [robustness analysis] remains in
the world of models (...). It makes inductive inferences from one
or a small number of models to models in general (...). Obviously,
however, it cannot be enough to stay in the world of models. If
the theorist is to make claims about the real-world, there has to
be some link between those two worlds.
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Cartwright (1991, p. 154) voices a similar criticism with respect to econo-
metricians applying derivational robustness analysis:
‘Econometrician X used a linear form, Y a log linear, Z something
else; and the results are the same anyway. Since the results are
so robust, there must be some truth in them.’ But (...) we know
that at the very best one and only one of of these assumptions
can be right. We may look at thirty functional forms, but if God’s
function is number thirty one, the first thirty do not teach us
anything.
These remarks call for a careful discussion of the value of the different
types of robustness. The aim of this section is to describe the current state
of this discussion and to build the ground for identifying key open questions,
which I am going to state in Section 1.4. The main claims of my thesis are
responses to these open questions.
The literature has so far engaged with the value of derivational, measure-
ment and inferential robustness. The main question of attention is whether
robust model results or robust sets of evidence confirm results or hypotheses.
Since there is to the best of my knowledge no literature on the value of causal
robustness that has a similar focus and does not merge with the broader
question of the nature of causality, I am setting this type of robustness aside
here.9
1.3.1 The value of measurement robustness
Why is one justified in believing (or holding a high degree of belief in) a
hypothesis if one is in a situation in which multiple evidential modes assert
the truth of the hypothesis?
9For the sake of completeness, let me flag two further strands of discussion. To start,
Woodward (2006, p. 231) points out that the failure of derivational robustness can gen-
erate new research questions. For example, if two models disagree about a prediction, an
empirical test might be needed to differentiate between the two parameter values in the
respective model description. Furthermore, Wimsatt (1987, p. 7-8) emphasises the value
of robustness analysis as a research strategy. He claims that aiming for robust findings can,
for example, provide a framework for a series of models of increasing realism and complexity
and undercut the too ready acceptance of a preferred hypothesis by scientists.
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The main argument for the confirmatory power of measurement robustness
is akin to the no-miracles argument for scientific realism. Scientific realists
claim that it would be a miracle to have theories that are empirically adequate
to a high degree, if the entities, properties, and relations, that these theories
postulated, did not exist (Putnam 1975, p. 73). In parallel, it would be a
miracle, or, as Cartwright (1991, p. 149) puts it, a “coincidence” to obtain
the same measurement result if there were not an underlying, causally active
phenomenon generating the result (Culp 1995, p. 448; Bycroft 2009, p. 133).10
In terms of its inferential logic, the no-miracles argument is an inference to the
best explanation. The best explanation for the concurrence of measurement
results is the existence of an entity that generates these measurement results
(Eronen 2015, p. 3964; Bycroft 2009, p. 129).
Two attempts can be found in the literature to make this argument more
precise. The first one delineates the domain of application of the no-miracles
argument. If one is in the epistemic situation of knowing (or having an ex-
tremely high degree of confidence in) the reliability of a particular evidential
mode (e.g., a satellite that allows for the measurement of cosmic background
noise), then no further measurement technique is needed. As Cartwright
(1991, p. 151) points out, measurement robustness is a guard against error
in instruments and, hence, if one is confident in having a reliable instrument,
then no guarding against errors is required. Accordingly, measurement ro-
bustness is not a necessary condition for establishing the reality of entities,
properties, or relations (see also Eronen 2015, p. 3968; Schickore and Coko
2013, p. 302).
As a preliminary comment on the second attempt, let me add a note about
the independence of measurements. To gain a handle on this concept, consider
again the classical example of measurement robustness: the determination of
the Avogadro number. As Cartwright (1991, p. 153) puts it:
10There exists also a slightly different version of this argument (see Woodward 2006, p.
234; Cartwright 1991, p. 150): If the measurement techniques are independent, then it is
reasonable to assume that all techniques are vulnerable to different kinds of errors. If so,
then a huge coincidence would be necessary for multiple errors to be operating at the same
time to have produced a wrong result. Hence, if all techniques agree, it is reasonable to
assume that they agree due to measuring a real phenomenon and not an artifact.
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The various different instruments involved [in determining the
Avogadro number] use assumptions which are, in the best case,
wholly independent of each other. (...) [The] independent instru-
ments [are] doing different things (...).
Cartwright (1991, p. 149) further elaborates that the strength of the mea-
surement support for the Avogadro number comes from the fact that different
experimental procedures, with associated different experimental situations,
skills, and assumptions, lead to the same result. This role of independence
is also mentioned by Woodward (2006) and Culp (1995). Woodward (2006,
p. 234) further illuminates the kind of independence involved here by stress-
ing differences in instrument design, operation according to different causal
principles, and different assumptions necessary to interpret data. Culp (1995,
p. 454) identifies three factors for determining the degree of measurement
robustness of a body of data: i) the size of the set of techniques producing
comparable data; ii) the degree to which different measurement techniques
rely on different assumptions to interpret the raw data; iii) for each measure-
ment technique, the degree to which its assumptions are dependent on the
theory of the object of measurement.
Let me now turn to the second attempt to make the no-miracles argu-
ment more precise. It is Bayesian in nature. Why is diverse evidence more
valuable than evidence from a single source? The key task this attempt faces
is spelling out a notion of independence in probabilistic terms that is not
prone to counter-examples. Full-blown statistical independence is too much,
since there can be correlation between measurement devices that are different
in important ways (e.g., thermometers that are based on different physical
principles, such as mercury or air pressure, give readings that are statistically
correlated) (Eronen 2015, p. 3969). Franklin and Howson (1984, p. 52) define
independence in terms of less than perfect correlation between measurement
techniques. Two measurement procedures are less than perfectly correlated
if the respective results produced from the same input data are less than per-
fectly correlated. Roughly, results are less than perfectly correlated if there
is a difference in the posterior probability value of two measurement results
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from different procedures given a series of the same previous measurement
results. For two test procedures E and E ′ and corresponding series of results
e1, e2, ..., en and e
′
1, e
′
2, ..., e
′
m, less than perfect correlation of results can be
defined more precisely as follows. If and only if, for all m > m0, for some m0:
P (em+1|e1 ∧ e2 ∧ ... ∧ em) > P (e′m+1|e1 ∧ e2 ∧ ... ∧ em)
and for all n > n0, for some n0:
P (e′n+1|e′1 ∧ e′2 ∧ ... ∧ e′n) > P (en+1|e′1 ∧ e′2 ∧ ... ∧ e′n)
then the two experimental procedures E and E ′ are less than perfectly
correlated (Franklin and Howson 1984, p. 52).
If these two conditions hold, then it can be shown that the marginal in-
crease of the posterior probability of a hypothesis is larger if the additional
experimental result comes from a different experimental procedure compared
to the case in which the additional experimental result comes from the same
experimental procedure (Franklin and Howson 1984, p. 52). Without going
into the details of alternative attempts to flesh out this Bayesian analysis11,
let me note a problem with this formal account of independence. As Collins
(1984, p. 172) points out, in many episodes of experimental scientific practice,
scientists have disagreed substantially about the (dis)similarity of experimen-
tal procedures.12
Schupbach (2016) has recently proposed an alternative Bayesian account
of evidential diversity. Schupbach (2016, p. 13) defines evidential diversity
in terms of alternative explanations for the evidence that are ruled out. A
set of evidence is more diverse than another, if it was generated by means of
determination that allowed the ruling out of more alternatives or competing
11See Fitelson (2001) and Sober (1989) for further discussion.
12The discussion of formal accounts of independence is kept deliberately short here. For
example, see Schupbach (2016, p. 6-12) for a discussion on reliability and confirmational
independence. Reliability independence defines independence as the situation in which
each means of determination is or is not reliable independent of each other. This notion
underlines Wimmsatt’s chain argument for measurement robustness: A linear chain of
justification cannot be stronger than its weakest link. In contrast, a web of independent
lines of justification is no weaker than its strongest member (Schupbach 2016, p. 8).
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explanations. He defends this criterion, which he makes formally precise, by
showing that it captures the ongoing scientific practice and that it is norma-
tively compelling, that is, it accounts for the special normative status that is
ascribed to robustness analysis (Schupbach 2016, p. 6).
Stegenga (2009) is not convinced by these attempts to strengthen the ar-
gument for the value of measurement robustness analysis. To start, he argues
that it is unclear how to individuate different modes of evidence (Stegenga
2012, p. 14-16). In particular, existing accounts of separating evidential
modes are not satisfactory: Culp (1995)’s stressing of theory-ladenness is
problematic, since not all evidence is theory-laden to the same extent and one
can have one theory but still two different modes of evidence. Reference to all
background assumptions does not do the trick either since it is not clear what
background assumptions are relevant for establishing independence. Refer-
ence to the problematic background assumptions requires that one has a way
of identifying what the problematic background assumptions are in the respec-
tive measurement techniques. In addition, concordant multi-modal evidence
does not necessarily give the correct answer. To put it bluntly, coincidences
can occur and wrong inferences about the existence of an entity can be the
consequence. Stegenga (2009, p. 652-653) mentions the case study of the
mesosome in cellular biology, where electron and light microscopes supported
the existence of these cell components.13 Finally, and most importantly in
Stegenga’s view, multi-modal evidence is usually not concordant, that is, ro-
bust, but the different modes of determination point in different directions.
It is far from clear what one should do in these situations and, according
to him, robustness analysis is worthless in providing much-needed guidance
(Stegenga 2009, p. 654). He distinguishes between two types of discordant
evidence: discordant evidence can either be inconsistent, when the evidence
bears on the very same hypothesis (e.g., Petri dish suggests x and test tube
suggests ¬x); or incongruent, when the background assumptions in the differ-
ent evidential modalities do not cohere and, consequently, the modes produce
evidence statements formulated in two non-translatable languages (Stegenga
2009, p. 654).
13Interpretation of this case study is hugely contested. See Culp (1994) for a discussion.
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Hey (2015, p. 70-71)’s response to Stegenga helpfully clarifies the issue
at stake here. First, if evidence is discordant, this might simply be because
different modalities are capturing different mechanisms at play (Hey 2015,
60). Second, one must distinguish between the method of robustness analysis
and the state of having robust results (Hey 2015, 70-71). Although robustness
analysis cannot tell us what to believe in situations of discordant multi-modal
evidence, it helps to generate new hypotheses that one can investigate. So,
to be precise, the debate concerns what to believe in the situation of dis-
cordant multi-modal evidence regarding the working of the same mechanism
underlying a phenomenon.
1.3.2 The value of derivational robustness
Why is one justified in believing (or holding a high degree of belief in) a
hypothesis when a class of models implies this hypothesis? A discussion on
the confirmatory import of derivational robustness analysis has occupied the
largest part of the literature on robustness analysis.
The starting point of the discussion was marked by Orzack and Sober
(1993). They argued that derivational robustness analysis is a type of non-
empirical confirmation and, hence, that it is suspicious (Orzack and Sober
1993, p. 544). They start from the formal representation of derivational
robustness analysis which involves multiple models (recall that Mi denotes
the ith member of a set of models and P a model derivation):
M1 ∨M2 ∨ ... ∨Mn
∀i : Mi ⇒ P
P
According to Orzack and Sober (1993), exploring the first premise (M1 ∨
M2 ∨ ... ∨ Mn) shows that derivational robustness analysis does not have
confirmatory power. The inference from the two premises to the conclusion
is sound if and only if one knows that at least one of the models Mi is true.
In practice, this is not the prevalent epistemic state (see also Parker 2011, p.
583). If one knows that all of them are false, then robustness of the result
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across the models does not establish and needs not support the truth of the
conclusion. If one is unsure whether one of the models is true, then one
again has no assurance that the conclusion is true (Orzack and Sober 1993,
p. 538-539).
The problem with this objection is that this formal representation of
derivational robustness analysis is a shorthand in an important respect. Each
model Mi must be understood as a set of assumptions. This set of assump-
tions can contain true and false statements. Hence, although a model might
be a literally false description of a target system (because it contains at least
one false assumption), there can still be a substantial overlap of the respective
true assumptions of the models. Accordingly, it is not prima facie clear that
one cannot gain some insights from the robustness of a derivation from a set
of literally false models. In particular, this would be the case if the falsehoods
in the models could be understood as irrelevant falsehoods with respect to
a target system.14 The upshot here is that, in the context of derivational
robustness analysis, one should not be ascribing truth values to entire models
but to model assumptions (Weisberg 2006b, p. 733; Levins 1993, p. 553).15
To make the subsequent discussion more concrete, let me introduce an
example of a model result that is widely accepted as being robust: the Volterra
property in population biology.
The Volterra property was derived with the help of the Lotka-Volterra
model of predation. Predation is an extensively studied phenomenon in ecol-
ogy since it is one of the key forces that keeps a population under the carry-
ing capacity of an environment (Weisberg and Reisman 2008, p. 108). Put
simply16, the model consists of two negative coupled differential equations
describing the evolution of the prey and predator populations respectively.
The model depicts this evolution as an undampened oscillation. Accordingly,
the prey and predator population grow out of phase with each other, that is,
an increase in the prey population increases the number of predators which
14I am going to elaborate on this point below.
15Interestingly, in a recent contribution Hands (2016, p. 44) suggests that derivational
robustness analysis can increase our confidence in models as a whole. However, he provides
no argument for why the confirmatory import should be attributed to models as a whole.
16The model is introduced in more detail in Chapter 4.
30
in turn drives down the number of prey (Weisberg and Reisman 2008, p.
112). Given this model, one can derive algebraically the Volterra property
which states that “a general biocide, any substance that has a harmful effect
on both predators and prey, will increase the relative abundance of the prey
population.” (Weisberg and Reisman 2008, p. 113). The Volterra property
can be derived from a wide range of parameter values for the two differential
equations (Weisberg and Reisman 2008, p. 115), from structurally different
models (e.g., a model with an upper boundary for the environment’s carrying
capacity, Weisberg and Reisman 2008, p. 119), and models that use a dif-
ferent way of representing the attributes of the model (e.g., an agent-based
computational model of the coupled predator-prey interaction, Weisberg and
Reisman 2008, p. 128). Then, the key question is whether the fact that
the Volterra property is a robust model result confers confirmation onto the
Volterra property? Three preliminary remarks can make this question more
precise.
First, there are clear cases in which this question is irrelevant because
there are other sources of confirmation that are providing the confirmation
for a hypothesis by themselves. If one has such confirming evidence for the
property, for example in the form of observations about biocides in actual
predator-prey ecosystems, then derivational robustness analysis is beside the
point with respect to the question of confirmation of the property (Lehtinen
2016, p. 1; Orzack and Sober 1993, p. 541). Hence, the question should be
re-formulated as follows: In the case of no direct evidence for the hypothesis
of interest, does derivational robustness confer confirmation onto this hypoth-
esis?
Second, one confirmatory function of derivational robustness analysis is
widely accepted in the literature. It involves confirmation in a rather trivial
sense. What derivational robustness analysis does confirm are claims about
the relative importance of various assumptions of a model with respect to the
model result of interest (Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 543; Muldoon 2007, p. 882;
Odenbaugh and Alexandrova 2011, p. 765; Weisberg 2006a, p. 643; Weisberg
and Reisman 2008, p. 106). Take the Lotka-Volterra model for example. It
turns out to be the case that if one introduces a carrying capacity of the envi-
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ronment, the property of the undamped oscillation disappears (Weisberg and
Reisman 2008, p. 118). Hence, derivational robustness analysis allows deter-
mining that assumptions about the effect of population density are relevant
for the property of undamped oscillations.
Third, Lisciandra (2016, p. 7) highlights the distinction between de-
idealisation and derivational robustness analysis. In a de-idealisation model
assumptions are replaced with more realistic assumptions. It is not necessarily
the case that in a process of derivational robustness analysis assumptions are
replaced by more realistic ones (see also Odenbaugh and Alexandrova 2011,
p. 759; Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 558). In the case of the Volterra property,
it might be that an agent-based representation of predator prey interactions
contains the same number of, or even more, idealisations (or idealises certain
aspects of this interaction to a higher degree). Hence, one cannot presume
that derivational robustness analysis confers a degree of confirmation onto
robust properties via a process of approximating a more realistic model of
a phenomenon of interest (Lisciandra 2016, p. 8). Consequently, the ques-
tion about the confirmatory import of derivational robustness analysis in its
sharpest form can be put as follows: In the case of no direct evidence for
the hypothesis of interest and the absence of a de-idealisation of the model
under investigation, does derivational robustness confer confirmation onto the
robust hypothesis?
Broadly speaking, there are two arguments in the literature that support
an affirmative answer to this question. I will discuss them in turn.
The first argument: Confirmation via direct comparison
Kuorikoski et al. (2010) argue that derivational robustness analysis in itself
cannot confer confirmation onto robust model results. A comparison be-
tween the model and empirical information about a target system is needed
(Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 549, 551; see Forber 2010, p. 38 for a defence
of the same claim). However, they argue that derivational robustness analy-
sis can play a vital role in such an empirical process of confirmation. To see
this, they differentiate between three types of model assumptions: Substantial
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assumptions, which describe a set of causal factors or mechanisms; Galilean
assumptions, which isolate the working of the causal factors or mechanisms by
idealising away additional causal factors; and tractability assumptions, which
are assumptions that are empirically not well motivated but which facilitate
the derivation of results (Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 547).17 According to
Kuorikoski et al. (2010, p. 548), in derivational robustness analysis you aim
to show that the result of interest (e.g., the Volterra property) is driven by
substantial and not by tractability assumptions. If there is evidence for the
truth of the substantial assumptions with respect to a target system, then
the robust model result is confirmed (Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 552; see also
Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009, p. 127).
Lehtinen (2016, p. 5) defends a more refined version of this claim. He
argues that this type of confirmation does not only occur if one has direct
evidence for the substantial assumptions, but also in the case of indirect evi-
dence, that is, evidence supporting the assumptions that allow deriving both
this evidence claim and the robust model result. According to this first ap-
proach to the confirmatory power of derivational robustness analysis, “there
is nothing dubiously non-empirical or Mu¨nchhausen-like in the epistemic im-
port of robustness analysis” (Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 551). Justus (2012, p.
800-801) helpfully captures this first approach as follows: “robust theorems
establish conduits through which empirical support for C [the substantial as-
sumptions driving the result] can transmit to R [the robust model result].”18
Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011, p. 763-764) take issue with this ap-
proach. They claim that showing that one has arrived at a theorem that is
derivationally robust with respect to the tractability assumption is not suffi-
17This tripartite is not as clear-cut as it might seem. The same assumption can fall into
different categories given different epistemic contexts. For example, the assumption of zero
transportation costs can be a Galilean idealisation in a model of international trade. The
very same assumption can also be a substantial assumption if one models the informational
transmission capacities of computer networks (see Musgrave 1981’s influential discussion of
this point in relation to Friedman’s instrumentalism and Hands 2016, p. 38).
18Weisberg draws attention to an underlying assumption of this view of the relationship
between robust theorems and target systems. One needs to assume that one can represent
the dynamic of a system via mathematical functions (Weisberg 2006b, p. 740-741; Weisberg
2013, p. 168). He calls this “low level confirmation” without which one could not even
connect model results to target phenomena.
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cient to lead to an adequate representation of the causal mechanism operating
in a target system. For if you replace one tractability assumption with another
idealised one, it might be the case that no causal relationship is represented.
To represent a causal relationship, all the false assumptions that go into the
formulation of the robust theorem must be replaced with true ones (Oden-
baugh and Alexandrova 2011, p. 764). Consider the Volterra property again,
but this time embedded in the Volterra principle (Weisberg 2013, p. 159):
Ceteribus paribus, if a two-species, predator-prey system is nega-
tively coupled, then a general biocide will increase the abundance
of the prey and decrease the abundance of predators.
What one needs to show according to Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011,
p. 764) is that there is some set of true auxiliary assumptions (involving
tractability and Galilean assumptions) under which the relationship between
coupled predator-prey systems and a general biocide holds. According to
them, unless one specifies correctly a causal mechanism, the supposed increase
of confidence should not take place. In particular, they argue that it is not
enough to show, as Kuorikoski et al. (2010, p. 561-562) claim, that the
assumptions that allow one to derive this relationship are independent in
the sense that they are unlikely to give rise to the same failure of inference.
Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011, p. 762-763) are not convinced, since
this explicit reference to one version of the no-miracles argument in defence
of measurement robustness overlooks that models are substantially different
from experimental modes of determination (see also Eronen 2015, p. 3965).19
Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011)’s conclusion is that derivational ro-
bustness should not be regarded as a tool of confirmation. Rather, they see
derivational robustness analysis as a method of discovery. For derivational
robustness analysis allows refining what they call “open formulas” by updat-
ing conditions under which the purported causal relationship holds. Open
19Lisciandra (2016, p. 11-14) raises an additional worry. It might be the case that one
cannot change tractability assumptions in isolation. Since tractability assumptions are
introduced to make the mathematics work, they are likely to come as interrelated sets of
assumptions.
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formulas are rough templates for causal claims and can be expressed as fol-
lows: “In a situation x with some characteristics that may or may not include
[conditions] (C1, ..., Cn), a certain feature F causes a certain behaviour B”
(Odenbaugh and Alexandrova 2011, p. 769-770). Accordingly, derivational
robustness analysis disciplines our background knowledge in a formally precise
way and facilitates the empirical confirmation of causal claims (Odenbaugh
and Alexandrova 2011, p. 770).
Let me now turn to the second argument that ascribes confirmatory power
to derivational robustness. In my view, it is this argument that is the target
of the prominent attacks of Orzack and Sober (1993) and Sugden (2000) on
derivational robustness analysis.
The second argument: Confirmation via covering the space of pos-
sibilities
Despite stressing the fact that there cannot be confirmation through deriva-
tional robustness analysis without direct empirical confirmation of parts of a
robust theorem, one can find passages in Weisberg that suggest confirmation
without such direct empirical information. Here is the passage that I have in
mind (Weisberg 2006b, p. 739):
Explaining a real-world phenomenon or predicting its occurrence
requires us to know that the common structure is actually be-
ing instantiated and that no other causal factor is preempting
the efficacy of the common structure. One way to determine if
the common structure is being instantiated and if any preempting
causes are present is to conduct an empirical investigation. While
this is the most reliable way to ensure that a robust theorem can
be applied, it is often impractical or impossible to collect the rel-
evant data. In fact, robustness analysis is usually introduced in
situations in which data are hard to obtain. Fortunately, there
is an alternative that, while not completely reliable, can give us
good reasons to believe the predictions and explanations of robust
theorems.
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Weisberg claims that this alternative involves answering two questions
that robustness analysis can partially answer: “1. How frequently is the com-
mon structure instantiated in the relevant kind of system? 2. How equal do
things have to be in order for the core structure to give rise to the property?”
(Weisberg 2006b, p. 739). According to Weisberg, the first question can be
answered if one assesses how diverse the set of models is that are consid-
ered and that share the common structure. If this set is sufficiently diverse,
then “it is very likely that the real-world phenomenon has a corresponding
causal structure” (Weisberg 2006b, p. 739). Unfortunately, Weisberg does
not give an account of the heterogeneity or diversity of models. As Orzack
and Sober (1993, p. 539) make clear, this question is not trivial. Being able to
say whether a set of models is sufficiently diverse presupposes a handle on the
question of how the dependency relation between models should be expressed.
In Orzack and Sober (1993)’s view, two salient attempts to make this notion
more precise fail. First, model independence cannot be understood as logical
independence. Logical independence of two propositions is given if neither
of the two implies the truth or falsity of the other. The problem is that in
applications of derivational robustness analysis one looks at competing mod-
els (involving contradictory assumptions) (see also Cartwright 1991, p. 154;
Bycroft 2009, p. 136; Schupbach 2016, p. 7). Second, it is problematic to
understand model independence in terms of statistical independence since for
this one needs to be able to specify the space of models, ensure that the mod-
els can be viewed as a non-overlapping partition of this space, and ascribe
probabilities to the elements of this space. If one is not a Bayesian, the last
task might already pose a problem (Orzack and Sober 1993, p. 539).
The second question, Weisberg claims, can be answered by conducting a
stability analysis of the robust theorem. Since this is already part of Weis-
berg’s four step process of robustness analysis, this information is readily
available. If the robust theorem is stable, that is, the link between the com-
mon structure and the result persists against perturbations, then one can
expect the effectiveness of the causal structure in the target system (Weis-
berg 2006b, p. 740).
Although this idea is no longer present in his most recent contribution to
36
the topic (see Weisberg 2013), the alternative view that derivational robust-
ness analysis can be confirmatory without direct evidence for the common
causal structure in a robust theorem has been picked up by others (see Justus
2012, p. 801). In particular, Parker (2011)’s discussion of the significance of
robust model predictions can be viewed as a contribution to this question.
Parker (2011) asks under what conditions robustness of model results have
special epistemic merit in the sense that there is a higher likelihood of truth,
increased confidence, or increased security of the hypothesis upon which all
the models agree. I will not discuss her leading case study – multi-ensemble
climate modelling – since this will be taken up in Chapter 2. The upshot
of her paper is that model agreement does not justify a higher likelihood of
truth, increased confidence, or increased security in the hypothesis. Model
agreement on a hypothesis H in the case of climate models does not increase
the likelihood of truth of H (Parker 2011, p. 584), because the ensemble
of models is an “ensemble of opportunity” and does not accurately reflect
structural model and parameter uncertainty (Parker 2011, p. 585). Model
agreement on H also does not justifiably increase our confidence in H given
E. Given a Bayesian analysis, confidence in H increases if and only if P (E |
H) > P (E | ¬H). Since one only has a limited understanding of the climate
systems, and hence, of the limitations of the state of the art climate models,
one cannot give an argument for why this inequality must hold (Parker 2011,
p. 591). Furthermore, a sample-based argument for this inequality also fails
(Parker 2011, p. 593). Assume you have a set of climate models that each
satisfy a quality threshold criterion. Now draw a random sample from this
set and evaluate what fraction of these models indicates the truth of H. This
fraction then is a proxy for the fraction of models in the initial set that indicate
the truth of H. The problem with this approach is again that the ensemble
is a not a random sample but an ensemble of opportunity (Parker 2011, p.
594).
These problems point towards an assumption that needs to be in place
for non-empirical derivational robustness having confirmatory import: the
models that are evaluated in the analysis need to span the space of possible
models. Possible models is a vague notion here but it can be made – in a
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first step – more precise as follows: The space of possible models can be
spanned by exploring possible model structures (i.e., alternative substantial
assumptions) and possible parameter values. Without such an assumption
in place, it is not clear that one has answered convincingly either one of the
two questions raised by Weisberg (2006b). Making this assumption explicit,
immediately prompts the question as to what happens to the epistemic import
of derivational robustness analysis if only a subset of this model space can be
explored (see Weisberg 2006a, p. 641 for a similar point). In his response
to Orzack and Sober, Levins (1993, p. 553) suggests that the more of the
possibility space is covered, the higher the confidence should be in the robust
model result. However, Levins mentions this only in passing and does not
give a detailed argument for this claim.
1.3.3 The value of inferential robustness
Why is one justified in believing (or holding a high degree of belief in) a
hypothesis when one is in a situation in which multiple ways of inferring a
hypothesis from a data set are in agreement?
Recall that Woodward (2006) provided two formulations of the inference
pattern (see Section 1.2.1). These formulations suggest that two conditions
need to be in place such that the link between robustness and truth or high
probability of a hypothesis is warranted (Woodward 2006, p. 221):
Completeness condition The set of auxiliary assumptions A contains the
true auxiliary assumption Ak.
Robustness condition The evidence together with every individual ele-
ment of the set of auxiliary assumptions allows inferring the hypothesis
S or confers a posterior probability onto S that is above a specified
degree of belief threshold.
Taken together, these two conditions provide sufficient conditions for the
link between robustness of a result and its truth (or high probability) (Wood-
ward 2006, p. 221). However, it is unclear what happens to the value of
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the inference patterns if one relaxes the completeness or robustness condition
(Woodward 2006, p. 222-223). As Woodward (2006, p. 222) points out,
in many real-world applications of robustness analysis, one or both of these
conditions fail to hold.
Let us assume that completeness holds but robustness fails. In this sce-
nario, only a few auxiliary assumptions allow inferring a particular hypothesis
(or confer the required degree of belief in its truth). Woodward (2006) seems
to suggest that our confidence could increase in parallel to the size of the set
of auxiliary assumptions that allow inferring the result (or confer the required
degree of belief in its truth). However, he quickly adds that this inference is
only warranted if the probability mass is not concentrated on a few auxiliary
assumptions for which the robustness condition does not hold.
Or consider the case in which robustness holds but completeness fails. This
case is not discussed by Woodward (2006). However, one can shed light on
this case by extending the parallel to the scenario of derivational robustness
analysis. Accordingly, the criticism of Orzack and Sober (1993) is also relevant
for the case of inferential robustness. A failure of completeness can, hence,
be interpreted in two ways. Either one knows that none of the auxiliary
assumptions supporting the inference is true or that one of the assumptions
might be true. In both cases, it is not clear what the epistemic import of
robustness analysis is. Naturally, the situation seems to be even less clear if
both the completeness and the robustness condition fail to hold.
1.4 Taking stock and the main claims of the
thesis
Let me take stock of the discussion so far. First, I revisit the taxonomy of
robustness analysis put forward by Woodward (2006). Second, I revisit the
arguments provided for the value of different types of robustness. As I go
along, I flag the key questions that need to be addressed to assess the value of
robustness analysis for evidence-based policy-making and state the responses
that I will defend in the rest of this thesis.
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As I have argued in the discussion of Woodward’s taxonomy, inferential ro-
bustness analysis can be regarded as a special case of derivational robustness
analysis. Hence, moving forward, I focus on derivational and measurement
robustness analysis. The introductory examples of evidence-based policy-
making suggested that both of these types of robustness analysis are prima
facie relevant for policy-making. I will argue that derivational and measure-
ment robustness analysis, in fact, play prominent roles in climate as well as
economic policy-making. At this point, a natural question is the following:
First research question Do measurement and derivational robustness anal-
ysis exhaust the set of useful types of robustness analysis?
Eronen (2015, p. 3965) and Wimsatt (1981, p. 139, 144) view measure-
ment and derivational robustness analysis as the fundamental types of this
inference technique. I will argue that in relation to policy-making a further
category of robustness consideration is useful: the stability of model results
across different (types of) target systems. A model result is robust in this
sense if it is instantiated across a number of target systems that differ sub-
stantially in their composition. I am going to call this type of robustness
predictive stability. I show that toy models, on which economic policy-making
relies, display predictive stability. This stability requirement can also be ex-
pressed in the form of an inference scheme. Let i be an index defined over a
set of n target systems (i = 1, ..., k, ..., n) that differ substantially in their
composition and P (k) be the statement that the model result P holds for
target system k, then predictive stability expresses the following inference:
M ⇒ P
∀i : P (i)
Let me now turn to the assessment of the value of robustness analysis.
From the point of view of using robustness reasoning in policy-making, there is
one pressing question: Are derivational and measurement robustness analysis
sound inference techniques?
Let me start with derivational robustness analysis. The literature review
presented two arguments for the confirmatory power of this type of robust-
40
ness. The first argument goes roughly like this: If robustness analysis shows
that model results are driven by substantial model assumptions about causal
factors or mechanisms, and there is evidence for these causal factors or mecha-
nisms, then these results can be regarded as confirmed. The second argument
goes roughly like this: If model results are robust across a set of models that
accurately represent the space of relevant possibilities, then these results can
be regarded as confirmed.
In my view, both of these arguments provide a sound foundation for the
value of robustness analysis, that is, both inference patterns can convey confir-
mation on hypotheses given that the conditions laid out in the inference pat-
terns are met. However, the two arguments describe derivational robustness
analysis’ role in confirmation differently. In the first argument, derivational
robustness plays an indirect role in confirmation. According to this argu-
ment, robustness considerations can establish the fact that a model result
is driven by substantial assumptions about the causal structure of a system.
The confirmation is then provided by model-independent evidence on the cor-
respondence of the causal structure postulated by the model and the one in
the target system. Whereas, in the second argument, derivational robustness
plays a more direct role in confirmation. Given that a set of models covers
the relevant possibility space and the model results are in agreement, then
the model result of interest is confirmed. In my view, the second argument is
more relevant for evidence-based policy-making. For policy-makers often lack
precise information about the causal structure of a target system. Consider
again the case of the UK housing market. One problem of designing effec-
tive housing policy is precisely that it is unclear what factors determine the
effectiveness of new regulation or subsidies.
However, with respect to this second argument, the review of the literature
revealed two questions:
Second research question What is the value of derivational robustness
analysis if not the entire relevant model space is covered by the available
models?
I will argue that derivational robustness analysis can still have value if less
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than the entire relevant model space is covered. Its value consists in the fact
that it provides the resources to assess in a structured way how much of the
relevant possibility space is covered by a model ensemble. This fact can be
used to formulate preference relations over automated evidence aggregation
procedures in medical policy-making. The other question that emerged from
the literature review is the following:
Third research question What should one do if the model results are non-
robust, that is, the model derivations are not in agreement?
I will argue that one must distinguish between problematic and unprob-
lematic forms of a lack of derivational robustness where problematic cases are
those that alter the lesson that must be drawn from a model substantially.
With respect to problematic cases of a lack of derivational robustness, I show
that one still can gain a form of conceptual learning or an uncertainty indica-
tion about values of variables in a target system. However, I will claim that
these two types of insights are only of limited use for economic policy-making.
Let me now turn to measurement robustness analysis. The literature re-
view has shown that an inference to the best explanation backs up the confir-
matory import of measurement robustness: It would be a miracle if different
ways of determining the truth of a hypothesis are all in agreement if the
hypothesis were not true. The review also revealed that this no-miracle ar-
gument depends on a crucial assumption: the assumption that the different
modes of determination are in fact independent from each other to a suffi-
cient degree. Articulating this independence condition in a technically precise
way has proven difficult. However, even if one does not attempt to provide
a probabilistic characterisation of this independence condition, looking ahead
to policy applications of measurement robustness analysis clearly presupposes
that one has at least some practical, tangible guidelines to assess the indepen-
dence of modes of evidence.20 Going back to the initial example of medical
20In my view, it is the context of these concrete applications of measurement robustness
analysis in which one can address Stegenga’s complaint that the individuation of evidential
modes is problematic. As will become clear across the case studies discussed in this thesis, in
practical applications the different evidential modes can be straightforwardly individuated.
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policy in the UK and my comments about evidence-based medicine reveals
that in many policy contexts one particular mode of evidence, that is, ex-
pert opinion, plays a crucial role. The voice of prominent medical experts
was a major factor behind the ongoing practice of bloodletting until the 19th
century and the evidence-based medicine movement was introduced against
the backdrop of what was called “expert based medicine” (Smith and Rennie
2014, p. 2). It appears that expert knowledge is often a key ingredient in the
evidence mix that underlies policy decisions. Hence, one key question that
emerges is the following:
Fourth research question How should one conceptualise the relation be-
tween expert knowledge and the evidence basis when one applies the
framework of measurement robustness?
I shall argue that expert knowledge can only under special circumstances
be viewed as a separate evidential mode that stands on a par with other ev-
idential modes (such as observations or model outputs). For the main part,
however, expert knowledge should not be viewed as separate to evidential con-
siderations but rather as a type of knowledge necessary to address questions
that arise when one applies the measurement robustness framework; questions
such as whether evidential modes are independent and whether they are of
high quality.
As with respect to derivational robustness analysis, the literature survey
has made clear that measurement robustness can fail to hold. A natural re-
action to this epistemic predicament is to suspend one’s judgement about
the hypotheses for which no robust evidence can be brought forward. How-
ever, particularly in policy-making contexts, one cannot always suspend one’s
judgement until the evidence is in agreement. It might simply be too costly
to gather additional evidence that could resolve the disagreement or the time
constraint might be such that one needs to decide based on a non-robust
evidence set. Hence, the following question emerges:
Fifth research question What should one do if one faces a situation of
non-robust evidence from multiple evidential sources?
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I will argue that, in such a situation, selecting a theory or a model that
underlie or constitute parts of the evidence set can be a reasonable action
and I provide a procedure to make this choice in a rationally defensible way.
This procedure suggests a way of seeing theory or model choices in a cardinal
context, that is, a context in which information is available in the form of
equally spaced units along a scale without a predefined zero point. Once
this cardinal context is established, one can apply scoring rules, a tool from
social choice theory, to make a choice. Scoring rules allow the aggregation
of information from multiple criteria that are deemed relevant for the choice
problem.
To summarise, here are my five research questions:
1. Do measurement and derivational robustness analysis exhaust the set
of useful types of robustness analysis?
2. What is the value of derivational robustness analysis if not the entire
relevant model space is covered by the available models?
3. What should one do if the model results are non-robust, that is, the
model derivations are not in agreement?
4. How should one conceptualise the relation between expert knowledge
and the evidence basis when one applies the framework of measurement
robustness?
5. What should one do if one faces a situation of non-robust evidence from
multiple evidential sources?
The chapter plan in the following section lays out how and in what order I
approach these research questions. As will become clear, I do not address these
five research questions in the order I have introduced them. This is because I
have organised the chapters to reflect the policy domains of climate, medical
and economic policy-making. I opted for this structure because, in my view,
the questions do not suggest an order in which they should be addressed
and the focus on policy domains emphasises the practical orientation of my
inquiry.
44
1.5 Thesis outline
In Chapter 2, I look at the case of climate policy-making to address the
fourth research question: How should one conceptualise the relation between
expert knowledge and the evidence basis when one applies the framework of
measurement robustness? In its most recent assessment report, the IPCC
presented an updated version of the uncertainty framework. This framework
is supposed to provide a unified approach to assessing and communicating
uncertainties about predictions of climate variables, explanations of climate
phenomena, as well as adaption and mitigation scenarios. The notion of a
body of evidence, which is robust in a measurement robustness sense, figures
prominently in this uncertainty framework. In this chapter, I analyse this
uncertainty framework and argue that even a charitable interpretation of it
faces substantial problems. These substantial problems allow me to delineate
the relation between expert knowledge and the evidence basis in the context
of a particular policy question. I argue that expert knowledge can only under
special circumstances be viewed as a separate evidential mode that stands on
a par with other evidential modes (such as observations or model outputs).
Generally, however, expert knowledge should not be viewed as separate from
evidential considerations.
In Chapter 3, I look at the case of medical policy-making to address the
second research question: What is the value of derivational robustness analy-
sis if not the entire relevant model space is covered by the available models?
Recently, there has been a growing number of automated evidence aggregation
procedures. My leading case study is Hunter and Williams (2012)’s proposal
of a fully automated algorithm that inputs medical studies and yields treat-
ment suggestions for a specific patient class. I argue that it is not clear how
such automated evidence aggregation procedures should be assessed and I
suggest a new way of conducting such evaluation. In particular, I argue that
derivational robustness analysis can be a fruitful tool to determine the opti-
mal extent of automation. Derivational robustness analysis turns out to be a
structured way of establishing a preference relation over different algorithm
designs by focussing on the amount of relevant possibility space. Due to the
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analogy between algorithms and models, this analysis shows that derivational
robustness analysis provides a structured way of forming preference relations
over different model structures.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I look at the case of economic policy-making. In
Chapter 4, I address the first research question: Do measurement and deriva-
tional robustness analysis exhaust the set of useful types of robustness anal-
ysis? One aspect, certainly not the only one, of economic policy-making is
its reliance on theoretical models. In fact, a significant part of economic
policy-making uses theoretical models that are extremely idealised and sim-
ple. These models, often called toy models, have recently received growing
attention in the philosophy of science literature. I provide a new characterisa-
tion of this model class that consists of a manipulability, multiple realisability
and a hybrid-representation condition. The multiple realisability condition
expresses a new form of robustness, that is, the stability of model results
across different (types of) target systems.
In Chapter 5, I address the third research question: What should one do
if the model results are non-robust, that is, the model derivations are not in
agreement? I use my characterisation of toy models to show that these type
of models provide two distinct forms of non-explanatory learning: conceptual
learning from a toy model and descriptive learning with a toy model. Having
a clear grasp of these two types of learning allows me to argue that even
non-robust model results can have epistemic value.
In Chapter 6, I address the fifth research question: What should one do if
one faces a situation of non-robust evidence from multiple evidential sources?
Given that a set of evidence can fail to be robust in a measurement robustness
sense, one might need to choose a model or a theory that underlies the set of
evidence. This brings into focus the question of how one should choose be-
tween theories and models. Recently, Okasha (2011) argued that such theory
(or model) choice faces a predicament: Arrow’s impossibility result. Arrow’s
impossibility result is the most famous result in social choice theory and can
be put, roughly as follows: Given a set of plausible assumptions, there ex-
ists no aggregation function that maps individual preferences to a collective
preference that is a weak ordering. Okasha (2011) argued that Arrow’s im-
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possibility result is relevant for the problem of theory choice: How should one
evaluate a set of competing theories (or models and hypotheses) in light of
epistemic virtues such as simplicity, accuracy, scope, fruitfulness, or consis-
tency? In this chapter, I propose a solution to Okasha (2011)’s challenge. In
a nutshell, the solution consists in offering a new way of thinking about how
the problem of theory choice can be represented. If one has a cardinal infor-
mational structure, then Gaertner and Xu (2012)’s general scoring function
can be used to aggregate the information.
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Chapter 2
Robustness in Climate
Policy-Making: An Assessment
of the Uncertainty Framework
of the IPCC
2.1 Introduction
At the Paris Climate Change Conference in November 2015, an agreement was
reached that is regarded as a milestone in addressing global climate change.
The parties committed to limit the increase in the global average temperature
to below two degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level (UN 2015, Article
2). In light of the high stakes, it can be hoped that the agreement is based
on the best available scientific knowledge on the causes and consequences of
climate change. Indeed, in the Paris Agreement an effective and progressive
response to climate change is explicitly asked for “in light of the best available
scientific knowledge” (UN 2015, Preamble).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) synthesizes the
current state of knowledge on climate change (Mastrandrea et al. 2011, p.
676). This involves understanding and being able to communicate the uncer-
tainties surrounding these scientific findings. To achieve these ends, the IPCC
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has developed an uncertainty framework (Mastrandrea et al. 2011, p. 676).
This framework is best understood as an attempt at a unified conceptualisa-
tion of different types of uncertainties, including model and data uncertainty,
scenario uncertainty, as well as ethical uncertainty (IPCC 2013, p. 138; Mas-
trandrea et al. 2011, p. 676).1 The framework is in constant development
with later versions building on previous ones. The latest and most developed
version of the framework equips scientists with a confidence and likelihood
metric to qualify their statements.
Within this framework the notion of robust evidence plays a crucial role.
What notion of robustness is in play here? The uncertainty framework defines
robust evidence as “multiple, consistent, independent lines of high-quality ev-
idence” (Mastrandrea et al. 2011, p. 678). This notion is best understood
as measurement robustness. To see this, let me point out two aspects of ro-
bust climate scientific evidence. To start, for most of the questions that the
IPCC assesses, one faces a situation of evidential diversity: evidence from
multiple sources such as current or historical observational data, model out-
puts, and theories is available and synthesized. For example, the existence
of marine-ice sheet instability is assessed by taking ice-dynamics theory, nu-
merical modelling simulations, and paleo records into account (IPCC 2013,
p. 1174). Furthermore, the IPCC’s definition of robust evidence highlights
conditions similar to the ones encountered in the introduction, which need
to be in place such that concurrence or stability of results across different
types of evidence has special epistemic merit. Interestingly, one of the key
claims of the framework is that robust evidence in combination with high
agreement amongst experts confers very high confidence onto climate scien-
tific findings (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 2). As I detail below, the IPCC
provides an elaborate matrix on how expert agreement and evidence should
influence confidence judgements on scientific findings.
Given this, the uncertainty framework proves to be an ideal case study for
investigating my fourth research question: How should one conceptualise the
relation between expert knowledge and the evidence basis when one applies
the framework of measurement robustness? I am going to argue that ex-
1I introduce these different types of uncertainty below.
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pert knowledge can only under special circumstances be viewed as a separate
evidential mode that stands on a par with other evidential modes (such as ob-
servations or model outputs). For the main part, however, expert knowledge
should not be viewed as separate to evidential considerations but rather as a
necessary type of knowledge to address questions that arise when one applies
the measurement robustness framework; questions such as whether evidential
modes are independent and whether they are of high quality.
I defend this claim by pointing out the conceptual shortcomings of the
current framework. A significant body of literature exists that discusses pre-
vious and current versions of the IPCC’s uncertainty framework (see Adler
and Hadorn 2014 for a review). The majority of the literature focuses on is-
sues surrounding the interpretation of probabilistic information by the readers
of the IPCC reports (e.g., Budescu et al. 2014; Morgan 2014). However, the
literature does address the conceptual foundations of the latest version of the
uncertainty framework only in a limited way (see Aven and Renn 2015; Jones
2011; Socolow 2011).
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I give some background on the
structure and aim of the IPCC and the motivation that lies behind the uncer-
tainty framework (Section 2.2 ). I then put forward an interpretation of the
framework that draws from introductory documents and the actual practice
of its users (Section 2.3 ). With this interpretation in hand, I identify three
conceptual problems that point towards untenable assumptions regarding ev-
idence aggregation in the context of climate scientific findings (Section 2.4 ).
This analysis allows me to defend the main claim of this chapter (Section
2.5 ). I close by putting forward three tentative suggestions for improving the
uncertainty framework (Section 2.6 ).
2.2 Background: Structure and aim of the
IPCC
The IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment Programme
and the World Meteorological Organization in 1988 (IPCC 2014a, p. 1). The
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aim of the IPCC is to “provide the world with a clear scientific view on the
current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental
and socio-economic impacts” (IPCC 2014a, p. 1).
The IPCC does not conduct original research but synthesises current sci-
entific knowledge on climate change. Furthermore, the IPCC does not provide
policy recommendations: “the work of the organization is (...) policy-relevant
and yet policy-neutral, never policy prescriptive.” (IPCC 2014a, p. 1) Hence,
the IPCC can be understood as an aggregation body of scientific evidence
that supplies policy-makers with a crucial but not sufficient component for
their decision making.
The key instrument for the interaction of the IPCC with policy-makers is
the assessment report. The latest, fifth assessment report was published in
2014. The assessment report consists of three parts written by three separate
working groups (IPCC 2014b, p. 1). Working group I is concerned with
the assessment of the physical aspects of the climate system and its change.
Working group II assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural
systems to climate change and processes of adaptation. Working group III
reviews the options for mitigating climate change based on limiting greenhouse
gas emissions and activities to remove them. For every working group report
there exists a summary for policy-makers, which states the key points of
the analysis in a non-technical language. A synthesis report across all three
working groups is also provided (IPCC 2014b, p. 1).
The work within these groups is organised roughly as follows. Coordinat-
ing lead authors are assigned to chapters of the respective assessment report.
These authors coordinate the work of lead authors and contributing authors.
The resulting document is reviewed by review editors. For working group I,
209 coordinating lead authors and lead authors as well as 50 review editors
and more than 600 contributing authors were part of the process. I mention
these details to convey the large amount of coordination that is involved in
producing an assessment report. In addition, summaries for policy-makers
are subjected to one round of governmental comments (IPCC 2013, p. viii).
This process of governmental approval highlights the political nature of the
IPCC assessment report.
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Working group I distinguishes between four types of uncertainties: first,
scenario uncertainty, referring to uncertainties due to limited understanding
regarding future emissions, concentrations and forcing trajectories, and lack of
knowledge about future options for adapting and mitigating climate change,
such as carbon capture methods (IPCC 2013, p. 138); second, model un-
certainty, capturing uncertainty regarding model parameters and the causal
structure of the system under study (IPCC 2013, p. 138); third, internal vari-
ability uncertainty, indicating uncertainties involved in describing the variabil-
ity of earth’s climate in absence of any forcing due to emissions (IPCC 2013, p.
138); fourth, boundary condition uncertainty, denoting uncertainties regard-
ing historical and paleoclimate simulations (IPCC 2013, p. 139). The last
two types of uncertainty are subsumed under the heading of data uncertainty.
Ethical uncertainty is the lack of knowledge regarding how outcomes should
be evaluated. Here the problem is not a lack of empirical knowledge (i.e.,
one knows what is going to happen given a certain action) but rather a lack
of normative knowledge (i.e., how one should value the particular outcome)
(Bradley and Drechsler 2014, p. 1228).
2.3 The uncertainty framework of the IPCC:
An interpretation
To adequately account for the uncertainties involved in scientific findings, the
IPCC uses in its latest assessment report an updated version of the uncer-
tainty framework.2 This framework serves two functions. It is an analytical
instrument to understand uncertainty and a tool for communicating uncer-
tainties to policy-makers (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 1).
2A comparison of the current version of the uncertainty framework, published in 2010
and used in the Fifth Assessment Report, with the previous one, published in 2005 (and used
in the Fourth Assessment Report published 2007), can be found in Mastrandrea et al. (2010,
Annex A). Here, I engage with the latest version of the framework for two reasons: First,
each version of the framework builds on earlier ones and takes shortcomings into account;
hence, it makes sense to engage with the most recent, arguably, most refined, framework.
Second, solely the latest version of the uncertainty framework is in use currently and is,
therefore, policy-informing.
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Throughout this chapter, I will focus on the assessment report of working
group I.3 The IPCC provides two supporting documents which explain the
framework: the Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assess-
ment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties (Mastrandrea et al.
2010) and a commentary article by Mastrandrea et al. (2011). I also take
into account the practice of the authors of the assessment report. As the
discussion below will make clear, the supporting documents and the practice
reveal ambiguities and inconsistencies in the framework. Hence, the aim of
this section consists in providing a charitable interpretation of the framework,
which dissolves the ambiguities in a way that minimises inconsistencies.
To gain a handle on the uncertainty framework, consider the following ex-
amples of its application. To start, there are cases in which solely a confidence
term is used to characterize a finding:
The release of CO2 or CH4 to the atmosphere from thawing per-
mafrost carbon stocks over the 21st century is assessed to be in
the range of 50 to 250 GtC [giga tons of carbon] (. . . ) (low confi-
dence). (IPCC 2013, p. 27, my emphasis)
There are cases in which solely a likelihood term is used:
It is likely that the frequency of heat waves has increased in large
parts of Europe, Asia and Australia [since the 1950s]. (IPCC 2013,
p. 5, my emphasis)
There are cases in which both confidence and likelihood terms are used:
In the Northern Hemisphere, 1983-2012 was likely the warmest
30-year period of the last 1400 years (medium confidence). (IPCC
2013, p. 3, my emphasis)
Finally, there are also cases in which no qualifying term is used. The
absence of qualifying terms indicates a finding for which “evidence and un-
derstanding are overwhelming” (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 2).
3I will briefly address the question of how my insights generalise to reports of working
groups II and III in the concluding remarks of this chapter.
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How should these confidence and likelihood qualifications be understood
and how are they related to each other?
2.3.1 Likelihood terms
Let me begin with the likelihood terms. The guidance note reveals that
these terms correspond to ranges of probabilities: virtually certain (proba-
bility of the occurrence of the outcome is 99-100%), very likely (90-100%),
likely (66-100%), about as likely as not (33-66%), unlikely (0-33%), very un-
likely (0-10%), and exceptionally unlikely (0-1%) (Mastrandrea et al. 2010,
p. 3). Accordingly, these likelihood terms express a quantitative measure of
uncertainty (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 1).
The basis for the ascription of probabilistic information can be statistical,
modelling analysis or elicitation of expert views (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p.
3). Model analysis involves the analysis of time series data for a variable
(e.g., global mean surface temperature) over a period of interest (e.g., 1980-
2050) from single or multiple models. It is with respect to this analysis that
derivational robustness analysis comes into play. For example, an ensemble of
models is used to generate predictions about the sea surface temperature over
the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean and the variability of the predictions is
assessed (IPCC 2013, p. 107). Expert elicitation techniques are procedures
that aim to determine experts’ subjective degrees of belief about the value of
variables. They are primarily used to capture the meta-knowledge of experts
regarding the limitations of climate models and observational data (Morgan
2014, p. 7176).
2.3.2 Confidence terms
Let me now turn to the confidence terms. In contrast to probabilistic in-
formation, confidence is expressed qualitatively, that is, it can be very high,
high, medium, low, or very low (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 1). The guidance
note gives the following indication for arriving at these confidence statements
(Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 1, my emphasis):
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Confidence in the validity of a finding. Based on the type, amount,
quality, and consistency of evidence (e.g., mechanistic understand-
ing, theory, data, models, expert judgement) and the degree of
agreement. Confidence is expressed qualitatively.
This statement needs to be disentangled. I begin with the two notions
of evidence and agreement. I then shed light on how these two notions are
combined to arrive at confidence statements. I pay particular attention to the
questions of how expert judgement and expert agreement are treated.
The supporting documents suggest an assessment of the available evidence
on the basis of the type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence. These
four dimensions are best viewed as criteria that should be considered indi-
vidually by the authors of the assessment report (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p.
2).
Under the heading of type of evidence, the guidance note provides five
categories of evidence: mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models, and
expert judgement (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 1). This underscores the point
I made earlier about the evidential diversity that is considered relevant by
the authors. Mechanistic understanding is described as understanding of the
physical processes governing a particular phenomenon (Mastrandrea et al.
2011, p. 678). As Jones (2011, p. 737) notes, it is puzzling why theory is
treated as one category of evidence, since, normally, evidence is viewed to
be (dis)confirming theories. A charitable way of understanding theory as a
subcategory of evidence is to see it as theoretical knowledge supporting (or
undermining) the particular explanations or predictions that are reported in
a finding. Predictions can be supported by theory, for example, if the predic-
tions are model-based (and the theory supports the structural assumptions of
the model) or are based on expert elicitation (and the experts ground their
judgements in theory). This interpretation of theory as an evidence category
is suggested by the practice of the authors:
In summary, ice-dynamics theory, numerical simulation, and paleo
records indicate that the existence of a marine-ice sheet instability
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(. . . ) is possible in response to climate forcing. (IPCC 2013, p.
1174, my emphasis)
Amount and quality of evidence are not defined in the supporting doc-
uments. The authors use amount of evidence to denote different things: a)
number of observation points (e.g., IPCC 2013, p. 137, 158); b) number of
models or total number of scenarios run on selected models (e.g., simulation
of Greenland ice sheet, Figure 5.16, IPCC 2013, p. 428); or c) the number of
studies (e.g., IPCC 2013, p. 129). Quality of evidence is used by the authors
in relation to observational data and models. Data quality involves judge-
ments about instrument design, equipment handling, or data processing (e.g.,
IPCC 2013, p. 143). Model quality is assessed based on empirical model per-
formance and adequate representation of relevant causal factors (IPCC 2013,
p. 749, 753f.).
Consistency of evidence is defined as “(. . . ) the extent to which it [ev-
idence] supports single or competing explanations of the same phenomena,
or the extent to which projected future outcomes are similar or divergent.”
(Mastrandrea et al. 2011, p. 678)
Evidence is expressed on a qualitative scale: evidence can be robust,
medium, or limited (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 2). As already stated in
the introduction, robust evidence should be understood in the sense of mea-
surement robustness and is defined as multiple, consistent independent lines
of high-quality evidence (Mastrandrea et al. 2011, p. 678). Notice that here
an additional criterion for the evaluation of evidence enters the scene that is
not explicitly introduced in the framework: the (in)dependence of different
pieces of evidence. For example, the models in an ensemble can be indepen-
dent to a higher or lower degree, given how many model assumptions they
share (IPCC 2013, p. 755). The supporting documents do not define the lev-
els of medium and limited evidence. In particular, there are no aggregation
rules given that might indicate the relative importance of type, consistency,
independence, amount, and quality of evidence. The practice of the authors
does not reveal specific aggregation rules or principles either.
Let me now turn to the notion of agreement. Agreement is expressed qual-
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itatively: agreement can be high, medium, or low (Mastrandrea et al. 2010,
p. 3). Agreement is not defined in the guidance note. However, Mastrandrea
et al. (2011, p. 678) offer the following two accounts of agreement in their
commentary:
[Agreement] is the level of consensus in the scientific community
on a particular finding.
[Agreement indicates] the degree to which a finding follows from
established, competing, or speculative scientific explanations.
At first sight, these two definitions differ. A way of reconciling them
would be to add the assumption that the level of consensus in a scientific
community depends on the degree to which a finding follows from established,
competing, or speculative scientific explanations. Given this assumption, the
second definition entails the first one.
Interpreting the framework in the way suggested here leads to a problem:
agreement and consistency cannot be ascribed independently from each other.
Recall that both agreement and consistency are defined with respect to a
finding in the assessment report. However, if agreement is low (due to the
presence of competing explanations), then consistency needs to be low as
well, since consistency is defined as the number of explanations supported
by the evidence. The same holds for high agreement and high consistency.
Mastrandrea et al. (2011, p. 678) seem to sense this tension and explain the
difference between agreement and consistency as follows:
“Agreement is not equivalent to consistency. Whether or not con-
sistent evidence corresponds to a high degree of agreement is de-
termined by other aspects of evidence such as its amount and
quality; evidence can be consistent yet low in quality.”
This explanation is not satisfactory since it is in tension with our first
attempt to make sense of agreement. Agreement has been so far understood
as depending only on the number of competing explanations for a finding.
Here, Mastrandrea et al. (2011) suggest that it depends also on the amount
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and quality of evidence. The best way to circumvent this problem is to view
agreement as an umbrella notion that covers two different concepts: agree-
ment as degree of consensus in the scientific community and agreement as
consistency of evidence.
This interpretational move is supported by the practice of the authors.
When the authors are using the uncertainty framework, they interpret agree-
ment in the majority of cases as consistency of evidence. Let me give an
example:
High agreement among analyses provides medium confidence that
oxygen concentrations have decreased in the open ocean thermo-
cline in many ocean regions since the 1960s. (IPCC 2013, p. 52,
my emphasis)
However, there are also instances where agreement is viewed as consensus
in the scientific community:
Many semi-empirical model projections of global mean sea level
rise are higher than process-based model projections (. . . ), but
there is no consensus in the scientific community about their reli-
ability and there is thus low confidence in their projections. (IPCC
2013, p. 26)
Let me take stock at this point. A hierarchy of the notions introduced
through the uncertainty framework, given the interpretational ambiguities,
can be visualised (see Figure 2.1).
After having discussed the evidence and agreement notions, I now turn
to their aggregation into overall confidence statements. The supporting docu-
ments specify that the increase in levels of agreement or evidence (individually,
while holding the other constant, or together) leads to a rise in the confidence
level (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 3). For findings with high agreement and
robust evidence, the confidence level ‘very high’ should be assigned (Mastran-
drea et al. 2010, p. 2). For findings with either high agreement or robust
evidence a confidence level should be given if possible (i.e., high confidence or
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Figure 2.1: Elements of the confidence metric under two interpretations of
agreement: (a) agreement as consensus in the scientific community, (b) agree-
ment as consistency of evidence (my diagram).
medium confidence). If this is not possible, then the summary terms should
be used (e.g., robust evidence, medium agreement) (Mastrandrea et al. 2010,
p. 3). For findings with low agreement and limited evidence, the summary
terms should be used. Figure 2.2 visualises these rules.
So far, I have discussed the likelihood and confidence terms of the uncer-
tainty framework. A crucial question remains: How are these metrics related
to each other?
2.3.3 The relation of likelihood and confidence terms
Do likelihood and confidence terms convey the same or different types of
information? The supporting documents do not rule out either of the two
possible but incompatible answers.
To start, the likelihood metric can be interpreted as a quantified uncer-
tainty tool that co-varies with the confidence metric. This interpretation
would treat the likelihood and confidence metrics as substitutes, conveying
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Figure 2.2: Aggregation of evidence and agreement into overall confidence
statements (my diagram, based on Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 2-3).
the same information. Any difference in the application of the two metrics
would derive from the fact that not all types of evidence allow a quantified
treatment of uncertainty. I refer to this reading as the substitutional interpre-
tation. The following statements from the supporting documents back this
reading:
Depending on the nature of the evidence evaluated, teams have the
option to quantify the uncertainty in the finding probabilistically.
(Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p. 1)
[If] a range can be given for a variable, based on quantitative anal-
ysis or expert judgement: Assign likelihood or probability for that
range when possible; otherwise only assign confidence. (Mastran-
drea et al. 2010, p. 4, my emphasis)
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However, one can also interpret the relation between confidence and like-
lihood statements differently: Confidence statements can be viewed as meta-
judgements and likelihood statements as intra-finding judgements. According
to this interpretation, the confidence metric allows assessing the goodness of
the evidential basis of a finding whereas the likelihood metric can be used to
specify the events that are mentioned in that finding. Under this reading,
the two metrics would convey different information. This would allow the
absence of co-variation between the likelihood and the confidence metric. I
refer to this reading as the non-substitutional interpretation. The following
statements from the supporting documents back this interpretation:
Author teams are instructed to make this evaluation of evidence
and agreement the basis for any key finding, even those that em-
ploy other calibrated language (. . . ). (Mastrandrea et al. 2010,
Annex A, my emphasis)
This scale [confidence metric] may be supplemented by a quanti-
tative probability scale (. . . ). (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, Annex B,
my emphasis)
How do the authors of the assessment reports deal with this interpreta-
tional ambiguity? The practice reveals that in the clear majority of cases
authors opt for the non-substitutional interpretation. The following example
illustrates this:
Estimates of the Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) based on
multiple and partly independent lines of evidence (...) indicate
that there is high confidence that ECS is extremely unlikely to be
less than 1◦C (...). (IPCC 2013, p. 871, my emphasis)
Finally, the supporting documents prescribe the use probabilistic informa-
tion only if confidence in a finding is high or very high (Mastrandrea et al.
2010, p. 4). No rationale is given for this rule. The implicit motivation could
be that it is more problematic to assign probabilities given one has low con-
fidence in the evidential basis for a finding. The authors of the assessment
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report seem to disregard this rule about the use of probabilistic information.
There are multiple instances in which likelihood terms are used given very
low, low, or medium confidence. Here is an example:
A nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean (. . . ) in September before mid-
century is likely under [emission scenario] RCP 8.5 (medium con-
fidence). (IPCC 2013, p. 92)
A straightforward way of reconciling the practice of the authors with the
guidance note would be to interpret the rule as stating that precise probabilis-
tic information, that is, complete probability density functions, should only
be given if confidence is high or very high.
This concludes my attempt at giving a coherent interpretation of the un-
certainty framework. In the next section, this interpretation will serve as a
background to an engagement with the conceptual foundations of the frame-
work.
2.4 Conceptual problems in the fundament of
the uncertainty framework
In this section, I argue that the uncertainty framework exhibits three substan-
tial conceptual problems. These problems make clear that the current version
of the framework is neither an adequate tool for conceptualising the uncer-
tainties involved in climate scientific findings nor for communicating them
to policy-makers.4 Importantly, identifying these three conceptual problems
also paves the way towards assessing the leading question of this chapter:
how should expert judgement be treated in measurement robustness consid-
erations? In Section 2.5, I argue that there are two distinct roles for expert
judgement with respect to measurement robustness: First, expert judgement
4Aven and Renn (2015) and Jones (2011) highlight additional conceptual problems of
the framework. For example, the problem of the consistent application of a qualitative
(compared to quantitative) confidence metric, the ambiguity of likelihood as an estimated
value or a belief about the true underlying likelihood, and the omission of the distinction
between perceived and actual risk. These observations are complementary to my analysis.
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can play a crucial role in assessing conditions that need to be in place such
that measurement robustness delivers its epistemic goods, and, second, under
some specific conditions, expert judgement can be a source of evidence. To
establish these claims, particular attention needs to be paid to the role of
expert agreement to which I turn now.
The first problem concerns the bifurcation of evidence and agreement in
the confidence metric. Given the two possible interpretations of agreement,
this bifurcation does not hod up to scrutiny. If one understands agreement as
consensus in the scientific community, then the social fact of consensus should
be a result of the evidence and should not be treated as an independent
dimension. As thermometer readings should track temperature, the social
fact of consensus in a community should supervene on the available evidence.
Ultimately, it is the evidence that should guide our uncertainty assessment.
If one understands agreement as consistency of evidence, then agreement is
straightforwardly part of the evidence dimension and nothing separate from
it.
This bifurcation between evidence and agreement leads to a second prob-
lem unfolding into a set of issues related to the rules for aggregating evidence
and agreement statements.
To start, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, the uncertainty framework allows
for a combination of robust evidence and low or medium agreement. Recall
that ‘robust evidence’ is defined as multiple, consistent independent lines of
high-quality evidence (Mastrandrea et al. 2011, p. 678). If one understands
agreement as consistency, then there cannot be low (or medium) agreement
in the light of robust evidence. Since robust evidence involves evidence that
is consistent, agreement as consistency needs to be high in the light of robust
evidence. If one understands agreement as consensus in the scientific com-
munity, then it is puzzling how there can be a limited level of consensus in
the light of robust evidence, given one makes the minimal assumption that
scientists base their judgements on the available evidence.
Even if one disregards this issue, a second issue emerges in relation to
aggregation rules. The pairs ‘limited evidence/high agreement’ and ‘robust
evidence/low agreement’ are treated symmetrically by assigning them medium
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confidence. This symmetry is puzzling. The intuition that one faces less un-
certainty given ‘robust evidence/low agreement’ than ‘limited evidence/high
agreement’ seems natural. This intuition can be substantiated as follows. If
one understands agreement as consensus in the scientific community, it seems
questionable to give the fact of consensus the same weight as evidential consid-
erations. If one understands agreement as consistency, it seems problematic
to give consistency considerations the same weight as the combined consider-
ations about type, amount, quality, and independence of evidence. This point
gains traction in the practice of the authors of the assessment report. Instead
of weighting consistency in the light of other evidential considerations, the
authors solely use consistency considerations to arrive at overall confidence
statements. Here is an example:
High agreement among analyses provides medium confidence that
oxygen concentrations have decreased in the open ocean thermo-
cline in many ocean regions since the 1960s. (IPCC 2013, p. 52,
my emphasis)
This constitutes bad epistemic practice since the other dimensions, which
should enter a critical assessment of the underlying evidential basis for a find-
ing, that is, the type, amount, quality, and independence of the evidence, are
not considered. If one assumes that the authors are considering these alter-
native dimensions implicitly, this practice is not transparent to the readers of
the report.
A final issue concerns the amount of information that is provided about
the aggregation rules. Consider again Figure 2.2. Why is it the case that
sometimes one can give an overall confidence judgement and sometimes one
is only supposed to give the summary terms? It is conceptually unclear how
a line between these two classes of cases can be drawn. Furthermore, the
diagonal in Figure 2.2 is puzzling. The diagonal contains all matching evi-
dence and agreement pairs (e.g., limited evidence, low agreement). In these
clear-cut cases, an overall confidence statement should be possible. However,
as Figure 2.2 illustrates, this is not the prescription of the framework.
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The third problem can be located in the rules about when it is permissible
to use probabilistic information. A charitable interpretation of the uncertainty
framework is that only if confidence is high or very high, precise probabilistic
information should be used to express uncertainty. If one adopts the non-
substitutional reading as suggested by the practice of the authors, it is not
clear why one cannot use precise probabilistic information if the confidence
in the evidential basis yielding this probabilistic information is low. To start,
using probabilities in itself does not confer any epistemic merit on a finding.
Furthermore, to prohibit communicating probabilistic information in these
cases amounts to deliberately setting aside available information. This vio-
lates Carnap’s plausible principle of total evidence (Carnap 1947), and, hence,
should alert suspicion.
Let me pause at this point and put these problems into the context of
my overall argument in this chapter. The first two problems are directly
related to my leading question of how expert judgement should be brought
into contact with the machinery of measurement robustness analysis. Hence,
these are the focus of my attention going forward. The upshot of these first two
problems is that expert agreement cannot be viewed as a separate, additional
consideration to the evidence that feeds into measurement robustness analysis.
In the remainder of this section, I strengthen this claim by considering some
potential objections.5
A first objection might go like this: Expert agreement understood as con-
sensus in the scientific community must be treated as independent from evi-
dence since the evidence itself does not settle the issue. To put this in Bayesian
terms, different experts might approach the evidence with heterogeneous pri-
ors, and, hence, end up with different posteriors in the light of the same
evidence.6
Let me make two points in response to this objection. First, it must be
noted that Bayesian convergence theorems can be employed that show that
5By considering potential objections, I am able to include parts of the literature that
so far have not been brought into direct contact with the uncertainty framework, but that
are relevant from a systematic point of view.
6I thank an anonymous reviewer who commented on the shorter, published version of
this chapter for raising this criticism.
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agents with heterogeneous priors will converge on their posteriors, given a
series of shared observations. I grant that these theorems come with specific
conditions attached – without going into the technical details of the literature
– such as at least some agreement in priors, numerous observations, or a long
time span (see for example Doob 1971). However, it is not clear to me why
these conditions cannot be met by the practice of climate scientists, especially
by those groups of the scientific community who are working on particular
topics (such as glacial hydrology). Second, one does not need to rely on
convergence theorems to defuse this objection. Consider that the experts
are supposed to reach an agreement on the evidence dimension separately,
that is, they need to agree whether there is robust evidence. As a reminder,
robust evidence is defined as multiple, consistent independent lines of high-
quality evidence. I take it to be the case that agreement on the presence
of multiple, consistent independent lines of high-quality evidence is hardly
compatible with experts maintaining radically different posteriors, no matter
how different their priors for a specific hypothesis were. Most importantly, the
consistency requirement of robust evidence, forces a high degree of agreement
about predictions or explanations that are deemed defensible in the light
of this evidence. The key point to see is that evidence in the uncertainty
framework not only denotes shared observations but involves a statement
about the relationship between evidence and a hypothesis.
Socolow (2011, p. 785-786) raises a second objection by offering the fol-
lowing argument for the independence of evidence and agreement: Robust
evidence can be combined with low agreement if key information is missing.
If key information is missing, given a large set of high quality and consis-
tent evidence, a variety of projections and explanations of a phenomenon are
possible, which is the definition of low agreement in terms of consistency of
evidence. Furthermore, limited evidence can be combined with high agree-
ment if one is in a situation in which the experts have converged on a single
explanation although robust evidence is lacking.
I think this line of reasoning is not compelling for two reasons. First,
according to the uncertainty framework, the claim that robust evidence is
available requires that this evidence is consistent, and, hence – given the defi-
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nition of consistency –, the evidence does not support diverging explanations
or predictions. Therefore, it is unclear how there can be competing explana-
tions when experts face robust evidence. Second, the number of competing
explanations for a finding is not conceptually linked to the agreement about
the finding, since scientists could agree on key characteristics of a phenomenon
even in the light of competing explanations for the occurrence of this finding.
A third objection might point to the source of expert agreement. Douglas
(2012, p. 152) points out that expert disagreement about hypotheses in the
light of shared evidence is grounded in different explanations about why the
evidence appears as it does. Hence, expert disagreement is possible in relation
to the same set of evidence.
Although this argument might be applicable to many areas of expert dis-
agreement, the agreement (or disagreement) in the context of the IPCC’s
uncertainty framework does not fall within its scope. Consider again the fact
that a working group must come to a shared judgement about the state of the
evidence for a hypothesis. This judgement – limited, medium, or robust evi-
dence – requires experts to take a stance on whether the evidence is consistent
(i.e., whether it supports a wide or narrow set of predictions or competing
explanations). Both the explanations and the predictions must be viewed
in relation to the hypothesis in question. Hence, experts express judgements
about whether they agree or disagree on a hypothesis in question. Any reason
for this disagreement – which might well be of the sort that Douglas (2012)
mentions – is not relevant input for the uncertainty framework.
A fourth objection runs as follows: The reason why one should value ex-
pert agreement independently of the evidence set is that expert agreement
contains information about those components of expert judgement that can-
not be expressed in terms of characteristics of the evidence. A case in point
could be, arguably, the agreement of experts on a set of tuning parameters for
a complex climate model. Tuning parameters are those parameters that can
be changed in a fine-grained manner to increase the empirical fit of a climate
model. It might be the case that experts are not able to justify the parameters
in the light of the available evidence. The distinction between knowing that
and knowing how can substantiate this point. If climate scientific research
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requires a significant amount of abilities that cannot be articulated fully in
evidential terms, then the uncertainty framework for climate scientific findings
should account for them. If there is agreement among experts regarding the
outcomes of these inarticulable abilities, then it makes sense to treat expert
agreement as an independent dimension in relation to the evidence dimension.
Let me make two points in response to this claim. First, in my view the
burden of proof lies with those who argue that there are significant parts of
climate scientific practice that cannot be articulated in evidential terms. Be-
fore one can assess the strength of this claim, it is desirable to have a clear
grasp of what areas of climate-scientific practice and what types of activities
are involved. Second, even if this can be made more precise and it turns out
that there are significant parts of climate-scientific practice that cannot be ar-
ticulated in evidential terms, an uncertainty framework should be maximally
transparent about these parts. Merely subsuming them under the heading of
expert agreement does not communicate the necessary information.
A fifth objection is this: There are scenarios in which one does not have
evidence for a hypothesis and, hence, one should base uncertainty assessments
on the level of expert agreement in terms of a consensus in the scientific
community (see Bradley et al. 2016, p. 9 for this claim).
In the hypothesised situation, evidence is absent. Accordingly, expert
agreement is not a separate evaluative dimension compared to evidence but
the only remaining one. Given this, it seems natural to view expert agreement
as a proxy to the unavailable – potentially not yet gathered or not yet analysed
– evidence. However, expert agreement is only a reliable proxy if certain
conditions are met. For example, experts should not be biased individually
(e.g., by reporting their assessment in a strategic manner) or as a group
(e.g., by relying on group judgement aggregation mechanisms that do not
adequately represent the judgements of group members). Furthermore, the
experts should be chosen such that they have the relevant expertise to assess
a hypothesis despite the fact that there is no evidence which bears directly
on it. However, even if these conditions are met, a satisfactory uncertainty
framework should contain the requirement that the experts are as transparent
as possible about the reasons for their agreement (or lack of agreement).
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Simply reporting the degree of agreement in situations of absent evidence is
not transparent enough since these reasons are ultimately ground uncertainty
assessments.
Following Reiss (2015), a sixth objection runs as follows: The IPCC pro-
vides risk assessments. These risk assessments are done by working groups
II and III for mitigation and adaption scenarios. Risk assessments should be
evidence-based. In the IPCC set-up, these risk assessments are based on the
scenarios and the process understanding provided by working group I. Now,
evidence assessments always involve norms that themselves cannot be judged
against the facts, meaning that these questions cannot be settled by the ev-
idence itself or other empirical facts but involve a non-reducible normative
component. Normative decisions of this particular kind are, for example, de-
cisions about the appropriate level of significance for rejecting a hypothesis (in
a frequentist approach to statistical testing); or which concept of cause is the
appropriate one for a particular context. Hence, the uncertainty framework
should give the role of expert agreement an even larger role than it already
does.
The strength of this argument depends on what context of risk assess-
ments one examines. In the case of climate scientific risk assessments, the
fact that the IPCC has established a review process that defines shared norms
of assessment should reduce the likelihood that there are radically different
methodological or conceptual standards in play that necessitate making ex-
pert agreement central. Furthermore, giving up the evidence dimension with
its categories that could guide the process of uncertainty assessment is mis-
guided since it seems to presuppose that these categories do not provide a
fruitful framework for most of the cases covered by experts. However, let
me emphasise once more that my claim is not that expert agreement should
not play a role in uncertainty assessments. My criticism solely targets the
claim that expert agreement understood as social consensus in the scientific
community (and as consistency of evidence) is an independent dimension that
grounds confidence judgements in a hypothesis.
Finally, a seventh objection can be mounted if one leaves the realm of the
epistemic considerations and pays attention to the social context of the IPCC.
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The IPPC supplies decision-relevant information to political leaders who face
high-stakes decisions. These high-stakes decisions – such as cutting carbon
emissions – have significant implications for the (immediate and long-term)
well-being of their respective electorate. In this context, expert agreement
can have social benefits. Expert agreement signals the coherence of scien-
tific opinion and, thereby, can underwrite claims about the urgency of action
regarding climate policy.
I do think that this social function of coherence is undeniable, however, I
do not think that – even in the case of the IPCC – the blending of social and
epistemic considerations is desirable. To start, it is not clear that the experts
agree on the hypotheses and, hence, giving expert agreement the weight of an
independent dimension of assessment can be counterproductive. Furthermore,
the social benefits can still be realised without disregarding the need for sound
epistemic foundations of the uncertainty assessment. They can be realised
by being more aware of the division of cognitive labour between the policy-
informing IPCC authors and the policy-conducting governing bodies behind
the IPCC. The degree of certainty in scientific findings can be assessed based
on the evidence at hand. Once the degree of certainty is assessed, the policy-
making bodies can devise decision mechanisms that allows them to arrive at
policies that, then, can be communicated.
2.5 The role of expert judgement in measure-
ment robustness analysis
In the previous section, I put forward the claim that expert agreement and
evidence should not be viewed as two independent dimensions of assessment
in uncertainty judgements. A natural follow-up question is to ask what the
role of expert judgement (not the fact that experts agree) should play in
uncertainty assessments. Since uncertainty assessments in the context of the
IPCC should be based on evidence, and the IPCC is facing a situation of
evidential diversity, this question boils down to asking how expert judgement
should be related to measurement robustness considerations. In my view, the
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discussion so far points towards two distinct roles for expert judgement with
respect to measurement robustness.
To start, expert judgement can play a role in assessing conditions that need
to be in place so that measurement robustness delivers its epistemic goods.
As the discussion of the framework has shown, these conditions refer to the
quality of evidence, the number of evidence pieces, and their independence.
Assessing these three dimensions of evidence requires, plausibly, some expert
judgement. It is not the case, certainly not for the context of climate scien-
tific findings, that these dimensions are defined rigidly and are unanimously
agreed upon. To see this, consider why the IPCC developed the uncertainty
framework in the first place; it was introduced to provide a shared standard
of evidence appraisal. Also, the practice of the authors in working group I
suggests that arriving at statements about the nature of the pool of relevant
evidence are the very subject of the discussion in the author teams compiling
the respective sections of the report. It is a further interesting question how
experts should express their individual statements about quality, amount,
and independence and how these statements should be aggregated. I will not
dive into this question here to avoid distracting from the main point of this
section.7
Furthermore, expert judgement can be one type of evidence that feeds
into measurement robustness analysis. This is the case if the elicited expert
judgement concerns one (or multiple) aspects of a problem (e.g., the question
whether a particular mechanism for a phenomenon should be considered) or
when it concerns a piece of information for which there is no direct evidence
(e.g., the tuning parameter values for a climate model). There exist sophis-
ticated expert judgement elicitation methods that generate this type of evi-
dence in a systematic and reproducible way. The key goal of these techniques
is to control for judgement biases that could affect the experts. One of the
most prevalent judgement biases is overconfidence. Overconfidence denotes
the situation in which an expert is too certain about the truth of her or his
statement (Aspinall 2010, p. 294). The crucial point to see is that judgement
7Thompson et al. (2016), for example, suggest using the method of structured expert
elicitation to incorporate the perspectives of experts into the settling of evidential questions.
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elicited in this way then enters into the pool of relevant evidence for a hy-
pothesis. To this pool of relevant evidence, then, one can apply measurement
robustness analysis and assess the degree of concordance between the different
evidence pieces. Hence, agreement should play an entirely different role than
was suggested by the uncertainty framework. It is the agreement of pieces of
evidence and not the agreement of experts that is a necessary component for
measurement robustness claims.
2.6 Ways to improve the uncertainty frame-
work
In Section 2.2, I provided some background information about the structure
and aim of the IPCC. In Section 2.3, I offered an interpretation of the uncer-
tainty framework that drew from supporting documents and the practice of
the authors. The discussion made clear that the framework contains multiple
ambiguities as well as inconsistencies. In Section 2.4, I showed that even a
charitable interpretation of the framework faces three substantial conceptual
problems. In Section 2.5, I argued for a new way of linking expert judgement
and measurement robustness analysis. In my view, the discussion in Sections
2.4 and 2.5 gives concrete leads to how the uncertainty framework should be
developed.
Let me now present three steps towards an improvement of the uncer-
tainty framework. First, the bifurcation between evidence and agreement in
the confidence metric needs to be removed. As my discussion has illustrated,
agreement should not be viewed as an independent dimension from evidence.
Rather, our confidence in a finding should be solely determined by the avail-
able evidence; the better the available evidence for a finding, the higher our
confidence should be in this finding, and vice versa. Making this statement
precise is the key task. Importantly, as pointed out before, this is not to say
that expert judgement should be erased from the IPCC’s uncertainty frame-
work.
Second, assessment criteria for the available evidence need to be identi-
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fied and spelled out in sufficient detail. The following questions should be
answered: What criteria are relevant for assessing the ensemble of available
evidence? What criteria are relevant for assessing individual pieces of evi-
dence? Can one define the assessment criteria in a formally precise way?
Third, once the assessment criteria for evidence have been identified the
task of aggregating these criteria into overall confidence judgements can be
addressed. Here, the rich literature of social choice theory and multi-criteria
decision analysis suggest themselves as sources for technical tools. It remains
to be explored to what degree general, non-case specific, aggregation rules can
be developed for the context of climate scientific findings.
2.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I engaged with the uncertainty framework of the IPCC to
address my fourth research question: How should one conceptualise the re-
lation between expert knowledge and the evidence basis when one applies
the framework of measurement robustness? At the heart of this uncertainty
framework is the notion of robust evidence that is best understood as mea-
surement robustness. The discussion has revealed that the framework exhibits
substantial conceptual problems – problems that results from the fact that
the relationship between robust evidence and expert agreement is convoluted.
I have suggested three ways of improving the uncertainty framework. These
suggestions are built around the idea that one needs to ground confidence
judgements in evidence and, importantly, that one needs to consider carefully
how to incorporate expert judgement into measurement robustness consider-
ations. My answer to the fourth research question is the following: There
are two distinct roles for expert judgement with respect to measurement ro-
bustness. First, and most importantly, expert judgement can play a crucial
role in assessing conditions that need to be in place such that measurement
robustness delivers its epistemic goods, and, second, under certain conditions,
expert judgement can be a source of evidence.
Note that I have solely taken into account uncertainties involved in the
physical science basis of climate change. Ethical uncertainty, which is ad-
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dressed in working group III, has been deliberately set aside. In my view, the
uncertainty framework should first be improved to address adequately the
uncertainties involved in the physical science basis of climate change before it
can be generalized to different types of uncertainties.
In the next chapter, I turn to policy-making in the medical domain. This
enables me to address issues surrounding derivational robustness analysis.
74
Chapter 3
Robustness in Medical
Policy-Making: Automated
Large-Scale Evidence
Aggregation
3.1 Introduction
In biomedical contexts, policy-makers face a large amount of evidence from
various sources such as observational studies, randomized control trials, statis-
tical meta-analyses and biochemical studies (Stegenga 2011, p. 497; Krimsky
2005, p. 129; Weed 2005, p. 1545). These sources often confirm conflicting
hypotheses. Stegenga (2013, p. 2391-2392) provides an illustrative exam-
ple: There are three hypotheses about the transmission mechanism of the
influenza virus between humans. Although these three hypotheses are not
mutually exclusive, understanding their relative contribution to the spread of
influenza is critical for designing more effective anti-influenza policies. The
droplet hypothesis states that the virus is spread on large droplets that are
expelled when people sneeze or cough; the airborne hypothesis states that
influenza is transmitted via small airborne particles; the contact hypothesis
states that the virus is spread by direct contact between people. Looking at
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the literature on these three hypotheses reveals that evidence from a variety
of sources has been gathered: evidence from controlled animal experiments
using various designs and kinds of animals, mathematical modelling, clinical
experience, and epidemiological patterns of influenza outbreaks.
Recently, increased attention has been paid to this situation of eviden-
tial diversity. To start, evidence-based medicine has moved to the heart of
medical policy-making. Originating in the early 1990s, its main purpose is to
replace or supplement the potentially biased judgements of clinicians with rig-
orous evidence-based recommendations. This movement also advocates tak-
ing meta-evidence into account. Meta-evidence is evidence concerning how
a given set of evidence bears on a hypothesis of interest. Studies reveal, for
example, that there is a robust industry bias, that is, medical studies spon-
sored by the pharmaceutical industry report a higher rate of positive causal
efficacy results; or a publication bias, that is, it is more likely that statistically
significant results are published than that statistically non-significant results
(Cosgrove et al. 2016). Furthermore, medical policy-makers face growing
demands for accountability from stakeholders. Taxpayers, regulation author-
ities, and patient groups ask for transparent decision-making processes that
use available resources in an effective manner.
The importance of evidence for medical decision-making prompts a ques-
tion: How should these large sets of diverse and potentially conflicting evi-
dence, if at all, be aggregated to facilitate best-informed policy recommenda-
tions? Throughout this chapter I refer to aggregation procedures involving
evidential input of this sort, that is, high volume, highly diverse and poten-
tially conflicting, as ‘large-scale’ evidence aggregation.
In a series of recent papers, Hunter and Williams have developed a decision
support tool to guide medical policy-makers, that is, doctors as well as well
people who decide which treatment should be available in a health system
(see Gorgoannis et al. 2009; Hunter and Williams 2010; Hunter and Williams
2012; Hunter and Williams 2013). Their framework is used in this chapter
to motivate my discussion since it is ambitious and thus raises a number of
questions. First, their approach is large-scale and computational – it involves
an explicit algorithm, such that, once initiated, little user input is required.
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Throughout this chapter, I refer to their approach as ‘highly automated’.
Second, they provide a full account of the steps involved in choosing a policy
recommendation. That is, their framework involves both an epistemic compo-
nent (assessing hypotheses concerning the various causal effects of the relevant
treatments) and a preference-driven component (weighing the treatments in
light of these hypotheses). This chapter focuses on the epistemic component.
With respect to the epistemic component, Hunter and Williams’s proposal
raises questions: Does it make sense to deliver a highly automated large-scale
evidence aggregator? How does one asses the optimal extent of automation
for any given type of evidence aggregation task?
Before I introduce the leading question and the main claims of this chap-
ter, let me add two clarificatory remarks. To start, the notion of automation
in the context of evidence aggregation needs to be made more precise. For
the subsequent discussion, I regard evidence aggregators as automated to the
extent that they explicitly encode procedures or algorithms that are fixed,
transparent, and dependent on inputs characterised in a particular way. I
assume that these procedures are encoded in such a way that they can be run
on a computer at high speed, and also so that values for the key parameters
of the aggregation function can be easily changed. Non-automated aspects of
aggregation procedures refer to the implicit reasoning that affords flexibility,
in the sense that how inputs are interpreted and weighed may be determined
‘on the fly’. It is effectively expert judgement that may or may not be capa-
ble of explicit articulation. So, the main contrast is between reasoning that is
made explicit or public, and reasoning that is ‘behind the scenes’ or happen-
ing in a ‘black box’. The more the aggregator relies on ‘behind the scenes’
reasoning, the less automated it is.
Furthermore, this chapter focusses on evidence aggregation regarding gen-
eral causal claims about the efficacy of treatment options. I am not looking
at specific causal claims, that is, claims about the efficacy of treatment op-
tions for a particular patient. Accordingly, this chapter does not engage with
recent advances in personalised medicine, such as gene sequencing techniques,
which allow the assessment of individual biomarkers to develop personalised
treatments (Gross 2016, p. xv-xvi). I focus on general causal claims since
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they form the content of the evidence aggregation guidelines provided by the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the UK and a
variety of clinical practice guidelines (see Fuller 2013, p. 433-434).
As I show below, the issue of automated evidence aggregation in medicine
is a fruitful background against which I can address my second research ques-
tion: What is the value of derivational robustness analysis if not the entire
relevant model space is covered by the available models? As it turns out,
structural reflections about evidence aggregation algorithms are the same as
those that can be brought up with respect to a set of models. In particular, I
argue that to determine the optimal extent of automation, derivational robust-
ness analysis can be a useful tool. Derivational robustness analysis provides
a structured way of establishing a preference relation over different algorithm
designs by emphasising the amount of relevant possibility space covered by
different designs. This can be formulated in the form of a criterion that helps
to decide between different algorithm designs. The basic motivation for this
criterion is that it directs attention to the question that matters: Does the
aggregator have the appropriate input variables and associated parameters?
Due to the analogy between algorithms and models, this analysis shows that
derivational robustness analysis provides a structured way of forming prefer-
ence relations over different model structures, where the preference relation
is based on the amount of the relevant possibility space that is covered by a
model.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I sketch the general problem
of evidence-based comparison of policy options. The leading question for this
section is how far standard logic(s) of inference guide the task of constructing
a large-scale evidence aggregator. Standard logic of inference helps to frame
the aggregation problem, but it does not lead far in answering the question
about the optimal extent of automation (Section 3.2 ). I illustrate this with the
help of Hunter and Williams’s framework (Section 3.3 ). So further criteria are
needed for assessing large-scale evidence aggregators. I go on to introduce the
ability to perform an adequate robustness analysis as such a criterion, which
enables me to state the main claim of the chapter (Section 3.4 ). Finally, I
defend my criterion against objections (Section 3.5 ).
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3.2 Separating components of evidence-based
decisions
The claims that are relevant in practical medical contexts are of the sort
‘treatment 1 is medically better than treatment 2 for patients of type X’.1
While such a claim appears to concern only medical facts, it is a claim about
preferences – whether treatment 1 is preferred, on all-things-considered med-
ical grounds, to treatment 2.2 One should not expect to find evidence that
bears directly on the overall claim. Rather, behind such a claim is a decision
problem that involves the resolution of various value and epistemic issues.
The value issues may involve whether one potential health side effect is worse
than another, or, more generally, what the more important aspects of health
are. The epistemic issues concern the nature and likelihood of the possible
health effects of the treatments under consideration.
Consider a person compiling a clinical practice guideline. Assume there
are just two treatments for a medical condition.3 Assume that in the case
of the condition under scrutiny both the impact on pain relief and on blood
pressure matter. Representing the situation in terms of a multi-criteria deci-
sion problem helps to illuminate the components of the problem (see Table
3.1).
Pain relief Blood pressure
Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Table 3.1: A simplified decision problem between two treatments in light of
the criteria ‘pain relief’ and ‘blood pressure’.
Recall that the aim is to assess the claim: ‘treatment 1 is more choice-
1Let me emphasise that this is a general causal claim not a claim about a particular
patient. The patient class description subsumes different conditions that might be in place,
such as an age cohort or gender.
2Non-medical considerations (such as monetary cost) may also play a role in advice
relating to the comparison of medical treatments, but I leave such considerations aside.
3For simplicity, I assume that medical conditions, including diseases, can be charac-
terised straightforwardly. For a comprehensive discussion of the nature of such characteri-
sations see Kincaid and McKitrick (2007).
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worthy (i.e., medically better, with respect to pain relief and blood pressure),
relative to treatment 2, for patients of type X’. Table 3.1 makes explicit that
this involves comparing the treatments with respect to both pain relief and
blood pressure, and then ultimately ranking the treatments, depending on
their performance in these respects, and the relative importance of the two
criteria. So, compiling a clinical practice recommendation in this case (e.g.,
‘For patient of type X given condition C, treatment 1 is recommended’) in-
volves both facts (the causal effects of the treatment options with respect to
pain and blood pressure) and values (the relative importance of differences in
pain relief and blood pressure).
Appreciating the structure of this decision problem is a first, important,
step in analysing Hunter and Williams’s decision support tool that I outline
in Section 3.3. The remainder of this section is concerned with the question
of how much further standard (decision) logic can take us in analysing Hunter
and Williams’s proposals. Besides identifying the role of facts and values in
assessing medical hypotheses, one might hope that standard logic of inference
is able to give guidance regarding the optimal extent of automation of evidence
aggregation processes. I will argue, however, that, although the appropriate
logical structure is necessary for an aggregator to provide credible advice, this
does not in itself resolve the more substantial question concerning optimal
design. I focus mainly on the epistemic aspect of the issue (see Sections 3.2.1-
3.2.2) and mention the value aspect briefly at the end of the section (Section
3.2.3).
3.2.1 The evidence aggregation problem
For simplicity, in what follows I focus on the comparison of two treatments.
In such a situation, the key empirical questions are whether one treatment is
better than the other for each respective medical dimension (e.g., pain relief).
Accordingly, one wants to know the sign and ideally also the magnitude of
the difference in the relevant effect size(s) for the two treatments.4
4The pain relief effect size, for instance, might be characterised in terms of the proportion
of subjects who report a significant decrease in pain after treatment in the treatment group.
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In this chapter, I rely on one benchmark logic of inference: Bayesian
epistemology. I opt for this logic of inference not to introduce unnecessary
technicalities but because this framework allows identifying the components
of the inference involved in evidence aggregation in a straightforward and
convenient manner. As I shall detail below, Bayesian epistemology forces
one to consider individual pieces of evidence as sources of information, the
reliability of these sources, and mechanisms used to aggregate the information
that takes these reliability assessments into account. In addition, it turns out
that the literature on evidence aggregation can be nicely structured with the
help of this Bayesian perspective.
In a Bayesian setting, questions of whether and by how much one treat-
ment is better than another translates into a set of hypotheses: either very
fine-grained hypotheses concerning the precise difference in effect size between
two treatments, or else a more coarse-grained hypothesis concerning simply
whether or not treatment 1 is better than treatment 2 along the dimension in
question.
The problem of evidence aggregation (this is how I call henceforth the
epistemic aspect mentioned in the previous section) concerns what the total
evidence at hand says about any given target partition of hypotheses. For the
Bayesian, there is a straightforward answer to this question on an abstract
level. What ultimately matters is the posterior probability function, denoted
here P ∗, over the hypothesis partition: this is the assessment of the hypothe-
ses upon learning the total evidence. The prior probability function, denoted
here P , represents the scientist’s assessments prior to learning the evidence
in question. The posterior probability distribution is equal to the prior con-
ditional probability given the evidence. This expression can be written in
ratio form as follows: For some hypothesis H (e.g., ‘aspirin is more effective
than paracetamol in reducing headaches for patient class Y’) relative to its
complement, given total evidence amounting to the conjunction of evidence
propositions E1, ..., En (Howson and Urbach 2006, p. 20-21):
P ∗(H)
P ∗(¬H) =
P (H | E1, ..., En)
P (¬H | E1, ..., En) =
P (E1, ..., En | H)
P (E1, ..., En | ¬H)
P (H)
P (¬H)
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One can see from the above expression that the change in the prior to
posterior probability ratios is driven by the relative likelihoods for the hy-
potheses, or the relative probability of the total evidence conditional on the
respective hypotheses. In the case that E1, ..., En are conditionally indepen-
dent with respect to H, then the likelihood for the total evidence is just the
product of their separate likelihoods (Howson and Urbach 2006, p. 18):
P (E1, ..., En | H) = P (E1 | H)P (E2 | H)...P (En | H)
In the case of dependencies between the evidence propositions5, however,
the likelihoods cannot be thus decomposed.
While abstract Bayesian logic is useful in many respects, it falls short in
important respects if one wants to model a real-world problem of evidence
aggregation. In particular, the Bayesian model does not in itself provide
guidance for determining the relevant likelihood ratio(s) for any given evidence
set as well or how to proceed in cases of dependency relations between pieces
of evidence. Hence, I propose the following strategy: Instead of trying to
fill in a Bayesian model (determining likelihoods and dependencies between
evidence propositions) given a description of the aggregation problem at hand,
it is easier to adapt one’s description of the aggregation problem at hand to
a specific Bayesian schema for evidence aggregation.
One useful guiding schema within Bayesian epistemology is one where
the individual pieces of evidence are treated as witness reports (see for the
following Section 3 of Bovens and Hartmann 2003). A witness report is a
statement about the truth of the hypotheses of interest (whether this is a
probability of truth or a binary assessment of truth). The likelihood ratio
associated with any such report can be regarded as a measure of the reliability
of the witness; that is, the ratio of the probability that the witness reports
the hypothesis to be true, given that it is true, to the probability that the
witness reports the hypothesis to be true given, that the hypothesis is false.
In some more detail, this model can be stated as follows: Let me as-
sume that the evidence propositions E1, ..., En in the expression stated above
5This amounts to claiming that Pr(Ei | H) 6= Pr(Ei | Ej , H), for some i, j.
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amount to witness reports. In the simplest case, these witness reports concern
a partition of just two hypotheses, H and ¬H. The reports themselves, de-
noted w1(H), ..., wn(H), each take a value of 1 or 0, the former being a report
that H is true while the latter a report that ¬H is true. For n witnesses that
are independent (conditional on the hypotheses in question), the likelihood
ratio, which expresses the impact of the evidence on prior beliefs about the
hypotheses, is as follows:
n∏
i=1
P (wi(H) | H)
P (wi(H) | ¬H)
Note that each term in this product amounts to the likelihood ratio for the
witness report for the pair of hypotheses. This is effectively the reliability (or
else its inverse) of the witness with respect to her report in favour (or against)
the truth of H. So, one sees that the impact of the testimonial evidence of a
number of independent witnesses, in the Bayesian schema, is a fairly simple
aggregate (namely a product) of their respective report reliabilities (or inverse
reliabilities).
The task of applying the witness schema to a real case consists in identi-
fying what the separate pieces of evidence are that may be modelled as giving
independent witness reports. Then, the reliability of these reports need to
be assessed. So, in conclusion, what one gains from abstract Bayesian logic
is a tractable way of framing an evidence aggregation problem: one needs to
identify sources of information, assess their reliability, and come up with an
aggregation mechanism. As discussion of the existing literature on evidence
aggregation below and Hunter and Williams’s framework in the next section
will make clear, however, this is not enough to answer the question regarding
the optimal extent of automated evidence aggregation.
3.2.2 The literature on evidence aggregation vis-a-vis
the schema
The existing literature on aggregating diverse evidence for causal hypotheses
fits well with the witness schema introduced in the previous section. That is
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to say that much of the literature can be interpreted as being about the more
substantial questions emerging if one tries to apply this schema to concrete
cases: How should individual witnesses (and their reports) be delineated to
preserve independence and how should the reliability of these reports be as-
sessed? What algorithm should be used for aggregating the reported causal
conclusion?
The evidence-based medicine hierarchies are a good case in point for the
preoccupation in the literature with determining the reliability of (types of)
witnesses and the aggregation mechanisms of their reports (see Clarke et al.
2014 for an overview). For instance, the hierarchy of evidence introduced
by NICE places meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, and RCTs above
case-control or cohort studies, non-analytical studies such as case reports, and
expert opinion (NICE 2006). Hierarchies of this sort clearly can be interpreted
as making claims about the reliability and aggregation of evidence from dif-
ferent types of sources. The relative standing of a (type of) witness, such as
RCTs, is justified with reference to their respective reliability assessed based
on study type design (e.g., the sample sizes and the controls for bias). RCTs
are often claimed to be the gold standard to establish causal relationships be-
tween variables and, more precisely, to determine the size of the causal effect
of a particular intervention (see the overview discussion in Cartwright and
Hardie 2012). The large body of literature which criticises the top-ranking
spot of RCTs proceeds by providing arguments for why RCTs might not be
reliable in predicting the effectiveness of interventions in a given context. For
example, Kincaid (2001, p. 36) points out that the inclusion criteria of RCTs
are often so restrictive that it is not clear what RCT results reveal about
a general population or whether randomisation techniques provide assurance
that in a particular trial (in contrast to the repetition of the same trial design)
the control and treatment group are balanced.
The evidence-based medicine hierarchies are furthermore a good case in
point for discussing the ambition in the literature to assess the independence
of witness reports. A major criticism of the evidence hierarchies is that mech-
anistic evidence and expert opinion are placed at the bottom. Based on the
Russo-Williamson thesis, that is, the idea that establishing a causal relation-
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ship requires observing probabilistic association and stating a mechanism for
the association (Russo and Williamson 2007), the claim is that mechanistic ev-
idence for causation is rather complementary to statistical evidence. Instead
of undermining the witness schema, this debate sounds a note of caution re-
garding what counts as independent witness-style evidence. In particular,
one might argue that evidence of mechanisms and evidence of probabilistic
association cannot be treated as separate witnesses.6
One might worry that the witness model does not account for statistical
meta-analysis. Statistical meta-analysis involves four steps: a) selecting the
primary studies, b) determining the appropriate outcome measure for each
study (such as effect size), c) weighing each study (usually according to its
size and quality, for example by using the inverse of the variance of the effect
estimate), and d) calculating the weighted average of the effect sizes across
the studies (Stegenga 2011, p. 497-498). However, there are two ways of
reconciling statistical meta-analysis with the witness schema. The first is to
see meta-analysis as an instance of the witness schema. In this case, sta-
tistical meta-analysis chooses a particular algorithm for aggregating witness
reports and is limited to a certain kind of evidence (e.g., fine-grained effect
size results from RCTs). The second is to treat an individual meta-analysis
as a single study (or its results as a witness report). This might be viewed
as a particularly reliable study since it combines data from multiple studies
(but see Stegenga 2011 for doubts about the reliability of meta-analyses). In
what follows, I take the latter route, treating meta-analyses as a single study,
because I am interested in attempts at large-scale evidence aggregation, that
is, involving more than just evidence from RCTs.7
One might also wonder how more complex methods of causal inference
6To keep the discussion focussed, I do not engage here with the question of whether the
Russo-Williamson thesis holds. As Kincaid (2011) points out, to assess this claim one needs
to distinguish carefully between different meanings of the term mechanism and whether one
assesses hypotheses about the existence of a causal relation or the effect size of a cause.
7Let me point out that evidence guidelines, which review existing evidence for a con-
dition, usually treat meta-analyses as the final aggregation products (see Fuller 2013, p.
436). This can be explained by the fact that meta-analyses of RCTs are ranked the highest
in evidence-based medicine hierarchies, and, hence, are usually regarded as trumping other
evidence types.
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can be reconciled with the witness schema. Bayesian nets methods involve
inferring a causal graph from a joint probability distribution over a number
of variables (see for an introduction and discussion Ben-Gal 2007). Here
again, one might treat any such study as a single witness report with respect
to the particular cause and effect. Given the ability of these methods to
identify confounding and/or mediating variables, one might judge this source
of information as highly reliable. While the evidence aggregation problem
considered in this chapter is large-scale when it comes to the diversity of
evidence, it is in another sense simple in that one restricts attention to a
single cause and effect relationship, as opposed to a more detailed and complex
causal network. Accordingly, I am going to set these Bayesian net methods
aside.
In general, the above discussion supports the point that the witness schema
is a very flexible model for evidence aggregation. Clearly a lot depends on
how the evidence is divided into independent witnesses. That is, a lot of
the difficult questions in the context of evidence aggregation are shifted to
the ‘pre-processing’ of evidence and, hence, away from the final aggregation
task. So what one gains from abstract Bayesian logic is that one should assess
any proposal for aggregating evidence according to the way the evidence is
delineated and scored for reliability, in addition to how it is processed in the
aggregation function. This is an additional insight over the one gained by
seeing evidence as a multi-criteria decision problem involving an epistemic
and value-based component. In other words, the bulk of the aggregation task
is not settled by an abstract inference logic. How much automation is a good
idea is a question that remains unanswered.
3.2.3 Return to the multi-criteria decision problem
As noted earlier, in order to finally make a choice of treatment, one must not
only tackle the evidence aggregation problem for the empirical hypotheses,
but also the problem of combining the various empirical and evaluative claims
that are relevant for the final choice of options. This is a contested issue and
falls under the literature of multi-criteria decision analysis (for an overview
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see Keeney and Raiffa 1993). There are a host of suggested methods for
making a choice in the face of options that are ranked differently according to
different criteria which themselves have differing importance for the decision-
maker. An important specification of these methods is whether the ranking
of options for each dimension can be represented in cardinal terms or only in
ordinal terms; that is, can one specify how much better/worse treatment 1
is on pain relief compared to treatment 2 for patient type X or can one only
say which is better/worse? When cardinal information is plausibly available
and the criteria are comparable in cardinal terms, the decision analysis can
follow standard Bayesian principles in the form of expected utility theory.
When only ordinal information is available, the controversies regarding how
to make an overall choice are more extensive (see Chapter 6 for discussion of
the Arrovian problem for aggregating ordinal information).
3.3 Hunter and Williams’s highly automated
evidence aggregator
Hunter and Williams claim to offer “a new framework for representing and
synthesizing knowledge from clinical trials involving multiple outcome indi-
cators” (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 1). In line with what I said in the
introduction, Hunter and Williams’s proposal should be understood as a tool
to arrive at general causal claims. Here, I summarise what I take to be the
main tenets of their account. The key upshot of the discussion is that their
procedure illustrates the claim made in the previous section: to answer the
question about the optimal extent of automation of an evidence aggregator,
further criteria are needed over and above the ones provided by standard logic
of inference.
The goal of Hunter and Williams’s approach is to come up with an or-
dinal ranking of two treatment options (Hunter and Williams 2013, p. 16).8
For example: Is the treatment of contraceptive pill or no treatment better,
8I discuss solely the case involving two treatment options. Hunter and Williams’s pro-
posal is able to deal with multiple pairwise comparisons of treatments.
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when one looks at pregnancy, ovarian cancer, and breast cancer as outcome
indicators for patient class Y ? (Hunter and Williams 2013, p. 16)9
In line with my discussion of the decision problem underlying evidence
aggregation, their approach contains two aggregation elements:
1. The aggregation of evidence for each outcome indicator, which involves
a) delineating evidence, b) assessing reliability of evidence, and c) an
aggregation rule.
2. The overall multi-criteria problem, taking into account all relevant out-
come indicators.
Given the focus of my discussion, I explain the first of these two aggrega-
tion steps in more detail. I briefly sketch their approach to the second step
for completeness. During my exposition of their proposal, I will point out
its automated nature and establish that it is a partly automated aggregation
procedure.
To aggregate the available evidence regarding the various outcome indica-
tors, Hunter and Williams introduce an evidence table. This table delineates
evidence in terms of different studies. For each study, a number of key input
variables are filled in or evaluated (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 5-7):
• the pair of treatments (e.g., contraceptive pill, no treatment)
• the outcome indicator denoting the dimension along which the treat-
ments are compared (e.g., breast cancer)
• the value of the outcome indicator given a particular measure. If one
adopts the relative risk measure, then the ratio between the portion
of people displaying the outcome, given treatment 1 (e.g., breast can-
cer given contraceptive pill), and the portion of people displaying the
outcome, given treatment 2 (e.g., breast cancer given no treatment), is
calculated
9Ultimately, Hunter and Williams’s proposal allows treatment recommendations for in-
dividual patients given the individual patient falls into the relevant patient class (Hunter
and Williams 2010, p. 119).
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• the net outcome indicating whether T1 is superior, inferior, or equiva-
lent to T2. The net outcome is determined by the measured value of
the outcome indicator and whether the outcome indicator is desirable
for a patient class. For example, given a value of 1.04 (assuming the
above specified measure of relative risk and the outcome indicator breast
cancer), the contraceptive pill is inferior to no treatment (Hunter and
Williams 2012, p. 13)
• whether the measured value of the outcome indicator is statistically
significant
• the evidence type (e.g., RCT study, cohort study, meta-analysis, or
network analysis)10
These input variables inform what the evidence says about the treatments
and how reliable it is. The information in the evidence table is the total
available input for the automated aggregation procedure. Their algorithm
can “be run” based on this information, given some additional specifications
that I introduce below.
The different studies in the evidence table are treated as independent
witnesses. For each witness, its reliability is determined via so-called meta-
arguments. Hunter and Williams consider the following meta-arguments (for
identifying unreliable evidence): ‘the evidence contains flawed RCTs’, ‘the
evidence contains results that are not statistically significant’, ‘the evidence
is from trials that are for a very narrow patient class’, ‘the evidence has
10This is merely one candidate list for characterising evidence. Hunter and Williams
note that further information should be captured by the evidence table if practicable; for
example, the sample size of a trial, the geographical location for each trial, the drop-out rate,
the method of randomization, and whether a trial used a narrow patient class (Hunter and
Williams 2012, p. 7). However, note that they only aggregate clinical data. Non-clinical
data, such as genomic information about the patient classes under consideration are not
considered. The approach via the evidence table also presupposes that the problem of
data integration, that is, how data from different sources can be made compatible (Leonelli
2013), is solved.
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outcomes that are not consistent’.11 These meta-arguments return binary ‘in
or out’ results (meaning that a study either feeds into the aggregation function
or it does not) for computational ease and theoretical simplicity (Hunter and
Williams 2012, p. 4, 9, 20).
With these elements in place, one can discuss Hunter and Williams’s ag-
gregation rule for any given outcome indicator. It is based on the notion of an
inductive argument, where this is a pair (X, )i, with X being a subset of evi-
dence and  the claim that either T1 is superior to T2, T1 is inferior to T2, or T1
is equivalent to T2 with respect to outcome indicator i (Hunter and Williams
2012, p. 3, 4, 11).12 The set of inductive arguments is constructed by the
algorithm in the following way. To start, the available evidence (concerning
T1 and T2) is divided into three subsets SUPERIOR, INFERIOR, and EQUI-
TABLE. The subset SUPERIOR contains all rows of the evidence table (i.e.,
evidence pieces) for which T1 was shown to be superior to T2. The subsets
INFERIOR and EQUITABLE are defined via the inferiority and equivalence
relations, respectively (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 10-11). The inductive
arguments are determined by permissible inference rules from the set of evi-
dence. Hunter and Williams propose the following three simple inference rules
that apply to cases where evidence is not conflicting (Hunter and Williams
2012, p. 11):
• If X ⊆ SUPERIOR, then T1 > T2
• If X ⊆ INFERIOR, then T1 < T2
• If X ⊆ EQUITABLE, then T1 ∼ T2
For example, given that two RCTs in the evidence table (E1, E2) state
that the contraceptive pill (T1) is inferior to no treatment (T2) for the outcome
11Hunter and Williams do not claim that this list of meta-arguments is definitive. Differ-
ent meta-arguments could be used in different application contexts or if different clinicians
use the aggregator for the same problem because the notion of ‘reliable evidence’ is debat-
able (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 25). Furthermore, Hunter and Williams explicitly say
that this flexibility of their aggregator allows for “a form of sensitivity analysis”. I take up
this idea in Section 3.4.
12I have augmented Hunter and Williams’ notation for an inductive argument to indicate
that inductive arguments are indexed to outcome indicators.
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indicator breast cancer (k), the inductive arguments (E1, T1 < T2)k, (E2, T1 <
T2)k, and ((E1, E2), T1 < T2)k can be generated. In a nutshell, their procedure
can be viewed as taking the last of one of these inductive arguments as being
the relevant one; that is, the inductive argument with the broadest set of
evidence for the respective superiority, inferiority, or equitability claim for an
outcome indicator.
With the notion of an inductive argument in place, one can specify the
aggregation rule for a single outcome indicator. Consider the example of two
studies with contradictory claims about the effects of contraceptive pills. Let
me assume that two inductive arguments can be generated for the outcome
indicator ovarian cancer (o): (E1, T1 < T2)o and (E2, T1 > T2)o, where T1 is
the contraceptive pill and T2 is no treatment. Hunter and Williams propose
two options to aggregate this information.13 First, they suggest performing a
statistical meta-analysis which aggregates the effect sizes of the two studies.
Once the effect size are combined one then can infer the binary superiority
relation. This amounts to generating a new inductive argument (while delet-
ing the two other ones) with the evidence basis E3 being the meta-analysis:
(E3, T1 < T2)o. This corresponds to laundering the evidence such that it no
longer conflicts. Second, the reliability criterion could be contradicting one
(or both) of the inductive arguments and thereby resolve the conflict between
the two arguments. It seems that Hunter and Williams assume that all (or
certainly the largest part) of the studies will give the same ordering for the
treatments for any particular indicator. Note that they do not propose an al-
ternative aggregation rule which is salient: a majority (or supermajority) rule
could be used in assessing the relevant majority proportions between numbers
of studies indicating that T1 is superior (inferior) to T2. This aggregation algo-
rithm shows that some expert judgement is required in the case of conflicting
evidence. Hence, their procedure is best described as partly automated.
So far, I have described the first aggregation step. For the sake of com-
pletion, I turn to their treatment of the overall multi-criteria problem: What
is the best treatment option taking into account all relevant outcome indi-
cators? Hunter and Williams suggest a pairwise comparison of the inductive
13This was clarified in personal communication with Hunter and Williams.
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arguments involving different outcome indicators: for example, the compar-
ison of two inductive arguments one stating that T1 is superior to T2 with
respect to ovarian cancer, the other stating that T2 is superior to T1 with
respect to pregnancy (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 15).
To this end, Hunter and Williams introduce a preference relation that is
defined over inductive arguments. The preference relation is derived from
a notion of benefits of treatments. Benefits of a treatment are defined by
the outcome indicators and their values: considerations regarding the relative
standing of the outcome indicators (e.g., pregnancy or breast cancer) and the
respective relative risks of developing the outcome indicators (e.g., small or
great relative risk reduction) (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 15). To illus-
trate the notion of benefit of treatment and how it can be used to construct
a preference relation over inductive arguments, consider the following hypo-
thetical example. Two evidence pieces for the same treatment pairs (e.g.,
T1: contraceptive pill, T2: no treatment) are available. Study 1 (E1) reports
for the outcome indicator ‘breast cancer’ (k) that T1 is worse than T2; study
2 (E2) reports for the outcome indicator ‘pregnancy’ (l) that T1 is better
than T2. Based on these studies, the following two inductive arguments can
be constructed: (E1, T1 < T2)k and (E2, T1 > T2)l. Note that the two out-
come indicators pull in different directions. In this case, Hunter and Williams
suggest that we should prefer the benefit of the substantially reduced risk
of becoming pregnant to the disadvantage of having a slightly increased risk
of developing breast cancer (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 15). Hence, the
preference relation between the two inductive arguments looks like this:14
(E2, T1 > T2)l  (E1, T1 < T2)k15
14They characterize the preference relation by a set of properties (Hunter and Williams
2012, p. 17-18). These properties, for example transitivity, can be used to extend the
preference relation to pairwise comparisons of treatment options for which benefits have
not been explicitly determined.
15One might worry that this suggestion runs into the problem of overlooking confounding
factors. For, is it not the case that one can only make statements about the benefits of
the two treatments in terms of ‘pregnancy’ and ‘breast cancer’ if the two treatments have
been evaluated in the same study? Hunter and Williams account for this problem via
meta-arguments that ensure that the patient classes are similar enough such that these
comparisons of different studies are possible.
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Hunter and Williams make suggestions about how the construction of the
preference relation could be automated. One way to do it, is to specify rules
for its construction; for example, the rule that for any outcome indicator con-
cerning survival and any minor side effect, the inductive argument involving
survival is preferred to the inductive argument involving the minor side effect,
if the treatment increases the chances of survival and the increase in the side
effect is of the same order of magnitude as the increase in survival (Hunter
and Williams 2012, p. 17). If such a set of rules is implemented, the algorithm
can execute them and construct the preference relations over the inductive
arguments.
Once such a preference relation is defined over all inductive arguments, the
multi-criteria decision problem can be resolved by determining what Hunter
and Williams call the winning inductive argument. The winning inductive ar-
gument is determined by the algorithm as the inductive argument that does
not appear in any preference relation as being preferred over another induc-
tive argument. If the two inductive arguments in my hypothetical example
involving breast cancer and pregnancy were the only two inductive arguments
under consideration, (E2, T1 > T2)l would be the winning argument. Once the
winning argument is identified, the all-things considered preference relation
between the treatments can be read off straightforwardly. In my hypothetical
example, one could read off the ordinal ranking T1 > T2.
16
Let me take stock here. Hunter and Williams put forward a decision sup-
port tool that has the components outlined in Section 3.2. The evidence ag-
gregation component can be seen to accord with the Bayesian witness schema.
Thus, the right building blocks are present in Hunter and Williams’s aggrega-
tor. However, a lot of design choices in their aggregator are not settled by the
abstract inputs of a Bayesian decision logic. In fact, there are many design
choices in Hunter and Williams’s aggregator that one might challenge. For
example, Hunter and Williams’s evidence aggregator can strike one as rather
crude; evidence is delineated simply in terms of separate studies; there is only
16Note that the set of winning arguments does not need to be a singleton. This is not
a problem if all the winning arguments express the same ordinal ranking of the treatment
options. If this is not the case, Hunter and Williams’s procedure yields an indifference
relation between the two treatment options (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 20).
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a small set of meta-arguments that are used to form the reliability judge-
ments; and the binary reliability judgements do not allow ruling in favour of
one evidence piece over another in degrees. But maybe this crude design of
the aggregator does strike the right balance between various desiderata, and,
hence, corresponds to the optimal amount of automation. How should one
even begin to make such an assessment? I will turn to this issue in the next
section.
3.4 A new assessment criterion for determin-
ing the optimal degree of automation: Ca-
pacity for robustness analysis
Similar to other approaches to evidence aggregation, Hunter and Williams’s
proposal can be seen to accord with a witness model, but this in itself does
not go far in terms of settling the quality of the inferences. I now consider
in more detail whether their procedure is fit for purpose. I address this issue
not solely for Hunter and Williams’s decision support tool but with respect
to automated evidence aggregation procedures more generally: What is the
appropriate extent of automation for an evidence aggregator to help facilitate
policy recommendations in a medical context?
The large question that is left open by the witness schema is how to delin-
eate the independent witnesses, and assess the nature and reliability of their
findings. Reliability, for instance, is a matter of both the quality and relevance
of the experiment or witness, given the hypotheses at hand. One must deter-
mine what features of individual pieces of evidence should inform this complex
reliability assessment and how exactly reliability should be determined on the
basis of these features. Assessing the reliability of the witnesses is one of the
key tasks that is automated in automated evidence aggregators. Recall that
Hunter and Williams automate the reliability assessment via meta-arguments.
In Section 3.4.1, I consider this question first from an ideal perspective,
free from any constraints on computational resources. In effect, I consider
better and worse treatments of (or inferences based on) a fixed amount of
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evidence (the more the better). Here I introduce the key idea of ability to
perform an adequate robustness analysis. In Section 3.4.2, I consider the more
realistic scenario where there may be constraints on computational resources.
I show that this is a further problem of a trade-off between nuanced analysis
of evidence and volume of evidence. I argue that it may not be the case that
aggregators that can handle more evidence are better. I will argue that there
is no requirement to aggregate the total evidence available if this would in
fact reduce overall accuracy.
3.4.1 Assessing aggregators in an ideal setting: no com-
putational constraints
In the absence of any computational constraints, the goodness of an auto-
mated evidence aggregator is all about ideal performance – the idea is to
make the best or wisest inferences possible for a class of cases, given all the
available evidence. Thus, one wants the reasoning process to be as nuanced
as possible, where the more of this nuance that can be captured by an explicit
algorithm, and so automated, the better. A higher degree of automation is
desirable, all else being equal, because it allows transparency, removes com-
putational error, enhances speed, and facilitates analysis of the sensitivity of
results to choices of parameter values, that is, a robustness analysis. In the
ideal setting then, any part of the reasoning process that can be made explicit
in advance of seeing the particular evidence at hand, should indeed be made
explicit. The only reason to leave some aspects of the reasoning process as
a black box is if this is advantageous in terms of the accuracy of the infer-
ence. In this case, it is better to leave it to experts to interpret and weigh the
particular evidence when it arises.
It is one thing to state the goal of automating all reasoning that can be
made explicit without sacrifice in analysis and that improves the accuracy
of the aggregation, but it is another thing to make these extremely difficult
judgements. To give detailed advice on how to make such judgement would
be to ask too much from this chapter. For one thing, much of the detail will
depend on the type of policy task at hand and the kind of evidence available.
95
Instead, what I am looking for are strategies that a practitioner may employ
to approach or frame the question in a way that may assist in arriving at an
answer. To put it differently: What general criterion provides the best avenue
for assessing the optimal degree of automation?
The criterion I propose for assessing the degree of automation of an evi-
dence aggregator is: Does the automated aggregator permit one to conduct
a robustness analysis that would yield a thorough and compelling survey of
the possibility space? Note that robustness analysis has already been men-
tioned above as a useful byproduct of automation. I cover this point briefly
in the next subsection. The novel proposal, however, is that this consequence
of automation can serve as a key point in the algorithm design. This is a
matter of deciding the explicit algorithm structure ex ante with an eye to
whether the subsequent robustness analysis will serve as a reasonable survey
of the possibility space for the type of aggregation problem at hand. In short,
focussing on the ability to conduct an adequate robustness analysis serves to
direct one’s priorities to what really matters – away from the precise ‘dial
settings’ of an aggregator, so to speak, and towards whether one has the right
dials to begin with.
Before proceeding, let me first clarify certain terms concerning the struc-
ture of an automated evidence aggregator. To start, there are input variables
describing the evidence. Recall, for instance, Hunter and Williams’s evidence
table: the columns are the input variables accounting for relevant features of
the evidence, and each row – an individual piece of evidence – is effectively a
vector of values for these input variables. Furthermore, there are the parame-
ters of the aggregation function that dictate how the values of the input vari-
ables bear on the assessment of each piece of evidence and ultimately on the
overall aggregation or final inference concerning the hypotheses in question.
For instance, the aggregation function might include a parameter ‘threshold
sample size’, which is used to measure the quality of a piece of evidence with
respect to sample size. Finally, these parameters are associated with a range
of possible values. Thanks to programming design, the parameters can be set
to any value within this range/set, depending on initial user input.
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Robustness analysis in its traditional role – as a useful byproduct
of automation
As we saw in the introduction to this thesis, robustness analysis involves deter-
mining the stability of a result given changes in assumptions. I distinguished
two types of robustness analysis: Derivational robustness analysis looks at
the stability of model derivations given changes in the model assumptions
(Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 542). Measurement robustness analysis looks at
the stability of empirical results given changes in empirical modes of determi-
nation (such as different types of experiments) (Wimsatt 1981, p. 128).
Here, I focus on derivational robustness analysis for two reasons. First, I
do not want to assume that (or assess whether) the various pieces of evidence
indicate the same ordering of treatments, as would be the focus of measure-
ment robustness analysis. In fact, as Stegenga (2009) convincingly argues,
in the biomedical sciences one is usually facing discordant evidence. As I
point out in the next section, it is not the robustness of the results but the
ability to perform a robustness analysis that is the focus of my new criterion.
Second, derivational robustness analysis is a form of error analysis, that is,
a way of exploring the sensitivity of results to choices of parameter values.
This error analysis can be read in a heuristic way. In particular, derivational
robustness analysis allows a transparent and traceable way of dealing with un-
avoidable idiosyncratic choices in the construction of an evidence aggregator.
These parameter value discrepancies might occur through uncertainty about
the correct values for an epistemic agent or through reasonable disagreement
between epistemic agents. Derivational robustness analysis can play this role
since it allows, as pointed out in the introduction, determining the relative
importance of various assumptions in relation to the result (Kuorikoski et al.
2010, p. 543).
Given my assumption about how an automated evidence aggregator is
implemented, these aggregators are well set up for this kind of error anal-
ysis. This point has been brought up by Hunter and Williams in relation
to the meta-arguments in their aggregator. They note that their procedure
allows “a form of sensitivity analysis” by including different meta-arguments
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(Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 25). By including different meta-arguments,
the reliability of the evidence is assessed differently.
In other contexts too, sensitivity analysis is recommended as a way to
keep track and explore the implications of model choices that are subject to
uncertainty and/or reasonable disagreement. For instance, Stegenga (2011,
p. 498) points out that there are many choices of this kind in statistical
meta-analysis:
Meta-analysis fails to constrain intersubjective assessments of hy-
potheses because numerous decisions must be made when per-
forming a meta-analysis which allow wide latitude for subjective
idiosyncrasies to influence the results of a meta-analysis.
Let me now turn to the new role of robustness analysis in the context
of my criterion for assessing the optimal extent of automation for evidence
aggregation procedures.
Robustness analysis in its new role – as a central design criterion
For all the good of derivational robustness analysis, one might regard it a
secondary issue when it comes to assessing the degree of automation of an
evidence aggregator. Surely the primary issue is whether the aggregator facil-
itates roughly the best inferences possible given the available evidence; error
analysis is a matter of extra detail. As suggested in the previous section, ro-
bustness is indeed typically considered an ex post analysis or a way to check
what confidence one should have in a model result. Here I want to defend,
however, a more central role for robustness analysis in the construction and as-
sessment of an evidence aggregator. In short, the prospect of what robustness
analysis can be performed focuses one’s attention on what really matters, that
is, the functional form and possible inputs to the evidence aggregator, rather
than the precise parameter values featuring in the aggregator. Put differ-
ently, viewing the construction of an automated evidence aggregator through
the lense of robustness analysis helps one to assess what parts of the inference
process can be made explicit and transparent.
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There are two reasons why focussing ex ante on the capacity for robustness
analysis is helpful in making these judgements about algorithm design: To
start, it allows one to recognise that certain types of uncertainty or error
regarding precise parameter values do not compromise automation, since the
impact of these uncertainties can be explored via the robustness analysis ex
post. Furthermore, it allows one to recognise that other types of uncertainty
or error do in fact compromise automation, and, hence, call for a lesser extent
of automation. These are cases where there is not only low confidence in the
‘best guess’ estimates for parameter values, but where there is low confidence
in the entire possibility space that would be afforded by robustness analysis
accomplishable with the algorithm design under scrutiny. In this case, it is not
clear whether the remedy is more or less automation, but robustness analysis
can guide the deliberation process.
The basic idea of the latter point can be visualised with the help of a
diagram (see Figure 3.1). Assume that you face a particular evidence aggre-
gation task (e.g., the assessment of the causal efficacy of a treatment with
respect to pain relief and blood pressure). You ask yourself what optimal
extent of automation of an aggregator is for this type of aggregation task.
The criterion introduced above asks you to make this decision in the light
of robustness considerations. In particular, it asks you to choose an aggre-
gator design that allows better coverage of the relevant possibility space. In
Figure 3.1 this would be aggregator design B. The relevant possibility space
(illustrated with the help of a box) contains inferences (and their outcomes)
that are deemed relevant for the evidence aggregation problem at hand. Al-
though the space is here visualised in two dimensions, the space is in fact
multi-dimensional, being created by variations in input variables, forms of
the aggregation function defined over these input variables, as well as param-
eter values associated with the input variables. For example, one might be
unsure whether for a particular aggregation task the sample size of a trial
matters or not and how it should matter; multiple stances can be taken in
relation to this question and, hence, a space of relevant possibilities opens up.
Importantly, the qualification ‘relevant’ should not be understood as denoting
the theoretically relevant space, that is, all epistemically defensible variations
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of an aggregation procedure for a given task at hand. Rather, it is a practi-
cally relevant space, that is, the space of possibilities that are entertained by
the epistemic agent faced with the aggregation task.
Figure 3.1: Two different aggregator designs A and B that entail different
coverages of the relevant possibility space (my diagram).
Let me clarify the criterion with an example. Imagine the incremental de-
velopment of an evidence aggregator. The starting structure might be a very
basic one, where the pieces of evidence are described in terms of two input vari-
ables, say, ‘type of study’, with possible values ‘randomised controlled trial
(RCT)’ and ‘observational study’, and also ‘statistical significance’, where
possible values are simply ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The logic of the reliability assess-
ments might proceed along the following lines: Only studies that are sta-
tistically significant have positive reliability (such that they are included in
the aggregation), and amongst those, the RCTs are given more weight ac-
cording to a parameter β, specifically, RCTs are given β-times the reliability
weighting of observational studies. Note that Hunter and Williams introduce
a crude reliability judgement of this sort by considering meta-arguments that
include/exclude evidence pieces based on whether results are statistically sig-
nificant or not. Now, one might reflect on the robustness analysis afforded
by this aggregator design. The possibility space, which can be covered by a
robustness analysis, will include inferences based on a range of values for β.
But this might be regarded too limited a set of possibilities.
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For the above example aggregator, the possibility space afforded by ro-
bustness analysis might be deemed more adequate if the algorithm for making
reliability judgements were more detailed. A relatively straightforward inno-
vation is to convert judgements that are currently implicit but need not be
explicit aspects of the algorithm. For instance, with regard to the example,
the judgements of statistical significance could be spelled out more explicitly.
One way of doing this is substituting the p-value of the study as the input
variable, and then deriving whether the study is statistically significant ac-
cording to the parameter α, such that if the p-value is less than α, the study is
deemed statistically significant. The corresponding robustness analysis would
then produce a possibility space that includes a range of values for α, which
would presumably be more thorough.17
The more difficult judgements concern aspects of the reasoning process
where it is not clear whether more or less detail in the explicit algorithm
would be better. Adding detail to the explicit algorithm is a good thing pro-
vided this is tracking a genuine nuance of reasoning. However, there is an
alternative scenario in which extra detail in the explicit algorithm systemati-
cally distorts the reasoning process. This can happen, for example, by making
the algorithm design more rigid in a way that is not rectified by robustness
analysis. Returning to the example, a key reason why the initial robustness
analysis might be deemed inadequate is that the reliability weightings depend
purely on ‘study type’, and it might be thought that this is not the most per-
tinent grouping as far as quality of evidence is concerned. One possibility
is to add further dimensions to this grouping: perhaps ‘sample size’ and a
measure of the ‘relevance of experimental subject’, that is, the closeness of
the experimental group to the patient class at hand, could also be included
as an input variable, and treated in the reliability function with reference
to appropriate parameters. In this case, the robustness analysis would effec-
17Let me be clear at this point that I do not want to endorse statistical significance
as important for determining whether a study result ought to be included in evidence
aggregation. There are reasons to worry about this interpretation of statistical results.
The claim is simply that if this property were to play such a role, better to make the
reasoning as explicit as possible, and enable the exploration of changes in the chosen level
of significance.
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tively survey the possibilities associated with changing the relative weights of
these more fine-grained study groupings, which would potentially be a more
adequate representation of the real space of possibilities.18
At this point, I can take stock and connect the discussion to the leading
question of this chapter: What is the value of derivational robustness analysis
if not the entire relevant model space is covered by the available models? As
my discussion in this section was supposed to show, the structural reflections
about evidence aggregation algorithms are the same as the one that can be
asked about a set of models. There too exists a situation in which an epis-
temic agent must judge how much of the relevant possibility space is covered.
The transferable upshot of the discussion in this section is that, in cases in
which not the entire relevant possibility space is covered, derivational robust-
ness analysis nevertheless can play a fruitful role: it provides a structured
way of forming preference relations over different model structures, where the
preference relation is based on the amount of the relevant possibility space
that is covered by a model.
3.4.2 Computational constraints: When is greater vol-
ume of evidence better?
I turn now to the scenario where there are constraints on computational and
other resources. In practice this is always the case. Hunter and Williams
also have resource constraints in mind when they motivate the usage of their
aggregator (Hunter and Williams 2012, p. 2). To start, the on-going mainte-
nance of the database of evidential inputs demands a lot of person hours for
identifying and recording the relevant features of each experiment or piece of
evidence. When it comes to running the aggregator, once the database is in
hand, the algorithms for selecting, assessing the reliability and aggregating
relevant pieces of evidence to arrive at a conclusion about the hypotheses in
18For example, one can define for the input variable ‘sample size’ the parameter γ such
that the reliability assessment of a study correlates not linearly to the sample size but
increases in a step-function fashion. For the input variable ‘relevance of experimental
subject’, a parameter δ could be introduced in relation to the similarity measure between
the experimental and patient group.
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question all require processing time. In short, the aggregator may be subject
to various limitations on resources. The assessment of evidence aggregators
in the presence of such constraints calls for a trade-off between inferential
accuracy and efficiency.
The way forward is to carefully think about how one should spend one’s
budget to best achieve inferential accuracy. It is not the case that all available
evidence must be taken into account. The tenet that inference must be based
on all available evidence19 refers to an ideal setting but not to a practical
setting where, due to resource constraints, this evidence cannot all be assessed
in full detail. That would indeed be an odd requirement on an evidence
aggregator – that just because some apparently relevant evidence has been
tabled, it must influence the inference at hand, even if in a necessarily crude
fashion.
My claim in relation to the question of the optimal extent of automation
given resource constraints is the following: The assessment of an evidence
aggregator under circumstances of resource constraints is not so different from
the assessment of an aggregator that is free from resource constraints. In both
cases it is performance, that is, quality of inference regarding the hypotheses
at hand, that matters. Once again this is best assessed by focussing on the
capacity for robustness analysis. In the context of resource constraints, the
‘principle of total evidence’ may be better honoured by processing a subset
of evidence in more detail rather than a greater amount of evidence in lesser
detail.
This further balancing act can be informed by the capacity of an evidence
aggregator for robustness analysis. Let me discuss an extreme scenario that
may shed light on the more difficult non-extreme cases. The worst case, is an
evidence aggregator for which one is not confident that any of the input ev-
idence contributes to higher quality inference about the hypotheses at hand,
regardless of the precise values of key parameters. Here, it is not even the case
that, conditional on using the aggregator at hand, inferences based on more
evidence are better. In the more ordinary and difficult cases, by contrast,
all the aggregators under assessment will be ones for which more evidence
19This is the Principle of Total Evidence (Carnap 1947).
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(requiring more resources) permits better inferences using that aggregator.
Here, the possibility space associated with each aggregator, owing to robust-
ness analysis, is at least deemed adequate. The further question in this case
is which aggregator allows for the best quality inferences given the resource
budget at hand, where some aggregators process less evidence with greater
nuance while others process more evidence with lesser nuance. Thus, what
using robustness analysis as a lens allows one to do is to determine the set of
acceptable aggregator designs, which can be a very helpful piece of informa-
tion for assessing the question of balancing volume and nuanced analysis of
fewer pieces of evidence.
3.5 Potential objections to the proposed cri-
terion
To conclude, I consider potential criticisms of my approach to assessing the
optimal extent of automation of an evidence aggregator. On the one side of the
spectrum, it might be objected that I rely too much on intuitive reasoning or
expert judgement, when it would be better to appeal to objective assessments
of the track record of evidence aggregators. On the opposite side, it might
be objected that there is no plausible alternative to implicit expert reasoning
when it comes to aggregating diverse evidence.
Two things can be said in response to the first objection. To begin with,
in the case that one could objectively assess the track record of an automated
evidence aggregator, the ability to perform a robustness analysis would still
be an important consideration. This ability would allow comparing the per-
formance of multiple versions of an aggregator and, hence, selecting the best
aggregator. Second, it is not obvious of what an objective assessment of the
track record of an aggregator would consist. A clear criterion for an aggre-
gator having produced a verified result would be an instance in which the
aggregator predicts an event and the event in fact takes place. However, the
kinds of hypotheses considered in this chapter (e.g., ‘treatment 1 is better
than treatment 2 with respect to breast cancer rates’) are generally not of
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this kind. Medical hypotheses tend to be stochastic (and moreover, asso-
ciated predictions often depend on a number of auxiliary conditions); thus,
there is no definitive point in the future at which evidence would be received
that would settle such matters.
The second objection is: The automation of evidence amalgamation is
doomed to fail because it is inherently resistant to explicit algorithms. To
start, one might argue that judgement is required at a very basic level, namely
for the application of any (reliability) criterion to a particular experimental
finding. Even if the reliability criterion is expressed in a functional form
in terms of input variables and parameters, this objection goes, the value
assigned to the input variables in any concrete case requires expert judgement.
Stegenga (2014, p. 203) cites empirical studies showing that applying the
same quality assessment tools to the same medical finding leads to widely
diverging quality assessment of this medical evidence, because the finding
itself is perceived differently by different investigators. Let me respond by
pointing out that I accept the importance of expert judgement in the process
of evidence aggregation. Yet, I wish to stress that there is no reason to deny
that at least some of the reasoning involved in evidence aggregation/inference
can be broken down and made explicit via an algorithm. Indeed, aggregators
may be deemed more or less transparent depending on the extent to which
they explicitly account for the all the steps underlying the final assessment of
hypotheses.
In addition, one might argue that evidence amalgamation is resistant to
explicit algorithms since every case of amalgamation is distinct, and, hence,
an algorithm, which is necessarily more general, misses the distinct features
of the particular case. I do not find this objection convincing. Surely, there
is a sufficient degree of similarity between classes of evidence aggregation
problems that allows formulating aggregation rules that can be encoded in an
automated aggregator. The quality assessment tools mentioned by Stegenga
(2014) are a case in point.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I engaged with Hunter and Williams’ automated evidence ag-
gregator to address my second research question: What is the value of deriva-
tional robustness analysis if not the entire relevant possibility space is covered
by the available models? As it turned out, the structural reflections about
evidence aggregation algorithms are the same as the one that can be asked
about a set of models. I put forward a new criterion for assessing automated
evidence aggregators. This criterion reveals a role of derivational robustness
analysis even in cases where an epistemic agent knows that not the entire rele-
vant possibility space has been covered in a robustness analysis. Derivational
robustness analysis provides a structured way of establishing a preference re-
lation over different algorithm designs by emphasising the amount of relevant
possibility space covered. Due to the analogy between algorithms and models,
this analysis shows that derivational robustness analysis provides a structured
way of forming preference relations over different model structures, where the
preference relation is based on the amount of the relevant possibility space
that is covered by a model.
As a spin-off of my engagement with Hunter and Williams’s proposal, I
argued that where there are resource constraints on the aggregation process,
one must also consider what balance between volume of evidence and accuracy
in the treatment of individual evidence best facilitates inference. Again, con-
centrating on robustness analysis helps here, but there are further trade-offs
between nuanced analysis of evidence and volume of evidence that must be
taken into account. There is no requirement to aggregate the total evidence
available if this would in fact reduce overall accuracy.
In the following chapter, I turn to policy-making in the economic domain.
This enables me to examine further issues surrounding derivational robustness
analysis, in particular the question of what to do if the robustness condition
fails across a set of models. Before I address this question, I shall argue that
economic policy-making reveals that one can distinguish an additional fruitful
category of robustness analysis.
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Chapter 4
Robustness in Economic
Policy-Making: A New
Characterisation of Toy Models
4.1 Introduction
Observing a group of children is interesting for many reasons. One is surely
their ability to engage in all kinds of play. They spend hours building sand
sculptures, throwing marbles, or pretending to be characters from the middle
ages. A look into the psychological literature on child development reveals
that these activities foster the development of important cognitive and emo-
tional capabilities, such as creativity (Singer and Singer 1990), self-regulation
(Hirsh-Pasek et al. 2009), and problem solving (Smith and Dutton 1979).
These capabilities are particularly promoted by pretense-play, that is the in-
tentional projection of mentally represented alternatives on a given situation
in the spirit of play (Lilliard et al. 2013, p. 2).
Scientists in a variety of fields also engage in activities that have been
characterised in play-like terms. Most notably, scientists often construct and
explore toy models (Hartmann et al. 2016; Sugden 2000; Kuorikoski and Lehti-
nen 2009; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2013a). Such models play a cen-
tral role in science, including in social sciences. For example, Schelling (1971)
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introduced a toy model of racial segregation. In this model, cities are repre-
sented as two-dimensional grids, inhabited by stars and dots that move around
to satisfy their preference not to be in the minority in their neighbourhood.
The model is regarded as a paradigmatic case of a good social scientific model
(Sugden 2000, p. 29).
Toy models are particularly widespread in economics.1 Morgan (2013, p.
384) observes the following:
To an outsider coming to the field of economics, one of the most
striking things is the way that economists feel that they can ex-
press so much of what happens in the economy with their small
worlds, within these little chunks of mathematics or puzzling dia-
grams. (...) Economic models have occasionally been referred to
as ‘toy models’ (by both critics and users), conjuring up images
of the scale models of farm animals and fire engines.
Indeed, economists describe their own practice in these play-like terms.
Romer (1993, p. 66), a famous macroeconomist, explicitly uses the term ‘toy
model’ and remarks that the “label is apt because a good theoretical model
should be as easy to manipulate in one’s head as the mental image of a child’s
toy”. Jaeger (2009) reported the increased usage of the notion ‘toy model’ in
economics, before dismissing it since it had not yet been defined clearly.
Economic toy models influence economic policy-making. Economic policy
decisions are frequently justified with reference to a body of economic knowl-
edge. As, for example Kocherlakota (2009, p. 19) states, it was the case that
a significant part of policy during the recent financial crisis was not based on
particular models but on a broader set of background beliefs, including verbal
intuitions and crude correlations. Toy models shape these background beliefs.
Akerlof’s market for lemons model, which discuss in more detail below, illus-
trates this role of toy models in shaping relevant background beliefs. In 2001,
Akerlof shared the Nobel Prize for economics with Joseph Stiglitz and Michael
1This statement should not be read as suggesting that state of the art economics is
mostly a theoretical exercise. As Smith (2016) makes clear, economics has become more
empirically orientated over the last five decades.
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Spence, who were joint winners for their work on informational asymmetries
and market behaviour. Akerlof’s share of the prize was awarded largely for his
paper “Market for Lemons”, where he showed that in markets, in which the
sellers know more about the product than buyers, low-quality products can
squeeze out high-quality products (Akerlof 1970). This publication is not only
one of the best-known papers in theoretical economics (Sugden 2000, p. 2),
but the concept of informational asymmetries has influenced the regulation
and design of many markets. The model has been influential despite the fact
that, as will become clear below, it does not give precise quantitative predic-
tions about the role of different types of informational asymmetries that can
arise in markets.
In this chapter, I look closer at the notion of a toy model and provide a
new characterisation of this term that enables me to address my first research
question: Do measurement and derivational robustness analysis exhaust the
set of useful types of robustness analysis? As it turns out, toy models can be
characterised by a particular form of stability requirement which I will call
predictive stability : abstract (or higher-level) properties, which are exemplified
by toy model results, are robust under changes of target systems; or to put it
differently, toy models come equipped with the hypothesis that their results
are present across different target systems since the results do not depend on
the lower-level configuration of these systems.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce five models which
have been characterised as toy-like in the literature and which exhibit partic-
ularly interesting features (Section 4.2 ). Second, I show how existing charac-
terisations of models fail to adequately delineate this set (Section 4.3 ). Third,
I propose a new approach to characterising toy models. I take the five mod-
els as the starting point and identify three condition that jointly characterise
them: i) a manipulability condition regarding the derivation of key model
results, ii) a relation of multiple realisability between key model results and
a set of diverse target systems, and iii) a non-representation relation between
the basic entities and properties of a model and target systems (Section 4.4 ).
I then highlight three corollaries of my explication (Section 4.5 ).
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4.2 Five case studies
In this section, I introduce five models. These models are particularly in-
teresting cases of toy models as they give a totally wrong-headed picture of
reality. The examples stem from a variety of scientific disciplines: from physics
(Kac ring), economics (Akerlof’s market for lemons, Hotelling’s model, DY
model), and sociology (Schelling’s checkerboard model). Although the focus
of this and the next chapter is the epistemic value of toy models for economic
policy-making, models from physics and sociology are also discussed, since
the primary aim of this chapter is a conceptual clarification of the term ‘toy
model’.
My characterisation is based on these five models. These five cases, how-
ever, do not exhaust the models that are labelled ‘toy’ in scientific practice
and by the philosophy of science literature. As will become clear from the
discussion below, there is some disagreement about how the cases should be
classified. To start, the term ‘toy model’ is used across disciplines to denote
models that solely represent one causal (or explanatory) factor or mechanism
in a target system. After I have presented my account of toy models, I am
able to state precisely a crucial difference between these models and my five
identified cases. Because of this difference, I suggest distinguishing between
toy models and, what I call, one-factor models (see Section 4.5.1). The term
‘toy model’ is also used to denote models that are employed for exploring
theories. With respect to this usage of term, I will suggest that one should
group such models under the notion of probing models (see Section 4.5.2).
The main reason for these two, admittedly invasive, terminological moves
is to achieve the clearest possible view of the set of ‘toy-like’ models. My
account of toy models identifies a particularly interesting set of models; inter-
esting, because they pose a particular challenge to learning with models, as I
argue in Chapter 5.
4.2.1 Schelling’s checkerboard model
Schelling (1971)’s checkerboard model is widely regarded as toy-like (see Hart-
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mann et al. 2016; The´bault et al. 2016; Jebeile 2016; Casini 2014; Ylikoski
and Aydinonat 2014; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2013a; Cartwright
2009; Sugden 2000). Schelling’s model focuses on the “interactive dynamics
of discriminatory individual choices” (Schelling 1971, p. 143). Discriminatory
choices are those which reflect, consciously or unconsciously, identity features,
such as sex, age, religion, or race (Schelling 1971, p. 144).
The key insight of the model is that one can end up with segregation even
with very mild discriminatory preferences, such as the preference that one is
not in a minority (Schelling 1971, p. 156). Although, Schelling applies the
model to the segregation of black and white citizens in the cities of the United
States, he envisages a much broader domain of application (see Schelling 1971,
p. 144):
The analysis, though, is so abstract that any twofold distinction
could constitute an interpretation — whites and blacks, boys and
girls, officers and enlisted men, students and faculty, teenagers
and grown-ups. The only requirement of the analysis is that the
distinction be twofold, exhaustive, and recognizable.
How does the model work? Schelling assumes that a population can be
divided into two groups. Membership in a group is permanent. Everyone is
assumed to care only about the composition of their neighbourhood in terms
of members. Everyone has a particular location at every given moment in time
and is, if not satisfied with the neighbourhood, capable of moving (Schelling
1971, p. 149). He introduces a one- and two-dimensional version of the model.
In the one-dimensional version of the model, a given finite number of stars
and zeros are allocated in a random initial distribution on a straight line. For
each element of the line a neighbourhood is defined that contains the four
elements left and right of the particular star (or zero). Each element of the
line is endowed with a preference over the composition of its neighbourhood:
each element wants at least half of its neighbours to be like itself. Completing
the model with a movement rule generates the dynamics of the model: If every
element moves to the nearest spot that satisfies its preference and the order
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of movement is from left to right, then, after a short sequence of movements,
a segregated pattern emerges on the line (Schelling 1971, p. 151).
In the two-dimensional version of the model, the elements can move in
a plane. This yields a checkerboard structure (see Figure 4.1). Assuming a
suitable change in the neighbourhood definition (the neighbourhood includes
the eight adjunct cells of a specific cell on the grid), the preferences defined
over these neighbourhoods (a fixed percentage of members of the neighbour-
hood needs to be of the same colour), and the movement rule (the movement
happens roughly from left to right areas whereas elements move to the closest
spot determined by the number of squares they have to traverse horizontally
and vertically), patterns of segregation emerge (Schelling 1971, p. 157). Both
versions of the model do not presuppose any anticipation of the movements
of other agents (Schelling 1971, p. 150).
Figure 4.1: Two-dimensional version of Schelling’s checkerboard model with
a random initial distribution (Hartmann et al. 2016, Figure 1).
4.2.2 Akerlof’s market for lemons
In his paper Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, Akerlof investigates the role of information in the working of markets.
The model of a car market is widely regarded as toy-like (see Hartmann et al.
2016; Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009; Sugden 2000).
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The key insight of the model is the negative role that differences in infor-
mation between sellers and buyers of goods or services (informational asym-
metries) can play. More precisely, markets can collapse entirely if the infor-
mational asymmetries are too large (Akerlof 1970, p. 488; Sugden 2000, p.
4-5). Although Akerlof discusses the car market, he has a broader domain of
application in mind (Akerlof 1970, p. 488, 489). He makes this particularly
clear in an autobiographical reflection:
Indeed, I soon saw that asymmetric information was potentially an
issue in any market where the quality of goods would be difficult
to see by anything other than casual inspection. Rather than
being a handful of markets, the exception rather than the rule,
that seemed to me to include most markets. (Akerlof 2001, p. 4)
How does the model work? Akerlof assumes that there are only four types
of cars: New cars vs. old cars and good vs. bad cars. Akerlof calls bad cars
‘lemons’ and good cars ‘peaches’. Individuals in the market who buy a new
car do not know its quality at the moment of purchase, but do know that with
probability q it is a peach and with probability (1−q) it is a lemon. However,
after having owned a specific car for a length of time, the car owner can form
an idea about the quality of his or her car. In this situation, an asymmetry
of information has developed between the car owner and the potential buyer
(Akerlof 1970, p. 489). In this situation, the buyer of a used car is not willing
to pay more than the average expected quality of a car. Owners of peaches
are not willing to sell their cars on the market because they will not receive
an adequate price for their above average quality car. Hence, the peaches are
not marketed at all and one ends up with a market for lemons (Akerlof 1970,
p. 490).
Akerlof complements this analysis with a case in which the quality of the
product is not discrete (i.e., peaches vs. lemons) but continuous. In this
case the conclusion is even starker: one observes a complete drying-up of the
market, that is, no trade takes place. To show this, he introduces an explicit
demand and supply function for the used car market and investigates the
price assumption, under which trade happens. He distinguishes between two
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types of traders: group one and two. They are endowed with the following
utility functions (where M is the consumption of goods other than cars, xi
is the quality of the i-th car, and n is the number of cars) (Akerlof 1970, p.
490):
U1 = M +
n∑
i=1
xi (4.1)
U2 = M +
n∑
i=1
(3/2)xi (4.2)
Both types of traders are assumed to be von Neumann-Morgenstern max-
imisers of expected utility. Group one has N cars with uniformly distributed
quality (0≤x≤2) and the price of M is unity. These assumptions allow de-
riving the demand and supply of cars by group one and two, respectively.
Adding up the demand for group one and two gives the following description
of total demand D, where Yi is the income of group i of traders and µ is the
average quality of cars in the market (Akerlof 1970, p. 491):
D =

(Y1 + Y2)/p if p < µ
(Y2)/p if µ < p < (3/2)µ
0 if p > (3/2)µ
(4.3)
Since with price p the average quality of cars in the market is going to be
p/2, none of the conditions set out in the equations (4.3) are fulfilled at any
price level, and, hence no trade takes place (Akerlof 1970, p. 491).
To show that the insight of the model is also transferable to other market
contexts, Akerlof (1970, p. 492) discusses the case of medical insurance.
Older people have difficulty getting medical insurance since, as the premium
increases with age, only those who are increasingly certain that they need the
cover will insure themselves. This means that the average health level of the
insured deteriorates as the price level rises, resulting in a situation in which
no one can get insurance regardless of the price level.
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4.2.3 DY model
The Dragulescu and Yakovenko (DY) model (Dragulescu and Yakovenko 2000)
is a toy model from econophysics and has recently been picked up in the
philosophical literature (see Hartmann et al. 2016 and The´bault et al. 2016).
Econophysics is the relatively young field that applies models from physics to
questions in economics; mostly methods of statistical mechanics are used to
analyse financial market phenomena (Rickles 2007). The DY model is a model
of monetary income distributions in societies. Monetary income distributions
can be visualised by plotting the actual income per annum against the cumula-
tive percentage of people earning this income (see Figure 4.2). The DY model
treats agents as analogous to molecules and their interactions as analogous to
molecular collisions in which kinetic energy is exchanged. These collisions lead
to the observable income distributions. This contrasts with the neo-classical
macroeconomic approach to explaining income distributions, which sees the
interplay between technological development, education level of workers, and
their marginal productivity as key drivers. In short, given that there is ed-
ucational progress in a society, if there is a long period without significant
technological change, then the education levels of lower-skilled workers catch
up, their marginal productivity increases, and, hence, a more equal income
distribution results. In contrast, if there is rapid technological change, then
the education levels of lower-skilled workers will not catch up, a differential
in marginal productivity compared to better educated workers remains, and,
hence, a more unequal income distribution results (The´bault et al. 2016, p.
5-6).
The key insight of the DY model is that the bulk of the monetary income
distribution is exponentially distributed. This observation can be made for a
wide range of real income data (The´bault et al. 2016, p. 6).2
How does the model work?3 The DY model assumes that there is a large
2To keep the exposition simple, I focus here on the income distribution’s exponential
bulk. As displayed in Figure 4.2, income distributions also show a power law tail. This
second fact can be recovered by adding random savings to the DY model (The´bault et al.
2016, p. 3, 16).
3I rely on the exposition of The´bault et al. (2016), which parallels the one of Dragulescu
and Yakovenko (2000) but is clearer.
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Figure 4.2: Representation of an income distribution (The´bault et al. 2016,
Figure 1).
population of agents with zero intelligence (i.e., they have no capacity for
anticipatory or strategic behaviour). At any given time t an agent i is asso-
ciated with an amount of money mi that is non-negative. At any given time
t, two individuals i and j are randomly selected from the population. Their
interaction is modelled as a binary exchange of money. When they meet,
their pre-interaction money mi and mj, respectively, is pooled. From this
pooled money a random fraction ij is given to agent i and the rest to agent
j. During all the interactions the number of agents and the total amount of
money stays the same. The post interaction money allocation looks like this
(The´bault et al. 2016, p. 8):
mi(t+ 1) = mi(t) + ∆m (4.4)
mj(t+ 1) = mj(t)−∆m (4.5)
where ∆m denotes the amount that is exchanged between the agents and
can be expressed as:
∆m = ij(mi(t) +mj(t))−mi(t) (4.6)
Given this set-up, a probability distribution over the monetary income of
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the agents can be defined. To do this, bins of monetary amounts are delineated
such that a bin has the width a.4 Let Nk denote the number of agents with
income between mk and mk +a. The probability of an agent falling into bin k
(p(mk)) is
Nk
N
. Now, the fact that a specific number of agents is in bin k can
be realised in multiple ways (since only the number of agents is relevant and,
hence, two sets with equal cardinalities representing different combinations
of agents are not distinguished). Given this, one can express the number of
distinct placements of agents that establish the same number of agents in bin
k as:
Ω =
N !
k!(N − k)! (4.7)
Now, the DY model exploits the fact that the natural logarithm of (4.7)
corresponds to the entropy measure in statistical mechanics.5 Borrowing the
fact from statistical mechanics that equilibria in thermodynamic systems are
states in which entropy is maximised enables one to find the equilibrium prob-
ability distribution over the income bins by maximising lnΩ (see Dragulescu
and Yakovenko 2000, p. 724). Performing this maximising procedure yields
the following probability distribution (The´bault et al. 2016, p. 9):
P (mk) =
Nk
N
= e−
mk−µ
T (4.8)
with T = M
N
and µ = −T lnT
a
. The distribution P (mk) is an exponential
distribution and has a bulk. Hence, the DY model reproduces one of the facts
about monetary income distributions.
4.2.4 Hotelling’s model
Hotelling’s model (Hotelling 1929) is widely regarded as toy-like (see Reiss
2012; Alexandrova and Northcott 2013; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2013b; Hausman 2013;
Ma¨ki 2013; Rol 2013). Hotelling’s model is used to study monopolistic com-
4I part here with the notation used by The´bault et al. (2016, p. 9) to simplify the
exposition.
5This concept will be introduced in more detail in discussion of the Kac ring (see Section
4.2.5).
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petition, that is, situations in which sellers of a product or service have a
certain market power realised as price-setting capacity.
The key insight of the model is expressed as Hotelling’s law of minimal
differentiation (Reiss 2012, p. 44). The law states that competitors supply
products or services that are very similar (Reiss 2012, p. 46). Hotelling (1929,
p. 54, 57) observes this in many economic situations:
It [the tendency to minimal differentiation] leads some factories to
make cheap shoes for the poor and others to make expensive shoes
for the rich, but all the shoes are too much alike. Our cities become
uneconomically large and the business districts within them too
concentrated.6
Hotelling also observes this phenomenon in many non-economic situations
(Hotelling 1929, p. 54, 57):
In politics it is strikingly exemplified. The competition for votes
between the Republican and Democratic parties does not lead to
a clear drawing of issues, and adoption of two strongly contrasted
positions between which the voters might choose. Instead, each
party strives to make its platform as much like the other’s as
possible (...) Methodist and Presbyterian churches are too much
alike.
How does the model work? Assume that buyers of a commodity are uni-
formly distributed along a line with length l. At distances a and b from the
endpoints of this line two producers A and B are located (see Figure 4.3).
Each buyer consumes one unit of the commodity per time interval and
must transport the bought unit of commodity to his or her location with a cost
of c per unit distance. The production cost per unit commodity is zero for both
producers. The consumer’s preferences for producers are solely determined
by the total of the price per unit commodity and the transportation costs.
6The normative judgements expressed here (“too much alike”, “too concentrated”) refer
to the fact that the resulting equilibrium allocations are not socially optimal. I take this
point up in my description of the details of the model.
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Figure 4.3: Two producers are positioned along a continuum of buyers in the
basic set-up of the Hotelling model (my diagram).
Hotelling denotes the prices of producers A and B as p1 and p2, respectively
(q1 and q2 are the sold quantities at these prices) (Hotelling 1929, p. 45).
Given these assumptions, one can determine the equilibrium position of
the two producers A and B along the line. To do this, consider first consumer
C who is indifferent between buying from producer A or B (see Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Consumer C is indifferent between producers A and B since the
total costs of acquiring the goods either from A or B are identical (my dia-
gram).
For this consumer, the costs associated with acquiring the unit of the
commodity from either of the two producers need to be equal (where x and
y is the segment of l which connects A, or B respectively, with the consumer
of interest):
p1 + cx = p2 + cy (4.9)
Combining this with the observation that a + x + y + b = l, one can
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formulate the profits for producers A and B as (Hotelling 1929, p. 46):
pi1 = p1q1 = p1(a+ x) =
1
2
(l + a− b)p1 − p
2
1
2c
+
p1p2
2c
(4.10)
pi2 = p2q2 = p2(b+ y) =
1
2
(l − a+ b)p2 − p
2
2
2c
+
p1p2
2c
(4.11)
Differentiating both equations (4.10) and (4.11) with respect to the prices
p1 and p2 and setting the resulting equations to zero yields the following
optimal price-setting behaviour for the two producers (Hotelling 1929, p. 46):
p1 = c(l +
a− b
3
) (4.12)
p2 = c(l − a− b
3
) (4.13)
Given the equations for the optimal quantities of A and B (following from
the same optimality condition), one can express the profits of A and B as
(Hotelling 1929, p. 50):
pi1 =
c
2
(l +
a− b
3
)2 (4.14)
pi2 =
c
2
(l − a− b
3
)2 (4.15)
Now, assume that the position of the producers on the line is not fixed.
A tries to maximise profits by increasing a. B tries to maximise profits by
increasing b. Hence, if they can move, the two producers move as closely
together as possible without occupying exactly the same spot on the line (this
would end in a price war that reduces the profits for both) (Hotelling 1929,
p. 52). Note, finally, that the resulting allocation is not socially optimal. If
A and B were to end up at the 1/4 and 3/4 point of the line, they would also
split the profits but the customers would have to travel less (Reiss 2012, p.
46).
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4.2.5 Kac ring
The Kac ring (Kac 1959) is a toy model from statistical mechanics (see Jebeile
2016; Gottwald and Oliver 2009, p. 614). To be able to express its key insight,
I must present some background regarding the second law of thermodynamics
and time-reversible physical processes.
Thermodynamics is the field of physics that describes phenomena from
a macro-perspective, such as the temperature, volume, or pressure of a gas
contained in a box. Statistical mechanics adopts a micro-perspective on the
same phenomena, that is, on the micro-constituents (such as molecules of the
gas) of the macro-phenomena and their dynamical laws. Statistical mechanics
aims more specifically to account for the behaviour of macro-phenomena in
terms of their micro-constituents (Frigg 2010, p. 1).
One observable fact is that many processes are unidirectional: one sees
coffee being spilled over a laptop but not the coffee flying back into the mug;
one sees gin and tonic mixed in a drink but not the un-mixing of gin and tonic;
one sees a window being shattered by a rock but not the spontaneous assembly
of the glass pieces into a window (Frigg 2010, p. 2). This fact is captured by
the second law of thermodynamics. This law states, roughly, that transitions
from an equilibrium (such as the state of a well-mixed gin and tonic) to a
non-equilibrium state (such as the un-mixed gin and tonic) cannot occur in
isolated systems (Frigg 2010, p. 2), where isolated means that the system
does not exchange energy in the form of heat or work with any other system
(Reif 1985, p. 91). A key question of statistical mechanics is how one can
account for this second law of thermodynamics from the micro-perspective.
In fact, if one attempts to derive the second law of thermodynamics
from assumptions in statistical mechanics, one quickly encounters a problem,
termed the Loschmidt reversibility paradox (Frigg 2010, p. 12). Consider a
container with two compartments that are connected by a shutter. At the ini-
tial point in time (t = 0), a gas is contained in the left compartment and the
shutter is closed. Then, the shutter is opened, the gas spreads out, and after
some time it is distributed uniformly across the two compartments (t = 1).
The gas has reached its equilibrium state. Now, assume that all the veloc-
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ity vectors of the gas molecules are reversed, then the gas molecules would
travel along their initial trajectories back into the left compartment of the
box (t = 2). Hence, it seems possible to violate the second law of thermody-
namics without violating the dynamical laws constituting the system under
consideration (Henderson 2014, p. 90).7
The key insight from the Kac ring is that a system with a determinis-
tic, time reversible microdynamic and an ergodic decomposition shows an
equilibrium-like behaviour. An ergodic decomposition is the decomposition of
a system into its ergodic components. A component is ergodic if it is the case
that, on average, the time it spends in a subset of the phase space is propor-
tional to the portion of the phase space occupied by that subset (Frigg 2010,
p. 10). Put informally, the evolution of a system is equilibrium-like if the sys-
tems’ entropy is close to its maximum value, from which it exhibits frequent
small fluctuations, and rarer large fluctuations (Lavis 2008, p. 684). Figure
4.5 illustrates the difference between equilibrium behaviour and equilibrium-
like behaviour.
The insight from the Kac ring can be generalized. As Werndl and Frigg
(2016, p. 9) have shown, one can prove an ergodic decomposition theorem
stating that every measure-preserving dynamical system has an ergodic de-
composition, and, consequently, shows equilibrium-like behaviour.8 This the-
orem applies widely since most of the dynamical systems surrounding us, even
those with a very complex dynamic, are measure-preserving.
How does the model work? The Kac ring9 consists of n equidistantly
distributed sites on a circle. On each site, there is either a white or a black
ball. m of the intervals between the sites are marked and form a set S. The
balls move counter-clockwise to their nearest site. If a ball is before a marked
7The notion of time reversibility is used in a non-technical way here. For what follows,
this account of time reversibility suffices: “A physical law is time reversal invariant if
whenever a motion is allowed by the law, there is a nemesis ‘time-reversed’ motion that
is also allowed by the law, corresponding roughly to what one would see if a film of the
original motion were played in reverse” (Roberts 2013, p. 1113).
8To be precise, Werndl and Frigg (2016) prove this claim under the assumption of their
long-run fraction of time definition of Boltzmannian equilibrium. See Werndl and Frigg
(2015, p. 25) for the introduction of this equilibrium concept.
9I follow the discussion of Bricmont (1996, p. 41), which follows Kac (1959)’s exposition
very closely but is clearer.
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Figure 4.5: Level of entropy of two systems over time. System (a) shows be-
haviour in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, that is, an in-
crease of entropy over the observed time span. System (b) shows equilibrium-
like behaviour (my diagram).
interval, then it changes colour upon passing it. If a ball is in front of an
unmarked interval, then it keeps its colour in this movement step (Bricmont
1996, p. 38). A micro-state of the Kac ring is a ring with a distribution
of black and white balls and a distribution of marked intervals (see for an
example Figure 4.6). A macro-state of the Kac ring is defined in terms of the
number of white (Nw(t)) and black balls (Nb(t)). A macro-state (e.g., 5 white
and 5 black balls) can be instantiated by many micro-states (e.g., 5 black and
5 white balls placed alternately on the sites with 5 marked intervals).
The ring displays a time-reversible micro-dynamic (Bricmont 1996, p. 38).
If after t time steps one reverses the movement of the balls (from counter-
clockwise to clockwise movement), then after t time steps one returns to the
original state. This micro-dynamic is furthermore completely deterministic
(Bricmont 1996, p. 38).
The equilibrium state of the Kac ring is where there are an equal number
of black and white balls. How close one is to this equilibrium state can be
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Figure 4.6: A Kac ring with 16 lattice sites and 9 markers (Gottwald and
Oliver 2009, Figure 1).
expressed as the greyness of the ring, that is, the difference between the
(normalized) number of white and black balls:
Nw(t)−Nb(t)
n
(4.16)
Now, one can define the Boltzmann entropy for the system of the Kac
ring. The Boltzmann entropy of a macro-state is defined as the logarithm of
a measure of the micro-states that realise this particular macro-state. For the
Kac ring it is natural to define the entropy measure as:
Sb = ln
(
n
Nw(t)
)
(4.17)
This entropy value is maximal for the states of equipartition between black
and white balls (Bricmont 1996, p. 40).
This deterministic, time-reversible micro-dynamic shows an approach to
equilibrium. If the ring contains an infinite number of sites, then there is
a thermodynamic approach to equilibrium and, hence, irreversibility on the
macro-level. For, if the ring starts in an initial configuration of uneven black
and white balls and randomly distributed markers, it is much more likely
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that the system evolves towards an equal distribution of black and white
balls rather than a highly unequal distribution. However, if the ring con-
tains a finite number of sites, then there needs to be reversibility also on the
macro-level, since the ring returns to the initial configuration after a certain
amount of time. In this scenario, however, the ring still shows equilibrium-like
behaviour, since it exhibits an entropy profile for which it is the case that the
entropy value of the system is close to the maximum value for most of the
time considered.
4.3 Existing accounts of toy models
In this section, I review five existing accounts of toy models. I introduce these
accounts in turn and argue that they highlight, individually, important fea-
tures of the five cases introduced in the previous section. However, I go on to
claim that one needs to piece these features together to achieve a satisfactory
account of my cases. Before discussing the accounts, I add some preliminaries
on the project of characterising toy models. These serve as an overreaching
framework for discussing the existing accounts in the literature.
4.3.1 Preliminaries: Carnap on explication
According to Carnap, concepts must be made more precise to serve their role
in scientific theories. The method he proposes is explication. Carnap (1962,
p. 3) introduces this method as follows (italics in the original):
By the procedure of explication we mean the transformation of an
inexact, prescientific concept, the explicandum, into a new exact
concept, the explicatum (...) The explicandum may belong to
everyday language or to a previous stage in the development of a
scientific language. The explicatum must be given by explicit rules
for its use, for example, by a definition which incorporates it into
a well-constructed system of scientific either logicomathematical
or empirical concepts.
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Explication, according to Carnap, can be viewed as a method of re-
engineering concepts with the aim of advancing scientific theorising (Brun
2015, p. 1). One of Carnap’s leading examples is the explication of the con-
cept fish by the scientific concept piscis. ‘Piscis’ is defined as animals that
live in water, are cold-blooded vertebrates, and have gills throughout life.10
Let me illuminate the procedure of explication with reference to this exam-
ple. First, the explicandum should be clear. This is not a trivial point. The
whole project of explication gets off the ground because the explicandum is
in a sense too imprecise for scientific usage. Hence, making the explicandum
more precise does not mean that an exact definition should be given (see Car-
nap 1962, p. 4). Instead, the explicandum should be identified as clearly as
possible. One way of doing this is to present cases to which the explicandum
clearly applies or does not apply (Brun 2015, p. 4). With respect to the
concept ‘fish’, one can clearly identify animals to which the concept applies
and to which it does not apply. Second, an explicatum should be given. The
explicatum is stated in a target system of concepts, that is, the concepts used
in the domain of scientific theorising of interest (Brun 2015, p. 6). Usually
a definition of the explicatum in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions
is provided. Importantly, the explicatum and explicandum can be the same
word (Brun 2015, p. 5). In the example of the concept fish, the terms ‘ver-
tebrate’ and ‘gill’ are biological terms. Third, the explicandum is replaced
by the explicatum and the adequacy of the explicatum is assessed. Carnap
proposes four criteria that an adequate explication of a concept must meet
(Carnap 1962, p. 7): i) The explicatum must be similar to the explicandum
such that in most cases where the explicandum applies the explicatum ap-
plies as well. The concept ‘piscis’ applies to most things that in everyday
language are classified as fish but not to whales; ii) the explicatum has to
be exact, that is, the explicatum should be introduced in a well-connected
system of scientific concepts; iii) the explicatum should be fruitful, that is, it
should figure in many true generalizations (such as laws). The concept piscis
10Carnap makes it clear that the explicatum must not be introduced by a definition.
Other methods for concept introduction can be used as well, for example, postulates or re-
duction sentences. Carnap introduced the latter to overcome the problem of characterising
dispositional terms in observational terms (Brun 2015, p. 7).
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figures in more biological generalisations than the pre-scientific concept fish;
(iv) the explicatum should be as simple as possible. This requirement is best
understood as a tie-breaker criterion: if two explicata satisfy criteria (i)-(iii)
equally well, then the simpler one should be chosen (Brun 2015, p. 11).
I proceed in the same way in my characterisation of the term toy model.
First, I identify a set of, in my view relevant, examples of toy models (see
Section 4.2). Second, I introduce an explicatum of the term toy model in a
step-wise fashion in the form of a definition (Sections 4.4.2-4.4.4). Third, I
show that the explicatum meets the adequacy conditions set out by Carnap
(Section 4.4.5).
4.3.2 Hartmann et al.’s account of toy models
In their recent article Understanding (with) toy models, Hartmann et al. (2016)
suggest both a characterisation of the notion ‘toy model’ and an account of
how one can gain understanding with toy models. They restrict their analysis
to mathematical toy models in contrast to material toy models, which are
physical entities (Hartmann et al. 2016, FN 3).
Toy models are characterised by Hartmann et al. (2016) by three features:
First, toy models are strongly idealised in the sense that they contain Aris-
totelian as well as Galilean idealisations. Aristotelian idealisations strip away
some features of a target system, for example, the colour of the block sliding
down an inclined plane, or express the assumption that some causal factor is
absent. Galilean idealisations, in contrast, are descriptions that distort the
causal (or explanatory relevant) factors of a target system, for example, the
assumption that the surface area indeed affects the time it takes a block to
slide down an inclined plane (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 6-7). Second, toy
models are extremely simple as they represent only a small number of causal
factors (or more generally explanatory factors). Third, toy models are target-
directed models, that is, the models are built and evaluated in relation to
(types of) target systems (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 3). In passing, Hart-
mann et al. (2016, p. 3) also mention another feature of toy models; These
models can be grasped with cognitive ease by people trained in a particular
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field. Moreover, they do not think that there is a sharp distinction between
toy and non-toy models. Instead, they claim that there is a continuum of
models with respect to degree of simplicity and, independently, to degree of
idealisation. Despite the vagueness of the concept, they think that there are
clear cut examples of toy models (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 3).
With these preliminaries in place, they introduce a distinction between
embedded and autonomous toy models. A toy model is embedded if and only
if it is a model of an empirically well-confirmed framework theory (Hartmann
et al. 2016, p. 5). A framework theory is a set of uninterpreted sentences.
Models of a framework theory are structures in which the sentences of the
framework theory (e.g., the theory’s abstract calculus and its laws) are true
(Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 6). A framework theory is empirically well con-
firmed if the central predictions of the theory are accurate. Hartmann et al.
(2016, p. 6) mention Newtonian Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics as empir-
ically well-confirmed framework theories. The “Sun-plus-one-planet model”
of the solar system is an example of an embedded toy model. It is a simple,
highly idealised model in which the claims of Newtonian mechanics are true
(Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 7). A toy model is autonomous if it is not a model
of a well-confirmed framework theory. For example, there is no empirically
well-confirmed framework theory of which Schelling’s checkerboard model is
an instantiation (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 8).
How can one gain understanding with toy models? Hartmann et al. (2016,
p. 19) suggest two ways of gaining understanding with toy models. They claim
that an individual scientist S understands a phenomenon P via model M in
context C if one of the following conditions holds:
• S has how-actually understanding of phenomenon P via model M in
context C if model M provides a how-actually explanation of P and S
grasps M .
• S has how-possibly understanding of phenomenon P via model M in
context C if model M provides a how-possibly explanation of P and S
grasps M .
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An embedded toy model generates how-actually explanations only if fur-
ther conditions are met (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 19-20). First, the em-
bedding framework theory permits an interpretation and justification of the
idealisations of the model. Second, this interpretation and justification needs
to be compatible with the veridicality condition, which states that explana-
tory assumptions are required to be true or approximately true (Hartmann
et al. 2016, p. 15). Hartmann et al. (2016, p. 20) claim that key exam-
ples of autonomous toy models do not provide how-actually explanations;
They are best interpreted as providing how-possibly explanations. Schelling’s
checkerboard model can be understood as providing an explanation of how it
is possible that racial segregation patterns occur (Hartmann et al. 2016, p.
26).
Their account identifies key features of my five cases. To start, all five
models that I introduced in the previous section can be explored with ease
by a person trained in the respective field. This ease of manipulability seems
indeed to be linked to a cognitive ease with which central derivations of toy
models can be grasped by a person trained in the field. Furthermore, the five
models contain multiple Aristotelian and Galilean idealisations. The Schelling
checkerboard model omits social factors that are relevant for real world seg-
regation patterns. The DY models omits the ability to save a certain amount
of money, to invest in multiple financial instruments, and to entertain finan-
cial transactions with multiple persons at a given time. Akerlof’s market for
lemons and Hotelling’s model distort the calculation and memory capability
of real world agents. The Kac ring distorts the interaction structure of parti-
cles in a gas by assuming that the particles move counter-clockwise on a ring.
In addition, the five models are evaluated in relation to real world targets.
For example, Akerlof discusses the implication of his used car model for the
insurance market and the money lending market. Hotelling himself foresaw
the applicability of the principle of minimal differentiation to the interaction
between political parties. Finally, the five toy models are simple in the sense
that they do not contain a large number of causal (or explanatory) factors.
However, there are, in my view, two aspects of the five examples that
are not captured by Hartmann et al. (2016)’s account. First, on the level of
129
model description, these cases give a particularly wrong-headed picture of the
target systems of interest. Take Schelling’s checkerboard for example. The
description of a city as consisting of squares inhibited by dots of two different
colours is such a misrepresentation that it seems to be far-fetched to say that
Schelling had to discover (or learn) that this model is a misdescription of
the situation. The same holds for the Kac ring. To describe a gas as a ring
populated by balls of different colours and markers is to give a completely
wrong-headed picture of a gas. To strengthen this point, it does not seem
to be the case that these features of the models can be linked to features in
a target system via a process of de-idealisation. Since there is nothing that
corresponds to the ring structure of the Kac model in a gas, it is unclear
how one can arrive at a correct description of a gas by adding features to or
changing features of the Kac ring. I will spell out these observations in more
detail in Section 4.4. Second, Hartmann et al. (2016) do not incorporate the
fact that the five toy models are applied to a variety of target systems. Take
Schelling’s checkerboard model as an example. Schelling himself envisages
that the model can be applied to any target systems that exhibits a distinction
that is twofold, exhaustive and recognisable (e.g., students and faculty or
teenagers and grown ups). Hence, the results of Schelling’s model are claimed
to be stable across a variety of target systems.
4.3.3 Strevens and Weisberg’s account of minimal mod-
els
Weisberg (2007) and Strevens (2008) introduce the notion of ‘minimal mod-
els’. Although they do not refer to minimal models as toy models, one can ask
whether the criteria they suggest can be used to characterise my five cases.
According to Strevens (2008, p. 315-329) minimal models are idealised
models that truthfully represent two kinds of facts: to start, facts about a
minimal set of explanatory relevant factors including true causal laws and
statements about initial conditions for the target system under consideration;
furthermore, the fact that some factors are not explanatory relevant. To put
it differently, idealising assumptions refer to explanatory irrelevant factors.
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Weisberg (2007, p. 642) agrees with this characterisation of minimal models.
According to him, “minimalist idealization is the practice of constructing
and studying theoretical models that include only the core causal factors
which give rise to a phenomenon.” To put it more directly, a minimalist
model contains only those factors that make a difference to the occurrence
and essential character of a phenomenon of interest.11
Strevens (2004) offers the kairetic account of scientific explanation to make
room for the explanatory power of minimal models. According to Strevens,
minimal models provide a causal explanation, that is, a story about why the
phenomenon of interest occurred. However, for this causal story only those
factors are relevant that make a difference for the occurrence of the phe-
nomenon of interest. Strevens defines making a difference as “causal entail-
ment”, which is defined as logical entailment in a causal model. Accordingly,
a causal factor makes a difference only if one removes the factor from the
causal model, the model then no longer entails the phenomenon’s occurrence.
Since minimal idealisations introduce false but not difference-making factors,
minimal models can provide explanations according to the kairetic account.
Does Strevens and Weisberg’s characterisation of minimal models fit my
five cases? I do not think so. Take Schelling’s checkerboard model for example.
As Hartmann et al. (2016, p. 23) point out, if Schelling’s model were a minimal
model, then all its idealisation would need to refer to explanatory irrelevant
factors. Only in this circumstance can the model be said to capture the key
difference-making factors for segregation phenomena. This is, however, not
the case. The claim that economic factors and other social factors do not
have an influence on real world segregation patterns is wrong. The same can
be said for the DY-model. The assumption that agents are not able to make
any conscious investment and saving decisions is not explanatory irrelevant
11Weisberg (2007, p. 645-646) discusses in addition multiple-model idealisations that are
similar to minimal model idealisations in the sense that they are not justified by reference
to de-idealisation. They are, however, distinct to minimal model idealisations since it is
not assumed that there is a single best model of the phenomenon. Gibbard and Varian
(1978)’s notion of a caricature shows striking similarities to Weisberg’s idea here. Gibbard
and Varian define caricatures as models involving deliberate distortions of aspects of the
target system where these distortions isolate effects or are used to test the robustness of a
model claim (Gibbard and Varian 1978, p. 676).
131
for real world income distributions. Finally, regarding Akerlof’s market for
lemons, the cognitive capabilities of agents and their price-setting behaviour
are explanatory relevant factors.
4.3.4 Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s account of minimal models
According to Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009, p. 83), a minimal model is a model that
lacks world-linking properties. To be more precise, such models lack “any sim-
ilarity, isomorphism, or resemblance relation to the world” and are assumed
to “be unconstrained by natural laws or structural identity, and do not isolate
any real factors”.12
The upshot of Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009)’s discussion is the claim that minimal
models in economics can perform their surrogative function despite the fact
that the models do not have world-linking properties. How is this supposed
to work? Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009, p. 81, 85) argues that one can learn from
minimal models because results derived with the help of these models can
affect one’s confidence about impossibility hypotheses regarding the world in
a justified way. Take Schelling’s model as an example. One might hold the
belief that racial segregation in cities cannot occur without strict discrimi-
natory preferences. The model derivation of segregation patterns based on
the assumption of only very mild racial preferences should affect our credence
in the aforementioned impossibility claim. Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009, p. 94) adds
the qualification that minimal models need to be credible (or plausible) to
perform this epistemic function. He defines this notion of model plausibility
in a purely model-internal way. According to him
(...) judging a model to be credible is a consequence of what
scientists do with models: they imagine a world that the model
describes, they manipulate that situation in various ways, and
they investigate that world’s internal coherence and its coherence
12In the later Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2013a), he drops the notion of ‘minimal model’ and speaks
instead, with reference to the same and very similar examples, of non-representational mod-
els. He does, however, not offer a specification of what he means by non-representational
models that goes beyond the explicit account given of minimal models.
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with our intuitions. Crucially, these intuitions often do not exist
independently of the imagined world (...) credibility judgements
about economics are often elicited solely through consideration of
imaginary worlds. (Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009, p. 94)
Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s characterisation highlights one feature shared by my five
cases: in an intuitive sense, there is a lack of world-linking properties between
these models and their targets. Cities are not checkerboards, human beings
do not collide to exchange money, and gases are not rings with markers.
World linking properties seem to be absent on the level of the basic entities
and properties of these models. As I specify below, the basic entities and
properties of a model are those that are specified in the model description.
To put it differently, they are the scaffolding of the model world. Model results
are those statements that are derived from the model description. There are,
however, multiple such world-linking properties to be observed in my five
cases. These are in particular relations of similarity. Take the Kac ring for
example. The model shows an equilibrium-like behaviour. This approach to
equilibrium can be seen in many processes surrounding us. Market failures of
the nature described in Akerlof’s model (i.e., no transactions despite the fact
that they could improve the buyers and sellers’ utility) can be observed in
many real world markets. The resulting income distribution in the DY model
shows a striking similarity with the exponential income distribution in many
developed economies. Hence, on the level of model results there are world-
linking properties. One needs an account of models that differentiates in a
more fine-grained manner between levels of model descriptions. In addition,
Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s account also does not incorporate the observation, already
mentioned in relation to Hartman et al.’s account, that the results from the
toy modes introduced earlier are said to be stable across a variety of target
systems.
4.3.5 Batterman and Rice’s account of minimal models
According to Battermann and Rice (2014, p. 349), a minimal model is a
caricature of a target system. It is a caricature in the sense that it “really
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looks nothing like any system it is supposed to represent” (Battermann and
Rice 2014, p. 350). These models explain “universal patterns across diverse
real systems” (Battermann and Rice 2014, p. 350). By universal patterns,
Batterman and Rice refer to macroscale behaviour. By diverse real systems,
they mean systems that differ in their constitution on the microscale level.
They discuss the Lattice Gas Automaton (LGA) as an example of a minimal
model. The LGA describes a fluid as a set of particles confined to move on
a hexagonal lattice. Adding some movement rules (involving a specification
of what happens if particles collide) yields patterns that can be observed in
fluid flow (Battermann and Rice 2014, p. 358).
How can one gain understanding with minimal models? Battermann and
Rice (2014) argue that minimal models can provide minimal model explana-
tions. Minimal models do not explain in virtue of sharing features with target
systems of interest. Rather, the connecting element between minimal mod-
els and target systems is the fact that they belong to the same universality
class (Battermann and Rice 2014, p. 350). Universality is an expression for
the fact that many systems composed of different components show the same
behaviour at higher scales (Battermann and Rice 2014, p. 357). One can
show that a model and the target system it is supposed to describe belong to
the same universality class by establishing that differences on the micro-level
between the systems are irrelevant. This amounts to telling as to why very
many features are irrelevant to the phenomenon that one seeks to explain
(Battermann and Rice 2014, p. 361). To be more precise, a minimal model
explanation is successful if it answers three questions (Battermann and Rice
2014, p. 361):
1. Why are the common features among the systems necessary for the
phenomenon to occur?
2. Why are the remaining heterogeneous details (those left out of or misrep-
resented by the model) irrelevant for the occurrence of the phenomenon?
3. Why do very different target systems share common features?
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Batterman and Rice suggest that question (2) can be answered by em-
ploying a mathematical technique called the renormalisation group. Without
going deeply into technical details, the idea is as follows. One starts with
a set of possible systems (e.g., possible fluids, actual fluids, a solid). One
then applies an averaging technique to eliminate some degrees of freedom of
this set of possible systems. One then rescales this set to generate a new
set of possible systems. Examining this new set of possible systems allows
identifying those systems whose behaviour depicted in a phase space flows to
the same fixed point. These systems belong to the same universality class.
One also learns the common features from this procedure. Furthermore, one
sees why the systems share these common features as a consequence of the
re-normalisation procedure, and, hence, one receives an answer to Question
(3). Given the answers for Questions (2) and (3), one can answer Question
(1) (Battermann and Rice 2014, p. 362-363).
Batterman and Rice’s account highlights key features of my five cases. In
particular, it brings out two features that have figured prominently in the
discussion so far. First, these models seem to describe a behaviour that is
shared across different target systems and that is best described on a macro-
scopic level (in contrast to the level of components of these different systems).
Second, these models fundamentally mischaracterise their target systems.
However, there are aspects of Battermann and Rice (2014)’s account of
minimal models that limit the applicability of their characterisation to my
five cases. First, they provide what I will call a functional characterisation
of minimal models.13 They characterise this model class with the help of the
explanatory function it performs. This makes it unclear how models that
are similar to minimal models on the surface (i.e., they also look nothing
like their target systems), but for which no satisfactory answers to the three
questions can be provided, should be characterised. In a recent paper, Knu-
uttila and Loettgers (2016) argue that for social scientific models the group
renormalization technique cannot be successfully applied. Extending their
argument makes clear that Schelling’s checkerboard model, Hotellings’ model
and Akerlof’s market for lemons might also fall into this category. Second,
13I introduce this term in more detail in Section 4.4.1.
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Battermann and Rice (2014) do not spell out their claim that a minimal model
“really looks nothing like any system it is supposed to represent” in detail.
What representational relation is in play here? Which level of description is
supposed to represent and which one is not?
4.3.6 Bokulich’s account of fictional models
Bokulich (2011, 2012) introduced the notion of ‘fictional models’. Although
she does not refer to fictional models as toy models, one can ask whether the
criteria she suggests can be used to characterise my five cases.
Bokulich does not give an explicit definition of fictional models (or ‘fic-
tions’ for short). However, she describes various characteristics of fictions
and introduces illuminating examples. To start, a fiction is known to be false
(Bokulich 2012, p. 725). Fictions are not idealisations since they are not re-
lated to target systems via a smooth process of de-idealisation (Bokulich 2011,
p. 40). Bokulich discusses Bohr’s model of the hydrogen atom as a model
that contains fictional elements. In particular, there are no orbits along which
electrons circumvent the nucleus of an atom. An electron should be better
conceived as a cloud of probability density around a nucleus (Bokulich 2011,
p. 42). One cannot recover the modern quantum mechanical picture of the
hydrogen atom via a process of de-idealisation starting from Bohr’s model.
Adding additional factors or tweaking the parameter of Bohr’s model does
not do the trick. The two models of the hydrogen atom are in this sense not
related in a continuous way with each other (Bokulich 2011, p. 43).
Can fictions deliver explanations? Bokulich thinks so. To state precisely
how fictions can yield genuine explanations, she introduces a framework for
model-based explanations. Model-based explanations are characterised by
three features. First, such an explanation makes essential reference to a sci-
entific model that involves a certain degree of idealisation and/or fictionali-
sation (Bokulich 2011, p. 38). Second, the model needs to correctly capture
the counterfactual dependence in a target system. This means that the model
needs to answer correctly a wide range of “what-if-things-had-been-different”-
questions. Departing from Woodward (2003), Bokulich does not construe this
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counterfactual dependence along interventionist lines and allows for counter-
factual dependence that is not causal in nature (Bokulich 2011, p. 39). Third,
there must be a justificatory step that consists in stating what the domain of
applicability of the model is and in showing that the phenomenon that is to
be explained falls into this domain (Bokulich 2011, p. 39). This justification
can be given top-down by a theory that delineates the domain of applicability
of a particular model (Bokulich 2011, p. 39).
It is this justificatory step that, according to Bokulich, allows one to dis-
tinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory fictions (Bokulich 2011,
p. 39, FN 11; Bokulich 2012, p. 734). Explanatory fictions are representa-
tionally adequate. Representational adequacy should not be understood as
the accurate description of a target phenomenon (fictions are false hypothe-
ses about the target system) or as “ saving the phenomena” (this is also
accomplished by non-explanatory, phenomenological models) (Bokulich 2012,
p. 734). Rather, the representational adequacy relation is dependent on the
target system of interest, the epistemic aim one pursues with the modelling
project, and the scientific community in which one is embedded in (Bokulich
2012, p. 734-735). Bohr’s orbits are an explanatory fiction, since one can jus-
tify their representational adequacy, that is, semi-classical mechanics states
that the orbits approximate quantum mechanical effects to a sufficient degree
(Bokulich 2011, p. 44). The Ptolemaic epicycles are non-explanatory fictions
since the present scientific community cannot provide a justification for their
representational adequacy (Bokulich 2012, p. 727).
Bokulich’s account of fictions helps to characterise key features of my
cases. First, these models contain elements that are literally false statements
about the target system of interest. More precisely, some of these fictional
elements (such as the ring structure in Kac’s model) cannot be de-idealised in
a straightforward way. Second, nevertheless, these models are phenomenolog-
ically adequate in the sense that they reproduce patterns of data. However,
Bokulich does not address the ease of manipulability of the five cases. The
cognitive ease with which the models can be manipulated and results grasped,
however, seems to be a distinctive feature of this model type (see Hartmann
et al. 2016, p. 3). In addition, the stability of the model results across dif-
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ferent target systems is not part of Bokulich’s account. Finally, I think that
Bokulich’s account is somewhat unclear regarding the representational rela-
tion between fictions and real world targets. Bokulich (2012, p. 734) states
the following:
Where I want to part company with traditional philosophical ac-
counts, however, is on the question of whether truth or existence is
even a necessary condition for explanatory relevance. In particu-
lar, I want to argue that fictions can be explanatory relevant. That
is, truth or existence is not a necessary condition for an item to
be admitted to the scientists’ explanatory store. However, such a
position threatens to trivialize scientific explanation without some
principled way of determining which fictions are to be counted as
explanatory.
So, Bokulich suggests that there can be fictions that are genuinely explana-
tory despite the fact that they posit entities or properties that do not exist.
She qualifies this claim by saying that these non-existent properties or enti-
ties are only explanatory relevant if there is some principled way of justifying
them. However, this justification, as discussed above, is relative to a scientific
community’s standards of relevance. It is not clear to me to what extent these
standards of relevance can be spelled out in representational terms or whether
she has non-representational ways of achieving this justification in mind. To
put it differently, what exactly is the representational status of those parts of
models that are fictional in nature? I can relate my uncertainty here back to
her leading example: Bohr’s model of the hydrogen atom. In a sense, scien-
tists believed that electrons circumvent the nucleus in classical orbits. A lot
of experimental and theoretical work had to be done before it became clear
that the orbits were a false representation of the electron’s behaviour. In con-
trast, Kac proposing his model of the gas or Schelling presenting his model
of segregation knew from the beginning that these models give a completely
wrong-headed picture of their target system. This fact seems to be peculiar
to my five cases. How can this observation be spelled out?
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4.4 A new attempt at characterising toy mod-
els
The previous section should have made clear that none of the discussed ac-
counts of models delivers, in itself, a satisfactory characterisation of my five
cases. In particular, the accounts – beside Batterman and Rice’s proposal
– do not pay attention to the stability of the model results across different
(types of) target systems. In this section, I provide a single, comprehensive
account of my cases and suggest reserving the term ‘toy model’ for this model
class.
4.4.1 Preliminaries: Functional vs. intrinsic character-
isations
There are multiple ways in which one can explicate a term. One way of sepa-
rating different attempts is to draw a line between, what I will call, intrinsic
and functional characterisations.
Let me start by giving an example. A car can be characterised as an object
that allows the transportation of people and goods from A to B. However, one
can also characterise a car by giving a description of its number of wheels,
engine, fuel efficiency and interior design. The former characterises a car in
terms of the functions it performs. The latter defines a car in terms of its in-
trinsic properties.14 A parallel distinction can be drawn between inferentialist
and substantial accounts of representation. Inferentialist accounts of scientific
representation state, roughly, that a model represents a target scientifically
if the model allows accurate inferences about the target system (Kuorikoski
and Lehtinen 2009). Substantial accounts, as for example Giere’s similarity
account, try to identify the conditions that need to be in place such that a
model can perform its representational function.
14The relevant contrast is not between intrinsic and relational properties. I do not intend
to make a metaphysical claim about the nature of properties of cars. Intrinsic properties
of a car are in an important sense independent from the functions of a car, despite the fact
that the car can perform its functions only given some configuration of intrinsic properties.
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Accordingly, one can differentiate between a functional and intrinsic char-
acterisation of the notion ‘toy model’. A purely functional characterisation
would, for example, describe toy models as models from which one can eas-
ily gain insights or which are used in particular types of explanations. In
contrast, I shall give an intrinsic characterisation of toy models. I find a
purely functional characterisation of toy models wanting because it does not
illuminate the building blocks and representational relations of toy models.
Consequently, functional characterisations are not likely to provide insights
that can be used to answer the question that, I think, one should be ulti-
mately interested in: In virtue of what do toy models perform their epistemic
roles in different scientific and policy-making contexts?
Let me now introduce my three conditions, which, taken together, should
provide a satisfactory intrinsic characterisation of toy models.
4.4.2 Manipulability condition
Models share the property that they can be manipulated. One can physically
intervene in a material model, such as changing the water inflow in a hydraulic
scale model of the San Francisco Bay. One can also manipulate mathemati-
cal or graphic models by changing the values of variables or shifting curves,
respectively. As Morrison and Morgan (1999, p. 12, 32) point out, the ability
to manipulate models is essential for the epistemic import of modelling.
A closer look at my five cases reveals that all these models are manipula-
ble. However, a further peculiarity is striking. These models are manipulable
in a relatively easy way. Deriving Hotelling’s principle of minimal differentia-
tion requires solving a single profit maximisation problem for two producers.
The same is the case for Akerlof’s car market in which trading breaks down
as a consequence of the utility maximising behaviour of buyers and sellers.
Schelling’s checkerboard model does not require solving any equations but
can be simulated with a physical checkerboard and two types of objects by
executing the movement rules of the model.
This ease of manipulability is conditional on training in a particular field.
In the context of the debate about scientific understanding, de Regt and
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Dieks (2005, p. 151) put forward an intelligibility condition that brings out
this point. Gaining understanding with the help of a theory T requires that
the theory is intelligible. According to de Regt and Dieks (2005, p. 151),
a theory T 15 is intelligible for scientists in a particular context if “they can
recognize qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without performing
exact calculations”. For example, one can understand the temperature change
of a gas confined in a container given a reduction of the volume of the container
with the help of the kinetic theory of gases. This is the case since one can
recognise the qualitative consequences of this theory. For example, “if one
adds heat to a gas in a container of constant volume, the average kinetic
energy of the moving molecules (...) will increase.” (de Regt and Dieks 2005,
p. 152). Importantly, the capacities, background knowledge, and background
beliefs of scientists play a crucial role for intelligibility (de Regt and Dieks
2005, p. 151).
These reflections can be condensed into the following manipulability con-
dition:
Manipulability condition The handling of a model belonging to a disci-
pline D, including the derivation of key model results, is relatively easy
for people trained in D.
Let me add three clarifications. First, this way of spelling out the manip-
ulability condition captures, in my view, the simplicity of toy models, which
was particularly highlighted by Hartmann et al. (2016). It is simplicity in
terms of manipulability that really sets this model class apart. The fact that
the ease of manipulability is relative to the training received in a particular
field can be nicely squared with the fact that the structures of toy models can
vary quite significantly across different disciplines.
Second, non-toy models, such as a complex dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model or a coupled global climate model, can also be easy to
manipulate for the expert in the field equipped with enough training. This
is why the condition is formulated in a comparative way: toy models are
15de Regt and Dieks (2005) use a broad notion of theory that includes models in the
sense discussed here.
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relatively easy to manipulate. This should be read as relatively easy compared
to other modelling exercises. So even if manipulating a complex DSGE model
is fairly easy for a macroeconomist after enough training, manipulating an
economic toy model such as Hotelling’s or Akerlof’s model is considerably
easier.
Third, this way of spelling out the manipulability condition is straightfor-
wardly agent-centric. I take this to be a strength of my explication, since if
everyone were a Laplacian demon, equipped with unlimited memory storage
and computational capacities, modelling projects would look different. The
fact that toy models play a prominent role in many sciences must be accounted
for in light of our cognitive limitations.
4.4.3 Multiple realisability condition
Some results derived with toy models apply to a wide range of target systems.
I will capture this observation in a multiple realisability condition. I proceed
in three steps to explain this condition. First, I introduce Cartwright’s ‘ladder
of abstraction’, which makes talk of different levels of abstraction more precise
and allows me to formulate the condition. Second, I show that the condition is
satisfied by my five cases. Third, I clarify the condition further by discussing
its relation to the generality of toy model results.
Cartwright (1999) discusses how physical laws apply to the world.16 She
starts by pointing out that one can describe the world at different levels. Some
of these levels of description are more concrete than others. She then suggests
a parallel between the relationship of a fable and its moral to the relationship
between a concrete physical situation and a scientific law (Cartwright 1999, p.
36-37). The moral of a fable is an abstract claim (e.g., “the weaker are always
prey to the stronger”, Cartwright (1999, p. 37)) whereas the fable describes a
concrete situation in which the abstract claim is instantiated in a particular
way: For example, a marten eats a grouse and gets, in turn, eaten by a fox
(Cartwright 1999, p. 39). Accordingly, a scientific law (e.g., Newton’s second
16Cartwright makes similar points in her later paper Models: Parables vs. Fables
(Cartwright 2010).
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law F = ma) is an abstract claim. A particular physical configuration (e.g., a
block of wood on a plane that is pushed) is a concrete situation in which the
abstract claim is instantiated in a particular way (Cartwright 1999, p. 45).
Cartwright explains this parallel by pointing out that the relationship of
abstract to concrete levels of description is straightforward. The concrete
description fills out the abstract description (Cartwright 1999, p. 40) as in
the case of commonplace language use. For example, saying that “I have
worked this morning” is a more abstract description of my cleaning my flat,
writing up my thesis, and preparing to teach a class.
This idea of a ‘ladder of abstraction’ can be used to give a more fine grained
account of statements that can be derived from toy models. The results of toy
models can be described in concrete terms (e.g., a 9x9 checkerboard showing a
particular distribution of black and white dots) or in more abstract terms (e.g.,
a pattern of segregation). In the following discussion, I refer to properties
and relationships described in abstract terms as abstract properties. With
this clarification in place, I can formulate the following multiple realisability
condition:
Multiple realisability condition The abstract properties (and their rela-
tions to other abstract properties), which are derived with the model,
are instantiated in different ways in target systems.
Importantly, toy models are characterised by this condition in the following
sense: Toy models come equipped with the claim that their abstract properties
are multiply realised in target systems. This claim can be false. Hence, the
multiple realisability condition should not be read as inscribing a success
condition onto my characterisation of a toy model.17
The five case studies discussed satisfy the multiple realisability condition.
The key model result of the DY model is an exponential income distribution.
As discussed, many income distributions in the real world show an exponential
17The toy model itself instantiates the derived model results in a particular way. The toy
model is constructed such that the corresponding behaviour in target systems is illustrated.
This puts a constraint on the set of admissible toy models. For example, the Kac ring and
not a system in which an agent throws marbles at a wall is chosen, since the former and
not the latter exhibits the relevant abstract properties.
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bulk. The abstract property of an exponential income distribution is instan-
tiated in different ways in these economies. For example, different currencies
are used to save money and different retail banking structures are in places.
The claim of the DY model would be false if real world income data did not
show an exponential bulk.
The key model result of the Kac ring is the claim that any system with
an ergodic decomposition shows an equilibrium-like behaviour. This relation
between ergodic decomposability and equilibrium-like behaviour holds for any
system with a measure-preserving dynamic. The relation is instantiated in
different ways in these measure-preserving systems, such as gases or fluids.
The claim of the Kac ring can be false. This is the case for a measure-
preserving system that has an ergodic decomposition and does not show an
equilibrium-like behaviour.
The key model result of Schelling’s checkerboard model is that mild dis-
criminatory preferences can lead to segregation. This relation between mild
discriminatory preferences and segregation is instantiated differently in differ-
ent target systems: segregation patterns in cities with different geographical
and economic structures or segregation patterns in different schools or uni-
versities. The claim of Schelling’s checkerboard model can be false. This
claim does not hold in case of social systems in which mild discriminatory
preferences are present but in which there is no segregation pattern.
The key model result of Akerlof’s market for lemons is that informational
asymmetries between buyers and sellers in a market can lead to sub-optimal
market outcomes. This relation between informational asymmetries and mar-
ket outcomes is instantiated differently in different real-world market situa-
tions: consumer goods such as cars, medical services, or money lending. The
claim of Akerlof’s model can be false. This is the case in a situation with
informational asymmetries but a working market mechanism.
The key model result of Hotelling’s model is that competing agents offer
products of all sorts that are very similar. This abstract property of similar
offerings from competing agents is instantiated in different ways in different
target systems: vendors of different goods such as ice cream or electronic
goods, programmes of competing political parties, or religious groups. The
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claim of Hotelling’s model can be false. This is the case in a situation where
one has competing agents that do not supply products that exhibit a high
degree of similarity.
Let me clarify the condition further by making explicit its relationship to
the generality of a toy model. The target systems to which the toy models
are applied vary considerably across the different cases. Take again the Kac
ring and the DY model. Although economies and societies in which income
distributions can be observed vary considerably (compare, for example, Ger-
many with the US), this variability is smaller than the variability that can
be observed across the different systems for which the abstract properties of
the Kac ring are true. This variety in the target systems corresponds to the
degree of generality of the toy model under consideration. This is a desirable
feature of toy models. The generality of a model is not only the desirable fea-
ture of explanations but, in the form of ‘scope’, it is a desideratum of models,
hypotheses, and theories more generally (as will be discussed in more detail
in Chapter 6 in the context of theory choice). The generality of a toy model
is not ex ante fixed. It might be the case that, after further investigations
of a target system, it emerges that a system does not exhibit the purported
abstract property or, in a different scenario, more target systems exhibit the
abstract property than initially assumed.
4.4.4 Hybrid representation condition
The manipulability and multiple realisability condition already go some way
towards providing a satisfactory characterisation of toy models. However, the
two conditions miss one aspect which popped up across the five case studies.
In a sense, these models seem to give an obviously completely wrong-headed
picture of the target systems they are supposed to describe. No one believes
that cities are checkerboards on a plane inhabited by black and white dots. It
seems far-fetched to claim that Schelling made a mistake by describing cities
as checkerboards. He did not need to investigate his model to see that it gives
a totally wrong-headed picture of reality. Equally, no one believes that gases
are rings with sites occupied by balls that switch their colour upon passing a
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marker. Making these intuitions more precise is the task of this section.
The discussion in the previous section has made clear that the question
about the representational relationship18 of toy models and targets needs to
be answered for different levels of descriptions. The multiple realisability
condition has shown that abstract model results can be instantiated across
a variety of target systems. With respect to this level of description, there
is a representational relation between toy model results and target systems.
However, there is a lack of such a representation relation with respect to
the basic entities and properties of toy models. On this level, the toy models
portray target systems as checkerboards, rings, or point collisions. In a slightly
more precise way, these observations are captured in the following condition:
Hybrid representation condition The basic entities, properties, and re-
lations between the basic entities in the model do not represent features
in any target system. However, there is a representational relation be-
tween model results, formulated on a more abstract level of description,
and target systems.
This condition is formulated without reference to a particular account of
representation. In fact, the condition can be fleshed out with the help of
different accounts of scientific representation. I shall discuss two prominent
accounts to make the condition more precise.19 To keep the exposition rea-
sonably short, I will spell out solely one aspect of the hybrid representation
condition, that is, the lack of representation between the basic level of toy
models and target systems.
18The notion of representation is ambiguous. One can distinguish between three senses of
representation (I follow Contessa 2007, p. 52 here). A model denotes a target. Both the logo
of the London School of Economics (LSE) and a campus map of the LSE denote the LSE.
Denotation can be a matter of pure convention. A model can be an epistemic representation
of a target in the sense that the model allows performing surrogative reasoning about the
target. The map of the LSE campus is an epistemic representation of the LSE campus,
whereas the LSE logo is not. Finally, a model can be a faithful epistemic representation
when it accurately represents the target. With regards to some features, the campus map of
the LSE is a faithful representation of the LSE campus. For the subsequent discussion, when
I use the term ‘representation’, I understand it in the sense of epistemic representation.
19For a recent and comprehensive review of the literature on scientific representation see
Frigg and Nguyen (2017).
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The hybrid representation condition according to Giere’s similarity
account
Giere proposes a similarity account of representation. The basic idea behind
similarity accounts of representation is that scientific models represent tar-
get systems in virtue of being similar to them (Frigg and Nguyen 2017, p.
57). According to Giere’s account, models come equipped with theoretical
hypotheses that assert that a specific model is similar in relevant respects
and to specific degrees to a target system (Giere 2004, p. 747). Importantly,
these theoretical hypotheses are formed by agents with specific aims and in-
tentions and, hence, an agent-based version of representation results. Giere
(2010, p. 274) states this intentional conception of scientific representation as
follows:
Agents (1) intend: (2) to use model, M ; (3) to represent a part of
the world, W ; (4) for some purpose, P . So agents specify which
similarities are intended, and for what purpose.
The intentional component is needed to overcome two pressing problems
for similarity accounts. First, any object is similar to any other with respect
to some criteria of comparison, but it is not the case that anything can rep-
resent anything else. Second, similarity is a symmetrical relation whereas
representation is a directed relation, that is, models represent targets and not
vice versa (Giere 2010, p. 274). By building intentions into the picture both
problems vanish: agents specify what similarities are the relevant ones and,
by using a model to represent a target, they give the representation relation
a direction.
Frigg and Nguyen (2017, p. 60) provide the following helpful formulation
of Giere’s account:
A scientific model M represents a target system T iff there is an
agent A who uses M to represent a target system T by proposing a
theoretical hypothesisH specifying a similarity (in certain respects
and to certain degrees) between M and T for purpose P .
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The hybrid representation condition can be made more precise with the
help of the theoretical hypothesis H. In the case of a toy model, the claim
that the basic entities, properties and relations between the basic entities
of the model are similar to the target system is not part of the theoretical
hypothesis H. To put it more directly, the scientist does not claim that the
level of basic entities and properties (such as the ring and balls of the Kac
ring) stands in a similarity relation to the target system. In contrast, the
theoretical hypothesis H contains the claim that the abstract properties of
a toy model (such as the entropy profile of the Kac ring) is similar to the
entropy profile of a target system (such as a gas or a fluid).
The hybrid representation condition according to the DEKI account
Frigg and Nguyen (2016) offer an account of scientific representation that
emphasises the importance of the interpretation of a model. According to
their DEKI20 account, in a nutshell, a model represents a target system if
and only if i) the model denotes the target system, ii) the model properties
are endowed with an interpretation in terms of the target system, iii) some
of these interpreted properties are exemplified by the model, and iv) these
exemplified properties are keyed up and imputed onto the target system. As
an example, they discuss the Phillips-Newlyn machine, which is a machine
that consists of valves and pipes enabling a flow of water. This machine
represents a particular economy, let us say the Swiss economy, if and only
if i) the machine denotes the Swiss economy, ii) the properties of the model
(such as ‘the flow of water’) is interpreted in terms of the target system
(i.e., ‘the money circulation in Switzerland’), iii) some of these properties are
exemplified (e.g., a particular level of water in a tank corresponding to an
amount of money), and iv) these exemplified properties are turned into final
statements about the target system (e.g., the amount of savings in the Swiss
economy is such and such) via a key that allows one to add some modification
to the exemplified model result (Frigg and Nguyen 2016, p. 19).
The hybrid representation condition can be made more precise in relation
20The acronym stands for the different components of their account: Denotation, Exem-
plification, Keying-up, and Interpretation.
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to the operations of interpretation, exemplification, keying up and imputation.
The Kac ring can be regarded as a gas representation. For example, the balls
of the ring are interpreted as molecules of the gas and the active sites as points
in the space where molecules collide. These properties are also exemplified by
the model since, roughly, these properties are instantiated by the model and
they are epistemically accessible (Frigg and Nguyen 2016, p. 7). However,
in an application of the Kac ring, these exemplified properties are not keyed
up with properties of the target system. Scientists simply do not care about
the individual gas molecules or their collision points when they assess the
thermodynamic behaviour of a gas. However, scientists key up and impute
the exemplified property of the entropy profile onto target systems of interest.
The discussion of the DEKI account allows me to add a clarificatory re-
mark regarding the context sensitivity of my account of toy models. One
might worry that it is in principle possible to impute any exemplified proper-
ties onto the target system. Accordingly, it might just be a historical contin-
gency that scientists have not yet keyed up these exemplified properties with
a target system. Or, furthermore, it might well be the case that this (lack of)
keying up is a context-sensitive matter. With respect to some questions, some
of the exemplified properties on the basic level are imputed, with respect to
other questions, different ones will be imputed.
I am happy to accept this kind of context-sensitivity of my characterisa-
tion of the hybrid representation condition. In fact, the same model can in
principle be ‘toy’ if used by one scientific discipline and ‘non-toy’ if used by
another scientific discipline, if the latter discipline treats the level of basic
entities and properties as representationally relevant.
4.4.5 Taking stock: A new explication of the term toy
model
The discussion in the previous sections allows formulating the following ex-
plication of the notion ‘toy model’. A toy model is a model type for which
the following three conditions jointly hold:
Manipulability condition The handling of the model belonging to a disci-
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pline D, including the derivation of key model results, is relatively easy
for people trained in D.
Multiple realisability condition The abstract properties (and their rela-
tions to other abstract properties), which are derived with the model,
are instantiated in different ways in target systems.
Hybrid representation condition The basic entities, properties, and re-
lations between the basic entities in the model do not represent features
in any target system. However, there is a representational relation be-
tween model results, formulated on a more abstract level of description,
and target systems.
Let me elaborate on this characterisation. To start, the multiple realisabil-
ity condition expresses a new stability criterion: predictive stability. As I have
argued above, toy models come equipped with the claim that their key model
results are instantiated across a variety of target systems. This stability claim
can be expressed as an inference scheme as follows: Let i be an index defined
over a set of n target systems (i = 1, ..., k, ..., n) that differ substantially in
their composition and P (k) be the statement that the model result P holds
for target system k, then predictive stability expresses the following inference:
M ⇒ P
∀i : P (i)
Predictive stability differs in two respects from derivational robustness
analysis. First, derivational robustness analysis is concerned with assessing
the implications of alternative model assumptions for model results. As be-
came clear in the introduction of this thesis, additional conditions need to be
in place such that this study of the model world reveals something about tar-
get systems. In contrast, robustness across target systems is a claim about the
relation of model results and a set of target systems, that is, the results being
instantiated across target systems. Second, analysing the robustness across
target systems does not require changing the model assumptions. Rather, the
focus is on seeing whether a particular model exhibits a behaviour that can
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be observed across different target systems. This focus follows naturally from
the fact that in the discussed cases of robustness across target systems (e.g.,
for the Kac ring), the basic level of the model (e.g., the ring structure) does
not refer to features in the target systems.
The inference pattern of predictive stability shows some similarities with
a classical claim from confirmation theory, that is, the claim that a theory
or hypothesis is better confirmed by varied evidence (Bovens and Hartmann
2003, p. 103). Consider the following example: The hypothesis ‘All ravens
are black’ is better confirmed by the observation of a black raven in France,
Australia, and North America than by the observation of three black ravens
in a small french town (Strevens 2017, p. 73-74). Diverse evidence, so one
intuition goes, is more powerful in ruling out competing hypotheses, and,
hence, has more confirmatory power. Predictive stability does, however, not
make a claim about a relation of confirmation. The relationship between
the model result P and the instantiation of this result across different target
systems is postulated by predictive stability. The question whether the model
result P is in fact instantiated across different target systems and whether
this constitutes confirmatory evidence for P is a subordinated question. This
will become clearer when I introduce my account of learning with toy models
in the next chapter.
My characterisation of toy models also allows addressing the question as
to whether there is a sharp distinction between toy and non-toy models. To
answer this question, I consider which of the conditions are binary in nature
(satisfied/not satisfied) and which can be fulfilled to a lesser or higher degree.
The manipulability condition can be satisfied to a lesser or higher degree,
even if one takes disciplinary training into account. Two economic models,
both satisfying the multiple realisability and hybrid representation condition,
can still differ in their ease of use. I do think that in such a scenario it is
intuitive to view one of the two models as more ‘toy’ than the other. The
same line of reasoning does not apply to the multiple realisability condition.
If two models are equally easy to manipulate and satisfy the hybrid represen-
tation condition, but differ in terms of the number of systems in which the
respective abstract properties are instantiated, one of the two toy models will
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be more general than the other. What about the hybrid representation con-
dition? Here, some qualification is in order. I want to avoid overgeneralising
since I have only looked at five cases of toy models and fleshed out the hybrid
representation condition in two ways. However, despite these limitations, my
analysis shows that the hybrid representation condition is binary in nature.
With respect to all five cases, the level of basic entities and properties of the
model is not treated as representationally relevant by the users of the toy
model. To sum up, the claims about the non-binary nature of the manipu-
lability condition supports viewing the distinction between toy models and
non-toy models not as a sharp one.
Finally, my explication scores well on Carnap’s criteria for an adequate
explication. First, the proposed explicatum applies to those cases that were
identified as clear instances of the explicandum in Section 4.2. Second, the
explicatum represents an improvement in exactness as it states three explicit
conditions for a toy model whereas each of the conditions is made more precise
with the help of established terms (see, for example, the spelling out of the
hybrid representation condition in Section 4.4.4). The fruitfulness of this
explication will be established in two steps. To start, in Section 4.5, I highlight
three corollaries of the explication. In Chapter 5, I show that the explication
illuminates the question of the epistemic value of toy models.
4.5 Corollaries of the explication
The discussion so far has concentrated on the task of identifying and spelling
out conditions to characterise toy models. This conceptual work will pay off
in the next chapter in which I put the conditions to use. However, before
turning to this task, my explication implies three corollaries that, in my view,
are interesting in their own right.
4.5.1 Corollary 1: Toy models vs. one-factor models
Given my account of toy models, I can now return to the distinction between
toy models and one-factor models that I hinted at when I introduced my case
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studies. I argue below that the Ising model, the Lotka-Volterra model, the
MIT-Bag model, and Bohr’s model of the atom are better described as one-
factor models since they do not satisfy the hybrid representation condition.
To be more precise, they do not satisfy the first conjunct of the hybrid rep-
resentation condition, that is, their basic entities and properties do stand in
a representational relation to target systems. These one-factor models are,
hence, in a crucial respect distinct from the five toy models examined here.
The Ising model, the Lotka-Volterra model, and the MIT-Bag model are
regarded as paradigmatic examples of toy models by Hartmann et al. (2016).
The upshot of my distinction between toy models and one-factor models is
that Hartmann et al. (2016) cast the net too wide with their account of toy
models. If these three models are toy models, it is not clear how they can
draw a distinction to non-toy models since many models describe solely one
(or a few) causal factors and are highly idealised. As I pointed out earlier,
Hartmann et al. (2016) do not want to put forward a sharp boundary between
toy and non-toy models and regard this classification as a matter of degree.
However, my point stands, since even if the distinction is a matter of degree,
their notion of toy models can be too inclusive to be a useful category. It
is not a useful category since it lumps together too many different types of
models and, hence, glosses over important differences between them.
Ising model
The Ising model (Ising 1925) is a statistical mechanical model of ferromag-
netism. Ferromagnetic materials, such as iron or cobalt, can be magnetised by
an external magnetic field and remain magnetised after the external source is
removed (Cipra 1987, p. 937). In contrast, paramagnetic behavior of a mate-
rial occurs if the magnetisation is lost progressively as the external magnetic
field is removed (Friedli and Velenik 2016, p. 18). The two-dimensional Ising
model allows deriving a phase transition from paramagnetic to ferromagnetic
behaviour (Friedli and Velenik 2016, p. 28, 30).
In a nutshell, the model works as follows. The material is represented as a
two-dimensional lattice. At each point on the lattice there is an atom endowed
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with a spin which that is either orientated up or down. The spins interact with
each other. According to the Ising model, spins interact only pairwise with
their nearest neighbours: the one in the north, south, west, and east (Friedli
and Velenik 2016, p. 24). Given these spin interactions, one can define the
magnetisation density for the lattice. With respect to this magnetisation
density, two observations can be made. First, if the temperature of the lattice
system is very high, the magnetisation density is close to zero. This means
that the fraction between the up and down spins is essentially equal. If the
temperature is very low, the magnetisation density is close to one of the two
ground states of the lattice system, that is, a magnetisation of +1 or -1. Hence,
in the limit case of very low temperature, one type of spin is favoured and,
accordingly, a global order or spontaneous magnetisation is observed (Friedli
and Velenik 2016, p. 28). Second, there exists a critical, finite temperature
(the Curie temperature) at which this phase transition occurs (Friedli and
Velenik 2016, p. 30).
Why is the Ising model not a toy model? The hybrid representation con-
dition is not satisfied. The model captures one of the relevant causal factors
underlying the phenomenon of phase-transitions in materials, that is, the
spin-alignment (see Weisberg 2007, p. 642-643 and Rice 2016, p. 91). This
spin alignment process is based on a quantum mechanic assumption that the
magnetic moments in a material (induced by the spin of elementary particles)
can be quantized into a two-state system (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2016, p.
383). Due to this, the basic entities and properties of the Ising model (i.e.,
the spin structure and their alignment) represent features of the target sys-
tems of interest. The Ising model even represents these features faithfully.
Accordingly, it is not the case that solely the pattern of the phase transition
of the Ising model stands in a representational relation to the target system.
Lotka-Volterra model
As stated earlier, the Lotka-Volterra model (Lotka 1925; Volterra 1926) con-
sists of two coupled differential equations that relate the growth of prey and
predator populations. The guiding idea is that these quantities are coupled
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via a negative feedback: an increase in the number of predators leads to
fewer prey and abundance of prey is correlated with the number of predators.
The two differential equations can be specified, in the simplest version of the
model, as follows:
∂V
∂t
= rV − (aV )P (4.18)
∂P
∂t
= b(aV )P −mP (4.19)
V and P stand for the size of the prey and predator population, respec-
tively. The change in the prey population over time is expressed as the dif-
ference between the prey growth (where r is a constant growth rate) and the
prey-capture rate (where a is the prey capture rate per predator). The change
of the predator population is expressed as the difference between predator
births (which is the prey capture rate per predator multiplied by a constant
b) and predator deaths (where m is the constant death rate) (Weisberg 2006b,
p. 734). The term aV is called the functional response. The term b(aV ) is
the numerical response.
Why is the Lotka-Volterra model not a toy model? The hybrid representa-
tion condition is not satisfied. The Lotka-Volterra model is formulated at the
population level. All the parameters in the model (the birth and death rates,
the functional and the numerical response) are aggregate terms. This popula-
tion level is regarded as representationally relevant given one wants to model
particular target systems. For example, there are detailed empirical stud-
ies which determine the functional and numerical response in predator-prey
systems (Holling 1959). Due to this, the basic entities and properties of the
Lotka-Volterra model represent features of the target systems of interest. The
Lotka-Volterra model, if calibrated correctly, even represents these features
faithfully. Accordingly, it is not the case that solely the qualitative features of
the model (such as the undampenend oscillation) stand in a representational
relation to the target system.
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MIT-Bag model
The MIT-Bag model is a model of particles called hadrons. Hadrons, such
as neutrons or protons, are composed of quarks. Quantum chromodynamics
is the field that studies the strong forces governing the behaviour of quarks
(Hartmann 1998, p. 6). Quantum chromodynamics has three features: First,
asymptotic freedom. Quarks move freely at very high energies, however, their
movement is restricted by strong interacting forces at low energy levels. At
these low energy levels, one observes, second, quark confinement. No single
quark is observed because they always come in groups. The third feature
is chiral symmetry. One does not observe right- and left-handed versions of
particle spins, hence, a symmetry breaking occurs in the interaction of these
particles, generating the mass of the hadrons (Hartmann 1998, p. 7-8).
The MIT-Bag model is a model of quark confinement. Confinement is
modelled as the quarks being forced to move inside a spatial region (the bag)
by an external pressure. Within the bag, the quarks occupy particle orbits. No
interaction between the quarks is assumed to take place. The simplest version
of the model assumes that the bag shape is spherical (Hartmann 1998, p. 9).
This model allows recovering some features of hadrons, such as their masses
and radii, to some degree of approximation (Hartmann 1998, p. 11).
Why is the MIT-Bag model not a toy model? The hybrid representation
condition is not satisfied. The level of basic entities and properties in the
model, that is, the quarks in the bag and the bag, is regarded as representa-
tionally relevant. The model captures the fact that hadrons consist of two or
three quarks. The bag pressure reflects the fact that when a hadron is created,
the quarks dig a hole in a non-perturbative vacuum populated by gluons and
other entities. The inside pressure of a hadron must be as high as the outside
pressure to guarantee the observed stability of hadrons (Hartmann 1995, p.
8). Due to this, the basic entities and properties of the MIT-Bag model rep-
resent features of the target systems of interest. The model even represents
these features faithfully. Accordingly it is not the case that solely the quali-
tative features of the model (i.e., the features of hadrons, such as their masses
and radii) stand in a representational relation to the target system.
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Bohr’s model of the atom
As stated earlier, Bohr’s model of the atom is a model of particle physics.
The model superseded a variety of models of the atom that were proposed at
the beginning of the 20th century. For example, Thomson’s model describes
the atom as a uniformly positively charged sphere inside which the negatively
charged electrons move in circular orbits held together by electromagnetic
forces (Bohr 1913, p. 1). However, around this time it was discovered that
electrodynamics cannot be fruitfully applied to systems as small as atoms.
In contrast, Bohr’s model makes space for quantum effects and assumes that
an atom consists of a nucleus and electrons orbiting the nucleus in concentric
trajectories (Bohr 1913, p. 2, 4).
The key insights drawn from Bohr’s model is the structure of Rydberg’s
formula as well as an expression of the Rydberg constant in terms of more
fundamental constants of nature (Bokulich 2011, p. 41). Rydberg’s formula
describes the spectral lines of a hydrogen atom. A spectral line is light of a
specific frequency that is emitted from atoms or molecules when a change of
energy happens (Bokulich 2011, p. 41).
Bohr’s model is now regarded as superseded by the more accurate quan-
tum mechanical model of the atom (i.e., the valence shell model). The key
difference is that the valence shell model does not assume that electrons orbit
nuclei on trajectories. In fact, the quantum mechanical model of the atom
states that there are no trajectories (Bokulich 2011, p. 41).
Roughly, how does Bohr’s model work? Electrons are assumed to orbit
a nucleus in a discrete series of classical trajectories. These trajectories are
called stationary states. If an electron is in a stationary state, the energy of
the electron is constant. If the electron moves (or “quantum jumps”) from
one stationary state to another, the electron loses or gains energy. If such
a move occurs, a photon of a given frequency is emitted. The frequency is
determined by the energy differences between the orbits involved in the move
(Bokulich 2011, p. 41).
Why is Bohr’s model of the atom not a toy model? The hybrid represen-
tation condition is not satisfied. The level of basic entities and properties in
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the model, that is, the nucleus, the electrons, as well as the orbits, is regarded
as representationally relevant. Accordingly it is not the case that solely the
qualitative features of the model (e.g., the Rydberg formula) stand in a rep-
resentational relation to the target system. The fact that Bohr’s model was
superseded by a model that does not contain electron orbits reveals that this
aspect of the basic structure of Bohr’s model does not represent an aspect of
the target system faithfully. This is, importantly, not the same as treating
these orbits from the outset not as representationally relevant. It took time
and hard work from particle physicists to establish whether electrons orbit
nuclei or not on these trajectories. When Bohr introduced the model, it was
not clear that the orbits gave a totally wrong-headed picture of the atom.
4.5.2 Corollary 2: Toy models vs. probing models
My explication allows differentiating between toy models and what I suggest
calling probing models.21 Probing models are, in contrast to toy models, not
introduced in relation to any (type of) real world target system. Rather, they
are used to explore theories or nomologically impossible model worlds. Let
me introduce two examples to further clarify the distinction between a toy
and a probing model.
phi 4-model
Quantum field theory is a theoretical framework that is used to construct
quantum mechanical models of subatomic particles and quasi-particles in
condensed-matter physics. According to this framework, quantum mechanical
interactions between particles are expressed as interactions between quantum
fields (Stefanovich 2014, p. 299). The ϕ4-model is the simplest quantum field
theory that can be constructed. It shows a series of interesting features that
are also shared by more complex quantum field theories: the ϕ4-model allows
21The term ‘probing models’ is also used by Frigg and Hartmann (2012, p. 11). Note,
however, that they use the terms ‘toy model’ and ‘probing model’ interchangeably.
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introducing the technique of renormalization22 and is Lorentz invariant23.24
According to Hartmann (1995, p. 9), the ϕ4-model does not represent
anything. He suggests that it rather gives physicists a “feeling” for what
quantum field theories are like. In my view, this metaphorical talk about
“getting a feeling” or “getting a handle of something” is best spelled out in
the following way: probing models, such as the ϕ4-model, allow exploring the
features of theories. With the help of these models it can be asked what
properties classes of theories share and these shared properties can be investi-
gated further in the simpler setting of the probing model, as is the case with
the Lorentz invariance that is exhibited by the ϕ4-model and more complex
quantum field theories.
Ratchet and pawl machine
A perpetual motion machine is a machine that can produce work indefinitely
(Weisberg 2013, p. 126-127). The ratchet and pawl machine is particular
model of a perpetual motion machine. Two boxes are connected by an axle.
At the one end of the axle, four vanes are attached and contained in the box
on the right with temperature T1. At the other end of the axle, a ratchet is
attached and contained in the box on the left with temperature T2 (see Figure
4.7).
Due to a dampening pawl, the ratchet can only turn in one direction and
releases heat into the box on the left when it turns. In the middle of the axle
there is a wheel with a weight attached to it. When the wheel turns and the
weight is lifted, the machine is doing work. Now, how could this mechanism
work? If the box on the right is filled with a gas, then the gas molecules
22Very roughly, renormalization is a mathematical technique that enables dealing with
infinities that arise in expressions for measurable terms in quantum mechanics due to the
number of underlying particles and their interactions in a quantum system (see Li 2012 for
an introduction).
23Very roughly, Lorentz invariance of a system of equations denotes the fact that if the
equations hold in one inertial reference frame then they hold in any inertial reference frame
(see Mattingly 2005 for details).
24Contrary to my account, Hartmann et al. (2016, p. 8) regard the ϕ4-model as an
embedded toy model. In my view, this is inconsistent with their claim that toy models are
target-directed (see Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 3).
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Figure 4.7: Visualisation of the ratchet and pawl machine (Hartmann et al.
2016, Figure 7.3).
can push the vanes in one direction, thereby turning the axle in the direction
allowed by the ratchet, and, hence, the weight is raised and work is done.
Since there are no perpetual motion machines, the model can be used to show
why this is the case. In particular, it allows identifying which laws need to be
different such that the machine would work. To see the trouble, consider the
assumption that T1 is equal to T2. If the two boxes have equal temperature
to start with, then the turning of the ratchet and the associated dampening
mechanism rises T2. A rise in T2 means that the molecules in the box on the
left are pressing against the pawl and, from the right angle, could lift it and
reverse the ratchet wheel, thereby undoing the work (Weisberg 2013, p. 128).
The machine could only work if heat is extracted from the box on the left but
this is an extra process and one no longer has a perpetual motion machine.
Accordingly, the laws of energy conversion had to be different if the machine
is supposed to work. A form of violating this law could be the assumption
that energy just disappears.
Let me take a step back and reflect on the functioning of this type of prob-
ing model. In contrast to the ϕ4-model, the ratchet and pawl machine is not
introduced in relation to a particular theory; although thermodynamics is the
relevant theory in the background here, the model is not introduced to study
thermodynamics. The ratchet and pawl machine postulates a nomological
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impossible target. By postulating this scenario, it provokes a fruitful com-
parison between actual or possible real world targets. It is this comparison
which enables the insight about the status of the energy conservation princi-
ple. However, this comparison with possible or actual models is not necessary
to gain a conceptual insight from a probing model of this sort. Exploring a
nomologically impossible model worlds can also yield conceptual insights.
4.5.3 Corollary 3: The problem of de-idealising toy
models
My explication of the notion ‘toy model’ provides a handle on the observa-
tion that it is often not straightforward to de-idealise toy models. By de-
idealisation I refer to the process of turning a model into a more accurate
description of a particular target system or type of target system. McMullin
(1985) offers a helpful framework for de-idealisation. Formal de-idealisation
is the process of adding back explanatory factors which were seen as relevant
in the first instance of model building but were not included for tractability
reasons (McMullin 1985, p. 258). McMullin gives the example of the move-
ment of the sun that is omitted in the first versions of Newton’s model of the
solar system although Newton was well aware of the impact of the sun’s move-
ment on the trajectory of the earth. Material de-idealisation is the process of
giving additional details about an explanatory factor that is already included
in the model (McMullin 1985, p. 258). McMullin discusses the theory of ki-
netic gases which does not model the internal structure of molecules, although
their internal structure can become relevant in the context of a different line
of inquiry.
Let me make my initial observation more precise by distinguishing two
questions. First, one can ask whether it is difficult to de-idealise a particular
toy model to arrive at a non-toy model. Second, one can ask whether there is
something about the category of toy models that prevents de-idealisation be-
ing straightforward. I address the second question and argue that the answer
is yes.
My explication reveals two reasons why de-idealising a toy model is not
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a straightforward task. To start, it might not be clear which of the target
systems (or types of target systems) should be chosen as the target for the de-
idealised model. Take the DY model as an example. A de-idealised DY model
looks quite different if the target system is Swiss society as compared to US
society, with the modelling aim of reducing income inequality. The difference
consists in the set of relevant explanatory factors which are introduced in the
non-toy version of the model. There are likely to be different institutional
factors relevant in the case of Switzerland and the US, for example.
One might object here that this problem is usually settled by the con-
text of investigation. If one decides to de-idealise a model, this does usually
happen in the context of particular modelling tasks. For example, one can
de-idealise the DY model by taking into account income from wealth and the
educational structure in a society to arrive at a model better suited to guide
policy interventions to reduce income inequality.
However, even if the context of investigation can settle this objection,
there remains one further problem for de-idealising toy models. These models
contain a level of non-representing basic entities and properties. It is unclear
what the de-idealisation for these basic entities and properties looks like. How
should one de-idealise the ring in the Kac ring, or the checkerboard structure
in Schelling’s model? A salient answer is to look for guiding principles for the
de-idealisation. These seem to be available in cases where the toy model is
embedded in a theoretical framework.
Note, however, that not all toy models are “embedded” in Hartmann et al.
(2016)’s sense (see Cartwright 2009 for raising this point early in the debate).
A toy model is embedded if and only if it is a model of an empirically well
confirmed framework theory (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 5). As Hartmann
et al. (2016) point out, there are also “autonomous” toy models, that is,
models that are not models of a well-confirmed framework theory. My case
studies can serve as illustrations here. The Schelling model and the Akerlof
model are autonomous toy models. There is no well-confirmed framework
theory (either an overreaching sociological framework in the case of Schelling,
or a well-established economic theory in the case of Akerlof). Hence, there is
no framework that can provide clear guidance on the de-idealisation process.
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Furthermore, even if there were a theory that guided the de-idealisation with
respect to one type of target systems, it is not clear that this theory could
also guide de-idealisation with respect to different types of target systems.
The lack (or presence) of a guiding theoretical framework marks an addi-
tional difference between my cases of toy models and the Ising, Lotka-Volterra,
and MIT-Bag models. The Ising model is embededded in a theory of non-
relativistic quantum mechanics (see Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 8) which allows
for a straightforward de-idealisation of the models by taking into account
additional factors. The Lotka-Volterra model is widely regarded as the sim-
plest possible model of predator-prey interactions (Briggs and Hoopes 2004,
p. 299) whereas more complicated models in mathematical ecology are de-
idealisations of this model. Furthermore, Hartmann (1998, p. 11-12) discusses
three approaches of a theory guided de-idealisation of the MIT-Bag model by,
for example, taking into account the interaction between the quarks within a
hadron. The Bohr model is a slightly different case. As Bokulich (2011, p. 43)
argues convincingly, the Bohr model cannot be straightforwardly de-idealised.
The reason, however, is not the fact that its basic entities and properties do
not stand in a representational relation but the fact that a key component
of the model (the orbit assumption) turned out to be false. More accurate
models of the atom cannot build upon the Bohr model with respect to this
assumption and, hence, need to conceptualize the movement of electrons dif-
ferently. This, as turned out to be the case, required taking into account a
quantum-mechanical understanding of electrons.
4.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I provided a new characterisation of ‘toy models’ involving
a manipulability, a multiple realisability, and a hybrid representation condi-
tion. This characterisation enabled me to address my first research question:
Do measurement and derivational robustness analyses exhaust the set of use-
ful types of robustness analysis? I argued that the answer is no and that
predictive stability denotes an important additional category of robustness.
Furthermore, I showed that my explication implies three interesting corol-
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laries. First, it enables differentiating between toy models and one-factor
models that do not satisfy the hybrid representation condition. Second, it
allows distinguishing clearly between toy models, which are target-directed,
and probing models, which postulate nomological impossible worlds or are
used to explore theories. Third, the explication allows giving a sense of why
toy models are hard to de-idealise.
The conceptual scaffolding work of this chapter forms the basis for inves-
tigating the natural follow-up questions: how and what can one learn based
on toy models? I turn to these questions in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Robustness in Economic
Policy-Making: Learning Based
on Toy Models
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I identified a set of paradigmatic toy models and
characterised them with the help of three conditions: a manipulability, mul-
tiple realisability, and hybrid representation condition. My analysis revealed
that toy models exhibit a particular form of robustness – predictive stability,
that is, the claim that key model results are instantiated across a variety of
target systems. In this chapter, I explore what kind of learning toy models
allow. A particular emphasis will be placed on whether learning provided by
these models can be used in economic policy-making. As my discussion will
make clear, many toy model results are derivationally non-robust. Hence, I
can address my third research question: What should one do if model results
are derivationally non-robust?
To address this question, I proceed in a stepwise fashion. In particular, I
defend three claims. First, one must distinguish between learning from a toy
model and learning with a toy model. Learning from a toy model is a form of
conceptual learning, that is, an insight into what certain assumptions imply.
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Learning with a toy model is learning about a target system, but here the toy
model is merely a tool in the learning process. The actual learning happens in
the comparison of toy model results with a target system. This learning via
comparison takes place if the abstract property (or relation between abstract
properties) posited by the toy model is instantiated in target systems that
are distinct from the initial system that motivated the construction of the toy
model. Second, the issue of the derivational robustness of toy model results
has important implications for learning based on a toy model. Non-robust
toy models still can provide conceptual learning or can introduce a potentially
valuable modelling technique. Third, from these two claims it follows that toy
models can only play a limited role in economic policy-making: toy models do
not reveal precise predictions about or stable relations that can be exploited
for interventions in particular target systems.
This chapter is structured as follows: To start, I review existing accounts
of model-based learning to identify conditions for successful learning (Sections
5.2 ). I then introduce the distinction between learning from a toy model and
learning with a toy model (Section 5.3 ). Then, I put forward my account of
learning from and with toy models (Section 5.4 ) and discuss what the value
of this type of model-based learning is for economic policy-making (Section
5.5 ).
5.2 Existing accounts of model-based learning
To arrive at an account of learning based on toy models, I start by examining
three prominent approaches in the literature that propose accounts of model-
based learning. My strategy is, for each of the three approaches, to uncover
conditions for model-based learning and to state them as precisely as possible.
I then use these conditions to motivate and flesh out my account of learning
for toy models in subsequent sections.
I will discuss Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009, 2013a)’s, Hartmann et al. (2016)’s, and
Battermann and Rice (2014)’s accounts. I have selected these three accounts
since their intended domains of application covers types of models that share
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important features with my paradigmatic cases of toy models.1
5.2.1 Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s account of learning with minimal
models
Recall Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009)’s claim that one learns from minimal models be-
cause results derived with the help of these models can affect one’s degree of
belief in impossibility hypotheses. Accordingly, Gru¨ne-Yanoff suggests that
model-based learning consists in a change of degree of belief about particular
types of hypotheses. Importantly, Gru¨ne-Yanoff views this kind of learning
as a learning about target systems (Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009, p. 81, 85). A deriva-
tion with the help of a minimal model can affect one’s degree of belief since
this derivation displays a relevant possibility for a target system of interest.
Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s claim is that a derivation solely based on a minimal model
can ground learning about a target system.
What conditions need to be in place for this type of learning? As has
already been hinted at in the previous chapter, Gru¨ne-Yanoff suggests that
minimal models need to be credible to allow the derivation of relevant possi-
bilities. Credibility is spelled out as a coherence of the model set-up with the
intuitions of the epistemic agent who uses the model. According to him, it is
explicitly not the case that one needs to look at the coherence of an agent’s
model-independent intuitions with model assumptions. Rather, Gru¨ne-Yanoff
puts forward a purely model-internal notion of coherence. The reason for this
is his claim that the intuitions of model users often do not exist independently
of the model world (Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009, p. 94).
Let me look closer at this condition for successful learning about target
systems. Is a model-internal notion of credibility enough to establish that a
model derivation is a relevant possibility for a real-world target? Fumagalli
1Note that the two questions about the characterisation of toy models (what is a toy
model?) and their epistemic value (what does one learn based on toy models?) are distinct.
In Chapter 4, I argued that Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s, Hartmann et al.’s and Batterman and Rice’s
accounts by themselves do not provide a satisfactory answer to how my paradigmatic cases
of toy models should be characterised. This does not rule out that their respective accounts
of model-based learning can be applied to toy models.
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argues that this is not the case. He succinctly notes this for the case of
Schelling’s checkerboard model (Fumagalli 2015, p. 17-18):2
However, it [the model] does not per se foster justified changes in
confidence in hypotheses concerning real-world segregation pro-
cesses. To be sure, modellers may occasionally be able to demon-
strate that the possible cause of abstract segregation identified by
Schelling’s model can foster segregation also in the real-world sit-
uations they investigate (e.g., think of cases where independent
studies provide modellers with this information). Still, on the
supposition that Schelling’s model is minimal, this demonstration
would require modellers to supplement such a model with infor-
mation or presuppositions regarding those real-world situations
(...).
Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2013a, p. 853) seems to acknowledge the need for such a
model-external step for establishing the claim that a relevant possibility is
provided by a minimal model. He makes a very short remark about how such
a link can be established. According to Gru¨ne-Yanoff, such a link is present if
the model assumptions are conceptually linked to real world features. Gru¨ne-
Yanoff explicitly states that this conceptual link does not presuppose a resem-
blance relation between the model and the real world. He states that such
a conceptual link is given, if, for example, a “possible migration rule in an
agent-based model falls under the same concept as actual agents’ decision rules
concerning migration.” (Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2013a, p. 853). One way of spelling
out these brief remarks is the following: One can describe both the model
world and the real world on different levels of abstraction. There is a level of
abstraction at which a phenomenon of the real world and a model assumption
are instantiations of the same abstract notion. Let me elaborate on Gru¨ne-
Yanoff’s example in this spirit. Real world agents have reasons for migrating.
One of these decision rules could be to move if the neighbourhood does not
provide adequate primary schools. Agents in Schelling’s checkerboard are en-
dowed with a decision rule for moving between squares (i.e., move if a certain
2See Casini (2014, p. 649) for the same claim about Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s notion of credibility.
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percentage or more of agents in the agent’s neighbourhood are of different
type). Both these decision rules can be described in more abstract terms.
The two rules are, for example, instantiations of the abstract notion of “being
dissatisfied with composition of the neighbourhood”.
The key question is now, however, what kind of link between a model and
a target system is established in this way. According to Gru¨ne-Yanoff, the
relation describes the fact that two phenomena can be viewed as instantiations
of the same abstract notion. This establishes the fact that situations can be
described with similar vocabulary. Is this enough to show that model results
are a relevant possibility for the target system? I do not think so. Consider
again the example from Schelling’s checkerboard model. What one needs
to establish is the claim that factors for segregation identified in Schelling’s
model (i.e., mild discriminatory preferences) can lead to segregation in real
world targets. For this, it is not enough to describe factors in the model and
aspects of the real world phenomena with the same abstract notion. Even
if this re-description can be done, it is still an open question whether the
identified aspects of the real world phenomena are sufficient for leading to
segregation in real world targets.
Sugden (2000) provides a different account of the credibility of models. Im-
portantly, this account is not based on a model-internal notion of credibility.
According to Sugden, the credibility of a model is the compatibility of model
assumptions with known general laws governing events in the real world (Sug-
den 2000, p. 25). Accordingly, our model-independent background knowledge
comes into play here. Note that what Sugden is stressing here are relevant
similarities between a model and a target system. Relevant similarities hold
between the dynamics of a model and the laws governing the dynamic of the
target system. Hence, Sugden provides a similarity-based account of credibil-
ity or relevance of a model for a (type of) target system. These similarities
justify, in Sugden’s view, the “inductive leap” from the model result to claims
about a target system of interest (Sugden 2000, p. 20).
What emerges from this discussion is the insight that there is a gap be-
tween model results and claims about target systems. If one wants to learn
something with the help of a model about a real world target, one needs to
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be able to bridge this gap. One such way is to show that model results are
relevant possibilities. As my discussion of Gru¨ne-Yanoff showed, such a rele-
vance relation cannot be established in a purely model-internal way. Sugden’s
suggestion – establishing relevance via similarity between the model dynamic
and causal laws governing the target – is a more promising way of bridging
this gap.
5.2.2 Hartmann et al.’s account of understanding with
toy models
Recall Hartmann et al. (2016)’s account of gaining insights via toy models,
which is based on the notions of understanding and explanation. They claim
that an individual scientist S understands a phenomenon P via model M in
context C if one of the following conditions holds:
• S has how-actually understanding of phenomenon P via model M in
context C if model M provides a how-actually explanation of P and S
grasps M .
• S has how-possibly understanding of phenomenon P via model M in
context C if model M provides a how-possibly explanation of P and S
grasps M .
Here, Hartmann et al. reveal that the key notions of their account are how-
actually and how-possibly explanations. Hence, they provide an explanation-
based account of learning. The distinction between how-actually explanations
and how-possibly explanations can be put as follows. How-actually explana-
tions of phenomena consist of the true (or approximately true) explanatory
factors of phenomena (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 18). In contrast, how-possibly
explanations involve merely possible explanatory factors that could account
for the explanandum phenomena (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 18). The how-
actually explanation of a phenomenon is a subset of the how-possibly expla-
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nations of this phenomenon.3
What conditions need to be in place for this type of learning? As stated
in the previous chapter, Hartmann et al. distinguish between embedded
toy models, which can deliver how-actually explanations, and autonomous
toy models, which can deliver how-possibly explanations. An embedded toy
model only delivers how-actually explanations if the following conditions are
met (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 19-20). First, the embedding framework theory
permits an interpretation and justification of the idealisations of the model.
Second, this interpretation and justification needs to be compatible with the
veridicality condition, which states that explanatory assumptions are required
to be true or approximately true (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 15). As an ex-
ample, they provide Newton’s Sun-plus-one-planet-model. The idealisations
of this model are justified for pragmatic reasons since they turn calculating
earth’s orbit into a mathematically tractable problem. Furthermore, Newto-
nian mechanics offers a way of de-idealising this model (e.g., by adding the
influence of other planets and moons) such that the veridicality condition is
satisfied (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 20-21). Hartmann et al. (2016) are less
explicit about the conditions that need to be in place for how-possibly ex-
planations. They say merely that a how-possibly explanation is a potential
explanation of a general pattern. Importantly, they state, the models that
provide how-possibly explanations cannot themselves inform us as to whether
they have identified the actually present explanatory factors.
Hartmann et al. (2016, p. 27) discusses three functions of how-possibly
explanations: a modal, a heuristic, and a pedagogical function. For my pur-
poses, the modal and the pedagogical are crucial. The modal function of how-
possibly explanations is identical to Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s claim about influencing
one’s beliefs about impossibility claims regarding target systems (Hartmann
et al. 2016, p. 27). If my line of reasoning regarding Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s ac-
count is compelling, then this modal function of how-possibly explanations
also requires an additional step to establish that a model displays a relevant
3I deliberately brush over the question here as to whether there is for every explanandum
exactly one how-actually explanation. For an entry point into this debate see Pincock
(forthcoming).
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possibility. To put it differently, one needs to be able to give an argument for
why a particular how-possibly explanation should be part of the set of rele-
vant how-possibly explanations with respect to which the true how-actually
explanation is a member. The pedagogical function of how-possibly explana-
tions is to enable students and researchers to quickly grasp the idea behind
the solution to a problem, to describe a phenomenon, or to apply calculation
techniques (Hartmann et al. 2016, p. 27). Importantly, (Hartmann et al.,
2016, p. 27) state that this function does not presuppose establishing a link
between a target system and the model under consideration. This function
can be performed by the model itself.
Two insights emerge from this discussion. To start, learning qua providing
how-actually explanations or modal insights via how-possible explanations
requires establishing a link between a model and a target system. This link
cannot be supplied by the model itself. Furthermore, there is model-based
learning qua providing pedagogic tools which does not presuppose such a link.
This is a non-target-directed type of learning.
5.2.3 Batterman and Rice’s account of minimal model
explanations
Recall Battermann and Rice (2014)’s argument that minimal models can pro-
vide minimal model explanations. In contrast to Hartmann et al. (2016)’s
account, a different notion of explanation is in play here. In particular, min-
imal model explanations, they claim, do not explain in virtue of pointing
out features that are shared between a model and a target system of interest.
Rather, the connecting element between a minimal model and a target system
is the fact that they belong to the same universality class.
What conditions need to be in place for this type of learning? As stated
in the previous chapter, showing that a model and a target system belong to
the same universality class involves answering the following questions (Bat-
termann and Rice 2014, p. 150):
1. Why are the common features among systems necessary for the phe-
nomenon to occur?
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2. Why are the remaining heterogeneous details (those left out of or misrep-
resented by the model) irrelevant for the occurrence of the phenomenon?
3. Why do very different target systems share common features?
Putting it positively, these three questions reveal the conditions that need
to be in place for having a minimal model explanation. One needs to be able to
tell why heterogeneous details in the target systems belonging to a universality
class are irrelevant; why the shared features among these target systems are
necessary; and, finally, why their common features are shared across different
target systems. Applying the technique of group renormalisation, which was
introduced in the previous chapter, is a way of satisfying these conditions.
Importantly, group renormalisation thereby plays the role of establishing
a link between the model and the target systems that lie in the explanatory
domain. To see this, recall that the model system is just one additional system
that enters into group renormalisation besides the real world (and potential)
target system(s). As Lange (2014, p. 295) points out, however, even if a toy
model and a target system belong to the same universality class, it is not clear
that a satisfactory explanation has been given. Battermann and Rice (2014)’s
account fails to establish the asymmetry of minimal model explanations: min-
imal models explain a target phenomenon and not vice versa. Batterman and
Rice cannot claim that minimal model explanations lack explanatory asymme-
try. For scientific explanations involving minimal models exhibit explanatory
asymmetry despite the fact that the asymmetry is not generated by causal
factors figuring in the explanations (minimal model explanations, according
to Battermann and Rice (2014), do not explain in virtue of the fact that they
accurately represent (relevant) causal factors) (Lange 2014, p. 296-298). One
possible way out for Batterman and Rice could be to turn their account into
an explicitly agent-based account of scientific explanation. In such a version
of the account, Batterman and Rice could stipulate that an agent intends to
show that a model and a target system belong to the same universality class
and that she uses the model to represent the target system. By this the agent
introduces with her behaviour the relevant explanatory asymmetry.4 I think
4See the discussion of Giere’s similarity account in Section 5.4.4 for the same move.
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that such a move is a compelling way of defending the account against Lange’s
objection because I believe one should reserve an important role for the epis-
temic context and the epistemic agents operating within, as will become clear
in Chapter 6 on model and theory choice.
Regardless of whether one thinks Battermann and Rice (2014)’s account
can be saved from Lange’s objection by this move, one important insight
emerges from this discussion: Even a form of model-based explanation which
locates the explanatory power of models not in shared features between models
and targets, comes equipped with a way of establishing a link between a model
and a set of target systems. This supports the points made in relation to
Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s and Hartman et al.’s accounts: Learning something about a
target system with the help of a model requires a way of establishing the
relevance of the model results for a particular target. This justificatory step
cannot be skipped.
5.3 Taking stock: Some clarifications regard-
ing model-based learning
So far, I have used the term “model-based learning” as an umbrella term that
covers different forms of model-based explanations and the adjustment of
degrees of beliefs in impossibility claims. In this section, I rely on the insights
from the discussion so far to arrive at a more specific notion of model-based
learning.
Two key insights emerge from the discussion so far. First, one should dis-
tinguish between target-directed and non-target-directed accounts of learning.
Target-directed accounts view models as supplying statements about (types
of) real world targets. Non-target-directed accounts see models as yielding
statements that should not be viewed as claims about target systems. The
two types of learning come with different justificatory requirements. Target-
directed learning requires establishing a link between model statements and
statements about target systems. As the discussion in the previous section
made clear, this link needs to be established with the help of facts that are not
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to be found in the model-world itself. Second, not all forms of model-based
learning involve explanations. Gru¨ne-Yanoff’s account solely involves an agent
changing her degree of beliefs and the pedagogical function of how-possibly
explanations also does not involve a reference to explanations.
Taking these two insights on board allows me to introduce the key distinc-
tion of this chapter: the distinction between learning from a toy model and
learning with a toy model.
Learning from a toy model is present if the toy model itself provides the
learning. The insights that are gained in this type of learning do not require
additional input, that is, the facts that can establish a link between a model
and a target system. The previous discussion reveals that the pedagogical
function of how-possibly explanations are an instance of learning from a toy
model. Learning with a toy model is present if the toy model itself does not
provide the learning but nevertheless plays an important role in the learning
process. The toy model is a tool in this learning process. The discussion in
Section 5.2 shows that target-directed learning is an instance of learning with
a toy model.5
I take target-directed model-based learning to consist in the following:
A justified change of an epistemic agent’s degree of belief in one or more
hypotheses about a (type of) target system that makes essential reference to
a model. Let me clarify this characterisation.
First, this notion of learning presupposes a justification of a change in
belief. This justification can take various forms across different types of target-
5Let me further clarify how the two distinctions of target-directed vs. non-target-
directed and learning from a model vs. learning with a model relate to each other. Taking
the discussion in Section 5.2 at face value reveals that the combination of learning from
a model/target-directed learning is ruled out. However, the combination learning with a
model/non-target-directed is possible. This would be the case if a model plus some addi-
tional facts, for example, a de-idealisation, revealed some additional conceptual insights.
The two main categories are, however, “learning from a model/non-target-directed” and
“learning with a model/target-directed”. This distinction is different from Sugden’s dis-
tinction between learning about a model world and learning about a target system (see
Sugden 2000). Although “learning from a model/non-target-directed” does not involve a
target system, the upshot of this kind of learning does not consists in understanding a
particular model description (or “model world”) but rather in grasping a relation between
concepts. To see the difference, note that these conceptual relations could be instantiated
in other model descriptions.
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directed model-based learning.6 Second, let me emphasise that this notion of
learning allows explicitly for non-explanatory learning, that is, one can learn
something about a (type of) target system without being in possession of an
explanation.7 Third, this notion of learning is compatible with accounts of
representation that stress the fact that model results are usually not directly
applied to target systems. The DEKI account (see Section 5.4.4) is such
an account. According to this, a key is used to translate model results into
statements that are then imposed onto a target system. Hence, the hypothesis
that I refer to in my definition does not need to be identical to the derived
model result.
5.4 A new account of learning from and with
toy models
In this section, I spell out my account of learning based on toy models. After
introducing the key tenets of the account (Sections 5.4.1-5.4.2), I strengthen it
by articulating two of its features. First, the account allows stating how there
can be learning despite the fact that the basic entities and properties of toy
models do not represent features of target systems (Section 5.4.3). Second,
6If model-based learning involves providing an explanation of a phenomenon, different
types of explanations require different justifications for the change in the degree of belief.
For example, causal explanations require, very roughly, that one has identified key causal
factors contributing to the phenomenon. In contrast, unificationist explanations require,
very roughly, that one shows how the phenomenon fits into a pattern involving a range of
different phenomena.
7After all this conceptual work, the reader might be puzzled why a straightforward ques-
tion has not been asked yet: Are any of the discussed accounts of model-based learning
capable of capturing the epistemic import of my five paradigmatic examples of toy mod-
els? I have suppressed this question so far to have all the components in place to give
a succinct answer. As accounts of learning with a toy model about a target system, the
accounts of Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009), Hartmann et al. (2016), and Battermann and Rice (2014)
can only be applied to my cases if some additional, model-external facts establish a link
between the models and the intended target systems. For example, solely if the group
renormalisation technique were to work for the Kac ring, then the Kac ring could provide a
minimal model explanation of some universally observable behaviour across target systems.
Similarly, solely if one can provide a reason for why Schelling’s checkerboard model yields
a relevant possibility, this model can be said to provide a how possibly explanation of a
target phenomenon.
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the account enables saying precisely what role the robustness of toy model
results plays for learning with these models (Section 5.4.4).
5.4.1 Learning from a toy model
One learns from a toy model if the toy model itself provides the learning. In
particular, toy models enable one to learn that certain configurations of as-
sumptions have particular implications. Uncovering these inferential relations
amounts to one grasping a conceptual scheme.8 Let me illustrate these rather
abstract claims with the help of a few of my case studies.
The key model result of the Kac ring is that a system with an ergodic
decomposition shows equilibrium-like behaviour. The Kac ring highlights
the concepts of thermodynamic equilibrium, ergodic decomposability, deter-
ministic mechanics and time-reversibility. The model itself reveals relations
between these four abstract notions. In particular, the model shows that the
assumption of ergodic decomposability, deterministic mechanics, and time re-
versibility implies an equilibrium like behaviour. So, the Kac ring in itself
provides an insight into the inferential relations between these four concepts,
and, due to its ease of manipulability, does this in a transparent way.
The key model result of the DY model consists in an exponential income
distribution. Looking at the DY model makes clear that the model highlights
the concepts of random selection, resource exchange rules, entropy maximisa-
tion, and resource distribution properties. The model itself reveals relations
between these four abstract notions. In particular, the model shows that the
assumptions of random selection, pooling and random division of resources,
and entropy maximisation imply an exponential distribution. So, the DY
model itself provides an insight into the inferential relations between con-
cepts, and, due to its ease of manipulability, does this in a transparent way.
In fact, the model was used as a starting point for exploring further concep-
tual relations. Adding an assumption about resource saving decisions reveals
8Note that I use the notion of a conceptual scheme in a less demanding sense than
Davidson (see Davidson 1973). Davidson denotes something akin to a world view with this
notion whereas I have a set of concepts in mind that stand in inferential relations to each
other.
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that the resulting distribution is not only exponentially distributed but also
has a power law tail.
The key model result of Akerlof’s market for lemons is that informational
asymmetries between buyers and sellers in a market can lead to sub-optimal
market outcomes. Looking at Akerlof’s market for lemons makes clear that
the model highlights the concepts of the information states of market partic-
ipants, trading schemes, and the optimality of market outcomes. The model
itself reveals relations between these three abstract notions. In particular,
the model shows that the assumptions of informational asymmetries between
two market sides and a willingness-to-pay based trading scheme result in a
lack of market interactions. So, Akerlof’s market for lemons itself provides an
insight into the inferential relations between concepts, and, due to its ease of
manipulability, does this in a transparent way.
Two things are important with respect to these examples. First, these
inferential relations are relations between concepts and should not be read
as statements about (types of) target systems. This form of learning with
toy models is non-target-directed. Second, this does not preclude that these
conceptual resources are used to arrive at explicitly target-directed models
that are non-toy in nature.
5.4.2 Learning with a toy model
Policy-making involves real world problems and, hence, a pressing question
is whether toy models allow learning about target systems. I turn to this
question now.
One learns with a toy model if the toy model itself does not provide the
learning but nevertheless plays a role in the learning process. I suggest viewing
target-directed learning with a toy model as a three-stage process. In the
first stage, a toy model is constructed by an epistemic agent to capture a
pattern in a real world target T . This pattern can be a particular property
of a target system or a relation between properties. In the second stage, toy
models generate hypotheses about (types of) target systems. For a particular
toy model M it is the hypothesis H that abstract properties (or relations
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between abstract properties), which are instantiated by M , are instantiated
in multiple target systems. In the third stage, an epistemic agent learns with
the help of M something about a target system T ∗, which is distinct from
the initial target system T , if the hypothesis H is true for target system T ∗,
that is, the abstract property (or relations between abstract properties) is
instantiated in target system T ∗. The learning in this third stage consists in
two insights: the agent learns that a target system of interest instantiates the
abstract property and she learns, if she considers multiple target systems, the
scope of the hypothesis H.9
Taking a step back from this account of learning reveals that the toy
model plays the role of a hypothesis generator. The toy model itself cannot
provide learning about the target system. The learning occurs, metaphorically
speaking, in the moment in which the target system hits back in the expected
way. Let me illustrate these rather abstract claims with the help of a few of
my case studies.
The DY model captures, first, a key fact about income distributions, that
is, that they are exponentially distributed. It comes equipped with the hy-
pothesis that the abstract property of an exponential income distribution is
instantiated in multiple target systems. These target systems are economies
with different currencies, banking structures, and financial regulations. One
learns something from the DY model about a so far unexamined real world
economy, such as the economy of Denmark, if the income distribution of Den-
mark is exponentially distributed. If this condition is satisfied, one learns that
the income distribution of Denmark is exponentially distributed. One learns
something further, namely something about the scope of the initial hypoth-
esis, by examining how many other economies also display an exponential
income distribution.
The Kac ring captures, first, a key fact about the macroscopic behaviour
of gases, that is, that they show an equilibrium like behaviour. The Kac
9I have given here sufficient conditions and not necessary conditions for learning with
a toy model. The reason is that learning can also originate from the fact that patterns
that one had reason to expect are not present in target systems. To keep the discussion
manageable, I set this type of learning – one might want to call it “learning via discrepancy”
– aside.
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ring comes equipped with the hypothesis that there is a relations between
the concepts of ergodic decomposition and equilibrium like behaviour, in the
sense that systems that instantiate the former instantiate the latter. These
target systems are fluids and gases with different micro constituents. One
learns something from the Kac ring about a so far unexamined real gas if
it is true that the gas with an ergodic decomposition shows an approach
to equilibrium. If this condition is satisfied for a real gas, one learns that
this gas shows an equilibrium like behaviour. One learns something further,
namely something about the scope of the initial hypothesis, by examining how
many other systems also instantiate this relation between the two abstract
properties.
Schelling’s checkerboard model captures, first, a key fact about distribu-
tion patterns within social groups, that is, that they are often segregated along
binary lines (e.g., ethnicity in cities). The model comes equipped with the hy-
pothesis that there is a relation between the concepts of mild preferences and
a segregation pattern, in the sense that systems that instantiate the former
instantiate the latter. These target systems are cities, schools, or universities
with different social and geographic properties. One learns something from
Schelling’s checkerboard model about a so far unexamined particular real city
if it is true that the city where people have mild discriminatory preferences
shows segregation patterns. If this condition is satisfied for a real city, one
learns that this city has segregation patterns. One learns something further,
namely something about the scope of the initial hypothesis, by examining how
many other systems also instantiate the relation between the two concepts.
Let me clarify my account of learning with toy models about target systems
by highlighting some of its features. First, the discussed toy models offer
different learnings on the third stage. The DY model comes equipped with
the hypothesis that a single abstract property is instantiated in target systems.
In contrast, the other two models come equipped with the hypothesis that a
relation between two abstract properties is instantiated in target systems (e.g.,
the relation between ergodic decomposability and equilibrium like behaviour).
Second, one might ask whether my account is merely phenomenological.
This would be the case if the learning provided by these toy models did
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not classify as a type of explanation of the phenomena of interest. My ac-
count is phenomenological in nature. Even in the cases where the toy model
comes equipped with a hypothesis stating that there is a relation between ab-
stract properties, this is not a causal claim. Rather, the relation of abstract
properties should be viewed as a claim about the co-instantiation of abstract
properties in target systems. This relation of co-instantiation could also be
described as a correlation. The natural follow-up question is, why it should be
assumed that the postulated correlation between abstract properties should
be expected in target systems different from the target system (or type of
target system) that was used to recover the pattern in the first place.
In a sense, the move from a toy model result to the claim that the toy
model result is instantiated in a variety of (type of) target systems bears
similarity to Sugden’s inductive leap. To recall, Sugden suggests that one
can see model results as causal statements about target systems if there is a
sufficient degree of similarity between the model and the target system. Note
two crucial differences between my claim and Sugden’s. First, I do not claim
that toy model results should be read as causal statements. I only claim that,
in some cases, toy model results suggest the presence of a correlation between
properties in target systems (e.g., the correlation between mild preferences
and a segregation pattern). Hence, my inductive leap is less ambitious than
Sugden’s regarding the nature of the postulated relation in a target system.
Second, I claim that learning only occurs if the postulated relation is present
in a target system. Sugden suggests that similarity judgements, and not the
actual observation of causal relations in a target system, justify the inductive
leap. Hence, my inductive leap is less ambitious in the sense that I do not
require model-related grounds (such as similarity to a target system) that
motivate the truth (or high likelihood) of a causal claim. However, I take
it to be the case that even my less ambitious inductive leap requires some
motivation: why should one expect a correlation of properties, postulated by
a toy model, to hold in a variety of target systems?
In my view, the following analogy could provide some motivation for this
expectation. Humans have developed a capacity for seeing by developing
eyes. Eyes have been observed in organisms that differ significantly from
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the human make-up. This fact motivates the assumption that eyes or eye-
like systems can be expected in further organisms that differ significantly from
humans. In parallel, there are patterns in the real world that can be recovered
by toy models. These toy models are capable of adequately depicting these
patterns despite the fact that the toy models look nothing like the system
whose behaviour they capture. This fact motivates the assumption that other
target systems, which could vary significantly from the initial target system,
exhibit the same pattern. Let me emphasise again that, in my view, this
inductive leap requires significantly less motivation than Sugden’s inductive
leap from a model result to the claim about a causal relation in a target
system.
This allows me to state the relation between my account of learning based
on toy models and knowledge about the causal structure of a target system
in a precise manner: According to my account of learning, providing causal
knowledge about a target system is not a necessary condition for learning
with a toy model. However, gaining insights into the causal structure of a
system – that is, if it turns out that the correlation, which is postulated by
the toy model, is a causal relation in a target system – is compatible with my
account of learning.
Third, my account does not presuppose that toy models come equipped
with a well-specified domain of application. If this were the case, the second
insight on stage three (i.e., to how many systems does the hypothesis apply
to) would be defined ex ante, which is not always the case. The Kac ring il-
lustrates this point: Although the key model result of the Kac ring consists in
a relation between abstract properties, there remains an open question about
what systems satisfy the antecedent condition (i.e., the ergodic decompos-
ability). It must be shown that all measure-preserving systems satisfy this
condition.
Fourth, one might object that my account does not respect the asymmetry
of learning with a toy model: one learns something about a target system
with the help of a toy model and not something about a toy model from an
instantiating target system. In reply, I have accounted for this directionality
of learning in the formulation of my account by introducing the epistemic
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agent as the toy model user. In my view, an epistemic agent uses a model to
realise some particular epistemic aims. It is this use that gives the learning a
direction.10
Fifth, one might be worried that this account of learning with toy mod-
els about target systems does not adequately account for their status within
the sciences. Put bluntly, are these models anything more than random hy-
pothesis generators? If so, what distinguishes toy models from other sources
of inspiration, such as gazing into an open fire? Let me say two things in
response. To start, toy models are certainly distinct from these alternative
forms of generating hypotheses since toy models allow an alternative form of
learning. This was the conceptual learning highlighted in the previous section.
Furthermore, it is true that my account moves toy models into the realm of
discovery. Toy models themselves cannot justify their results. I see this as a
by-product of my account that should be welcomed since it is in line with an
empiricist account of knowledge generation.
This closes the exposition of my account of learning from and with toy
models. I now turn to two arguments in its defence (Sections 5.4.2-5.4.3).
5.4.3 Learning and the hybrid representation condition
In the previous chapter, I argued that toy models satisfy the following hybrid
representation condition:
Hybrid representation condition The basic entities, properties, and re-
lations between the basic entities in the model do not represent features
in any target system. However, there is a representational relation be-
tween model results, formulated on a more abstract level of description,
and target systems.
The fact that toy models satisfy this condition does not undermine my
claim that toy models can provide learning of the sort just described. To the
contrary, my account of learning based on toy models can nicely be squared
10See the discussion of Lange (2014)’s objection against Batterman and Rice in Section
5.2.3.
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with my characterisation of toy models. Let me elaborate on this with respect
to the two distinct forms of learning.
With respect to learning from toy models, toy models can reveal infer-
ential relations between concepts despite the fact that the basic entities and
properties of these models do not represent features in any target system. The
reason is simply that the inferential relations hold between the concepts itself.
With respect to target-directed learning with toy models, toy models can play
a part in revealing that an abstract property (or a relation between abstract
properties) is instantiated in a target system and the scope of this claim for
the same reason. For the learned facts do not make any reference to the non-
referring entities or properties of toy models. Although the toy model is one
system that instantiates the abstract properties (or their relations), and for
this the basic entities and properties of the model matter, the learning with
the model is not affected by the level of basic entities and properties since the
learning is located on the level of abstract properties.
Take the DY model to start. One can learn that some developed economies
show an exponential income distribution despite the fact that the money
distribution principle in a collision of agents does not represent features of
developed economies. From the Kac ring, one can learn that gases and fluids
that have an ergodic decomposition show an equilibrium like behaviour despite
the fact that the ring structure and the markers do not represent features in
these gases and fluids. From Schelling’s checkerboard model, one can learn
that schools, universities, and cities where agents have mild discriminatory
preferences show segregation despite the fact that the checkerboard structure
and the movement rules of the model do not represent features in real world
schools, universities, and cities.
5.4.4 Learning and lack of derivational robustness
An account of learning based on toy models is incomplete if it cannot account
for a salient feature of this model class: the fact that many toy model results
are derivationally non-robust, that is, the case that model results change if
the assumptions of the toy models are altered. I engage with this observation
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in two steps. First, I substantiate the point that many results of theoretical
models are derivationally non-robust. Since I am discussing how toy models
can be used in economic policy-making, I focus on economic models in this
section. Second, I explore the impacts of a lack of robustness on the types of
learning identified previously. To make this discussion as tangible as possible,
I focus on Hotelling’s model.
Derivational robustness of economic models
Reiss (2008, p. 118) points out with respect to economics (italics are mine):
(...) how sensitive to the precise setting many results in economic
experiments are. An analogous fact is true, and known to be true,
about results derived from certain kinds of economic models: they
are, by and large, extremely sensitive to the precise set of assump-
tions made. Just change the transportation cost function slightly,
change the setting from static to dynamic, introduce risk aversion,
take out money illusion and so forth: all these factors will often
make a dramatic difference to the derived result.
Let me focus on the two emphasised parts. To start, Reiss refers here to
what he calls “mathematical models” (Reiss 2008, p. 113). In particular,
he discusses Hotelling’s model, which falls under my account of toy models.
Furthermore, according to Reiss, the fact of the lack of derivational robustness
of Hotelling’s model can be generalised to other mathematical models (see
Reiss 2013, p. 287; Hindriks 2013, p. 524). Indeed, Cartwright (2009, p. 50)
makes a very similar point when she talks about the “paucity of economic
principles”. Because there are not many well-established economic principles
that can be included in an economic model, one needs a rich set of over-
constraining structural assumptions. As it turns out, the model derivations
depend heavily on these structural assumptions (Cartwright 2009, p. 53).11
This can be viewed as one way of spelling out her earlier comments about
11To avoid confusion at this stage, Cartwright uses the term “structural assumptions” dif-
ferently to Kuorikoski et al. (2010) (see Section 1.3.1). Cartwright’s structural assumptions
are Kuorikoski et al. (2010)’s tractability assumptions.
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the specific assumptions that are needed to obtain the results in game theory
(Cartwright 1999, p. 148-149).
This problem with respect to economics was probably stated in its most
general form by McCloskey (1993, p. 235) as the A-Prime/C-Prime Theorem:
For each and every set of assumptions A implying a conclusion C,
there exists a set of alternative assumptions, A’, arbitrarily close
to A, such that A’ implies an alternative conclusion, C’, arbitrarily
far from C.
What does this lack of robustness mean for the type of learning defended
in this chapter?12 To answer this question, I turn to a close examination of
the derivational robustness of Hotelling’s model.
Analysing a case: Hotelling’s model
In this section, I draw from the description of Hotelling’s model that I provided
in Section 4.2.4 to argue for the claim that the lack of robustness does not rule
out learning based on toy models. Is the key insight from Hotelling’s model,
that is, the principle of minimal differentiation, derivationally robust? As the
discussion will make clear, this is not an all-or-nothing matter but a matter
of degree: The principle of minimal differentiation exhibits different stability
properties given different types of changes in the model assumptions.
Hotelling devotes the last two pages of his article to the question of deriva-
tional robustness. He considers the following changes to his model: 1) buyers
not uniformly distributed along the line but distributed with varying den-
sity, 2) buyers not distributed along a line but on a two-dimensional plane,
3) more than two sellers, 4) different transportation cost functions (i.e., not
linear in distance), 5) additional factors that are relevant to a decision of a
buyer (e.g., product features, such as quality), 6) introducing a seller’s abil-
ity to discriminate between prices, and 7) changing the elasticity of demand
12This lack of robustness of mathematical model results is not only observable in eco-
nomics. As Weisberg and Reisman (2008, p. 118)’s discussion makes clear, the Lotka-
Volterra model exhibits a variety of non-robust model results. For example, introducing a
carrying capacity of the ecosystem for prey in a structural derivational robustness analysis
destroys the property of undampened oscillation of the predator/prey population.
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(Hotelling 1929, p. 56). For all these changes, he states that the key model
result, that is, the principle of minimal differentiation, holds (Hotelling 1929,
p. 56). To be precise, regarding changing the elasticity of demand, Hotelling
(1929, p. 56) postulates a slight difference in the result compared to his initial
analysis, that is, the tendency of a seller to establish its business “excessively
close to (...) [a competitor] is less marked”.
Interestingly, Hotelling does not offer any calculations for these robustness
claims with respect to these seven changes (see also Reiss 2012, p. 52). Even
more interestingly, the robustness claims do not withstand scrutiny, as is
carefully summarised by Brenner (2001). Brenner (2001, p. 20) ends his
survey article on the research tradition started by Hotelling’s model as follows:
“This survey reveals that differentiation – either in geographic or in product
space – depends delicately on parameters of the market structure”.
Recall Hotelling’s principle of minimal differentiation: It says that sellers
cluster together (or products show very similar characteristics) in markets
with competing sellers. I focus on three changes under which this result is
derivationally non-robust.13
First, if one solely changes the assumption about the number of suppliers
in the model (i.e., from two to three), the suppliers still have an incentive to
concentrate in the market centre, however, there is no location equilibrium
(Brenner 2001, p. 17). Second, if one changes the assumption that consumers
are price inelastic (i.e., they do not change their demand given a decrease or
increase in the price of the goods), and makes some assumptions about the
consumers’ reservation price, one can observe any location pattern between
minimal and maximal differentiation (Brenner 2001, p. 14-15). Third, if one
changes the transportation cost function (Hotelling assumed a function that
is linear in the distance travelled with the purchased good) to a function
d(x) = bxa (where d(x) denotes the costs and b > 0, 1 ≤ a ≤ 2), then one
observes in-between to maximum differentiation.
Now, what are the implications of these observations for the ability to
13Brenner (2001) discusses additional changes to the basic set-up of Hotelling’s model,
including changing customer distributions, introducing uncertainty about product charac-
teristics, the opportunity for firms to collude on prices, and different pricing strategies.
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learn something from Hotelling’s model? Let me break this question down
into two parts: First, what is the impact of the lack of derivational robustness
of Hotelling’s main claim for learning from Hotelling’s model? Second, what
is the impact of this observation on learning with Hotelling’s model about
target systems?
One can distinguish between, what I will call, unproblematic and prob-
lematic forms of a lack of derivational robustness.14 A lack of derivational
robustness is unproblematic if the new model result R′ instantiates the same
abstract property (or relation between abstract properties) that was instan-
tiated by the initial model result R. A lack of derivational robustness is
problematic if the new model result R′ does not instantiate the same ab-
stract property (or relation between abstract properties) like R. It should
be straightforward why the first type of lack of robustness is unproblematic.
If the same abstract property (or relation between abstract properties) is in-
stantiated, then no change has taken place on the relevant level of learning.
The model still comes equipped with the same hypothesis and, hence, learning
can take place if the hypothesis is true of a particular target system (or with
respect to the scope of the hypothesis). This can be shown with the help of
Hotelling’s model. Changing the number of suppliers in the model (from two
to three) reveals that there is still a tendency to agglomerate in the centre.
Importantly, this model result R′ also instantiates the abstract property of
similarity in location or product characteristics. Hence, the relations between
abstract properties that were postulated by Hotelling’s initial model remain
unchanged.
However, there are also examples of a problematic lack of derivational ro-
bustness with respect to Hotelling’s model. If one changes the assumption
that consumers are price inelastic, one can observe any location pattern be-
tween minimal and maximal differentiation (Brenner 2001, p. 14-15). Or, if
one changes the transportation cost function to a power function, then one
observes in-between to maximum differentiation. In both cases, the relation
between the abstract properties of competition and minimal differentiation
14Note that I use the notion of ‘problematic’ here in the sense of prima facie problematic
for my account of learning from and with toy models.
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no longer holds (or is no longer the sole outcome, as it was in the first of the
two cases). This allows to pin down the pressing question more precisely: In
what sense, if at all, can there be learning from and with a toy model result
that is derivationally non-robust in a problematic sense?
With respect to learning from Hotelling’s model, it is worth noting that
inferential relations between concepts are revealed even in the case of prob-
lematic derivationally non-robust results. To start, Hotelling’s initial result
reveals a relation between profit-maximising behaviour on the supplier side,
preference satisfaction on the demand side, duopolistic market structures,
and sets of possible actions (e.g., spatial movement) on the supplier and de-
mand side. Furthermore, the lack of derivational robustness in a problematic
sense shows that these inferential relations can change substantially. But the
outcomes of these changes reveal new inferential connections. For example,
the changes in the price elasticity of the demand side or the transportation
costs reveal a new inferential relation as specified above. This point can be
metaphorically put as follows: instead of viewing Hotelling’s toy model as a
fixed set of assumptions that reveals one insight (i.e., Hotelling’s principle of
minimal differentiation), the model should be viewed as a web of concepts
that can reveal different insights (i.e., inferential relations) given different
configurations of assumptions. Hence, what one gains from Hotelling, even in
these problematic cases of lack of derivational robustness, is a particular kind
of conceptual learning.
One can object to this view by pointing out that the alternative inferen-
tial relations, which are revealed in a problematic case of a lack of deriva-
tional robustness, are not interesting, since they mainly point out the role
of tractability assumptions. Recall that tractability assumptions are those
that are empirically not well (or not at all) motivated but are facilitating the
derivation of results (Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 547). I do not think that this
objection is convincing. First, as my discussion of Hotelling’s model makes
clear, the changes made in the robustness analysis reflect substantial concep-
tual changes. Second, and more importantly, assumptions can be classified
differently given different epistemic contexts.
With respect to learning with Hotelling’s model, I think the learning is
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rather limited. The fact that its key model result is non-robust leaves two
types of insights about target systems in place. First, Hotelling’s model still
provides a qualitative accurate description of a variety of target systems, that
is, the presence of a pattern of spatial concentration or degree of similarity in
an offering given a competitive structure. It is true that – given the lack of
robustness – Hotelling’s model provides this qualitative accurate description
only under a specific set of assumptions. Note that the smaller the set of as-
sumptions under which the model yields the qualitatively accurate description
of the target system, the more fragile, so to speak, is the model’s descriptive
accuracy, and, hence, the less value one should attribute to this descriptive
function of a toy model.
Second, Hotelling’s model still shows that a particular modelling tech-
nique can be applied to a particular type of social phenomenon, that is, game
theoretic modelling to strategic social interactions. This insight from a toy
model is even more indirect than my account of learning with toy models
already suggests. The toy model introduces or exhibits the applicability of
a particular modelling technique to a particular problem or type of target
system. Thereby, the toy model provides an insight about the tools that can
be brought into play with respect to a particular problem or target system.
Exploring these modelling techniques can yield more refined models that can
provide predictions or explanations that are more accurate. Let me briefly
leave my analysis of Hotelling’s model to further illustrate this point. Consider
Schelling’s checkerboard model. This model is widely regarded as the starting
point of applying evolutionary game theoretic modelling to social phenomena
(see, for example, Aydinonat 2006). By now, there exists a large body of lit-
erature that uses evolutionary game theory to model social phenomena (see,
for example, Alexander 2007 who applies evolutionary game theory to ques-
tions about the foundations of morality). However, note that Schelling’s key
model result (i.e., the segregation pattern) has different robustness properties
than Hotelling’s principle of minimal differentiation. The segregation pattern
emerges also if one changes the size of the neighbourhood and the individual
preferences (Muldoon et al. 2012). In my view, the fact that a model result
is derivationally robust is not a necessary condition for the aforementioned
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introduction of a modelling technique. To see this, note that one can dis-
tinguish between two questions: 1) Can one prima facie apply a modelling
technique to a particular question or (type of) target system? 2) If one can
apply it, is the application fruitful, for example in the sense that it leads to
robust model results? In the case of Hotelling’s model, in contrast to the case
of Schelling’s model, the answers to the second question differ. However, this
does not rule out the insight one can gain from Hotelling’s model regarding
the first question.
This concludes my analysis of Hotelling’s model. I have shown that there
needs to be a fine-grained assessment of the lack of derivational robustness
of Hotelling’s principle of minimal differentiation. The discussion revealed
that two distinct types of learning are still possible in this case: a form of
conceptual learning from the toy model and the introduction of a potentially
valuable modelling technique.
5.5 The use of toy models in economic policy-
making
In the previous section, I introduced my account of learning from and with
toy models and supported it by articulating two of its features. With this in
place, I can return to the key question of the chapter: What epistemic role can
toy models play in economic policy-making? The discussion so far supports
two roles for toy models: a conceptual clarification role and a descriptive role
in relation to target systems.
A conceptual clarification role follows directly from my analysis of learn-
ing from a toy model. I argued that toy models by themselves can reveal
inferential relations between concepts. This is the case both for derivation-
ally robust and derivationally non-robust results. This kind of conceptual
learning can be relevant in those policy-making contexts in which conceptual
clarifications are needed. Such a situation is, for example, present if two or
more actors involved in a policy-discussion disagree about the importance of
certain assumptions since they disagree about their implications. In such a
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context, a toy model can reveal in a formally precise way the implications
of these debated assumptions. However, this is not the key issue that eco-
nomic policy-makers face. Rather, disputes about concrete policy issues (e.g.,
What should be the price for carbon dioxide certificates? Should Heathrow
or Gatwick Airport receive the right to build an additional runway?) revolve
around questions as to what the impacts of particular policy interventions
may be. This shifts our focus of attention into the realm of prediction, ex-
planation, and control. Since these are target-directed epistemic aims, let me
turn to what can be gained from toy models in relation to target systems.
Here, a descriptive role of toy models in relation to target systems comes
into play. To start, consider the cases of robust toy model results or unprob-
lematic derivationally non-robust results. Here, the toy model serves as a tool
that suggests instantiations or co-instantiations of abstract properties in a tar-
get system. For example, in the oﬄine retail market for electronic consumer
goods in London there is a local clustering. However, as pointed out above,
the actual empirical verification of this claim (i.e., observing the local clus-
tering of sellers of electronic goods) is the learning step. Hence, toy models
should not be seen as supplying predictions that turn out to be correct with
a high probability or to reveal stable causal relations that can be exploited
for policy interventions. The reason for this can now be captured succinctly:
Learning with toy models means that the toy model is a tool for hypothesis
generation. This tool supplies hypotheses of a particular kind: claims that
abstract properties (or relations between abstract properties) are instantiated
in multiple target systems. However, in the case of economic policy-making
one is interested in a particular target system. Here, information about ab-
stract properties across diverse target systems is of less importance because
the details of the particular target system matter.
Next, consider the case of problematically derivationally non-robust toy
model results. The discussion in the previous section has made clear that even
in this case, there are some insights to be gained from a toy model in relation
to (types of) target systems: the toy model result still captures qualitatively
a feature or relation in a target system (albeit only under a restricted set
of assumptions) and can introduce a fruitful modelling technique that might
192
lead to the development of models that allow for quantitatively accurate pre-
dictions or yield explanatory insights. As before, these two insights that can
be gained directly with the toy model are likely to be only of minor relevance
for economic policy-making. With regards to the descriptive accuracy about
qualitative features of a system, toy models do not provide detailed knowl-
edge about the causal structure of a target system that could be used for
prediction and control. With regards to the the introduction of modelling
techniques, the toy model itself serves only as the starting point of a model
construction process, that, ultimately, might lead to a more refined model of
a target system that can be used for economic policy-making.
Taking a step back reveals that toy models can only play a limited role in
economic policy-making. There is a clear conceptual role for toy models, albeit
the conceptual clarification tasks in economic policy-making are, arguably,
limited. There is a descriptive role for toy models, albeit this descriptive role
does not supply the information needed for explanation and control regarding
particular target systems of interest. This upshot should caution against
reliance on these models in economic policy-making. Or, to put it positively,
economic policy-makers should be aware for what epistemic purposes a toy
model is used.
5.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have looked at the epistemic value of toy models to address
my third research question: What should one do if model results are non-
robust, that is, model derivations are not in agreement? I argued that non-
robust toy models still can provide conceptual learning or can introduce a
potentially valuable modelling technique. However, I have emphasized that
these two types of insights are only of limited use for economic policy-making:
toy models do not reveal stable, causal relations that can be exploited for
interventions in particular target systems.
My account goes some way towards providing a justification for why toy
models with non-robust results are so prevalent in scientific disciplines. Im-
portantly, my account suggests an epistemic reason for why this might be
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the case. Using toy models allows, potentially successfully, the depiction
of macro-scale behaviour across diverse target systems, can offer some con-
ceptual insights by uncovering inferential relations, or introduce potentially
fruitful modelling techniques.
This chapter concludes my engagement with the application of robustness
considerations to policy-making domains. In the final chapter, I ask what one
should do if there is a lack of measurement robustness and, given the situation
one is in, if one is forced to choose between models or theories.
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Chapter 6
What if Robustness Analysis
Fails? An Account of Theory
and Model Choice
6.1 Introduction
As I pointed out in the introductory survey of the literature on robustness
analysis, there is an open question about what to do if the robustness condition
is not satisfied. This can happen with respect to derivational robustness, that
is, the set of considered models does not yield the same (or reasonably similar)
outcomes; or it can happen with respect to measurement robustness, that is,
different types of evidence support conflicting hypotheses. Here, I focus on
the latter situation and address my fifth and final research question: What
should one do if one faces a situation of non-robust evidence from multiple
evidential sources?
One natural response to this epistemic predicament is to suspend one’s
judgement about hypotheses for which evidence is not robust. Suspending
judgement is compatible with pursuing additional investigations, which can
lead to robust evidence. However, one might not always be in the situation
that one can suspend one’s judgement. Consider the following hypothetical
situation.
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A policy-maker faces the task of safeguarding a city area against flooding
hazards from a nearby river. She must decide between investing into a new
technology for flood protection (a sophisticated drainage-pump system) or
setting aside money to build flood protection walls. The flooding hazard is
expected to materialise in 15 to 20 years from now. The decision must be
taken now, since the development of the new technology requires time. Only
one of the two actions can be chosen since there are not enough resources to
pursue both measures. Two possible states of the world are critical for the
decision the policy maker faces: whether the river level will be above or below
4 metres in 15 to 20 years from now. She draws a decision matrix (see Table
6.1).
River level ≥ 4 metres River level < 4 metres
Invest in new technology 100 -100
Set money aside for walls -100 100
Table 6.1: The decision matrix of the policy-maker
If the river level will be equal to or greater than 4 metres, investing into
the new technology is optimal since only the new system will protect the
city. If the level will be below 4 metres, setting money aside for building
walls is optimal.1 Now assume further that the evidence about future river
levels is inconclusive, in the sense that different types of measurements and
model predications are not in agreement. In fact, due to the specific geological
situation of the region, the scientists providing the evidence are unable to give
precise2 or imprecise probabilities3 over these two future states of the world.
1Let me expand on the interpretation of the utility numbers in the table. One way of
reading them is in terms of a relative comparison. That is, “walls” are better than “new
technology” when water levels are low, but “new technology” is better than “walls” when
water levels are high. Note that the precise numbers do not matter for my argument. It
only matters that one has a symmetric decision matrix, as I outline below.
2Ascribing precise probabilities to the two states in this examples requires a single
probability density function. Such an ascription could be for example: P(River level ≥ 4
metres) = 25% and P(River level < 4 metres) = 75%.
3Ascribing imprecise probabilities to the two states in this examples does not require
a single probability density function. Instead, one could rely on a set of such functions.
If one goes imprecise, an ascription could be the following: P(River level ≥ 4 metres) =
(25-45%) and P(River level < 4 metres) = (55-75%).
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Since no precise or imprecise probabilistic information is available, standard
decision theoretic tools fail to help here. Without probabilistic information
one cannot perform standard expected value analysis.4 Since the decision
matrix is symmetric, going for the decision criterion of maximising the value
of the worst potential outcome (i.e., maximin) also does not yield a resolution
here. This leaves one with two options: being indifferent between the two
options and, in the light of the need of choosing a measure, one flips a coin;
or to make an informed choice between the measures. Since one is in a policy-
making context in which accountability of the policy-maker to the general
public is likely, I think opting for an informed choice is the more realistic
scenario. To make this informed choice between the measures, it is reasonable
to go back to the evidence set and make a choice between the competing
models that support the different predictions about the future river levels.
Let me be clear about the status of this example. It should not show that
going back to the evidence set and making a choice is the only compelling
or rational permissible action for the policy maker. Nor do I want to imply
that I have given an exhaustive overview of decision rules in situations where
precise or imprecise probabilistic information is missing. The upshot of this
example is rather that there are some scenarios in which choosing between
models or theories that are part of or underlie an inconclusive evidence set is a
reasonable step to take. The example allows identifying some characteristics
of these scenarios: it is a decision situation in which a) alternative options
have radically different outcomes given different states of the world, b) one
cannot suspend judgement due to the time sensitivity of the choice, c) there
is sparse information about the decision-relevant states of the world, which
prohibits (or at least makes it difficult) to use standard decision theoretic
tools, and d) the evidence, which could help resolve the factual issue about
what the relevant future state of the world is for the decision maker, consists
4Standard expected value of an option (e.g., investing in new technology) is calculated
by multiplying the utility of an outcome with its probability of occurrence for the different
possible states of the world. If one has imprecise probabilistic information, one could
calculate expected values of options for different probability functions within the set that
is given by the evidential constraints (for more on this see Chapter 3 of Resnik 2011 and
Troffaes 2007).
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of or is underlied by models or theories.
Having said this, let me argue in more detail why a choice between models
or theories should be a reasonable step to take. I motivate this step by
highlighting the shortcomings of the two main alternative ways of proceeding.
Instead of choosing between the models or theories, one could endorse them
simultaneously. However, this would not solve the problem, since one would
be back in the situation, per assumption of the example, in which different
types of evidence support conflicting hypotheses. Alternatively, one could
also try to ascribe weights to the different models or theories, and, then, use
these weights to arrive at a weighted value for the predictions entailed by the
different models or theories. This weighted value of a prediction could then
be the basis for choosing between the different actions. Consider Figure 6.1
for a simplified visualisation of the situation.
Figure 6.1: Evidence set with two elements E1 and E2 that support two
conflicting predictions P1 and P2. The evidence set is constituted or underlied
by two competing models or theories M1 and M2.
I think this approach is likely to run into two problems. First, it might
be that the predictions P1 and P2, which are entailed by the models or the
corresponding pieces of evidence, are such that an averaging into an overall
number is not possible. Consider our example again. If the two parts of the
evidence set support the predictions “river level above or equal to 4 metres”
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and “river level below 4 metres”, then these two statements cannot be aver-
aged. Averaging presupposes predictions stated in precise numerical values.
Second, and more importantly in my view, it is not clear that one has enough
information to ascribe precise weights to the models or theories under consid-
eration. Recall that I assume in the example that one must be able to provide
some sort of justification for the policy option one chooses in the end, and,
hence, resorting to subjective degrees of belief for ascribing these weights is
problematic.
How does one rationally choose, then, between different models or theo-
ries? A look at the history of science reveals many such choice situations:
for example, the choices between the geocentric and heliocentric model of the
solar system, between phlogiston or oxygen based accounts of combustion,
and between Newtonian and Einsteinian dynamics. Kuhn (1977)’s paper still
provides the relevant stage-setting for discussing theory choice. Kuhn claimed
that a variety of epistemic values, most importantly scope, fruitfulness, ac-
curacy, simplicity, and consistency, influence theory choice. However, he re-
jected the idea that there is a unique algorithm to aggregate the information
provided by these values (Kuhn 1977, p. 322, 326).
Recently, Okasha (2011) gave a new twist to the debate of theory or model
choice.5 He proposed an analogy between social choice and theory choice. If
the analogy holds, an Arrovian impossibility result emerges: there exists no
aggregation procedure that yields a complete and transitive ranking of the
alternative theories considered and that satisfies a set of intuitively compelling
conditions. This result is troubling since it casts doubt on widely used multi-
criteria aggregation procedures for assessing the suitability of a theory.
In this chapter, I provide a procedure for theory choice that allows one
to perform this choice in a rationally defensible way. I argue that Okasha’s
analogy between social choice and theory choice does not hold since the the-
ory choice problem can be viewed in a cardinal context. Theory choice in
sciences is better described as a weighing processes than in the framework of
ordinal social choice theory, which emphasises consistency. My starting point
5To simplify the exposition, I use subsequently solely the expression ‘theory choice’.
Choices between models are always subsumed under this notion.
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is a suggestion made by Okasha in the latter part of his paper, namely to
enrich the informational basis of the analysis to allow for inter-criteria com-
parability. Okasha refers to Sen (1977, 1986) who argued that some degree of
interpersonal comparability is needed in order to avoid Arrow’s impossibility
result. This shift in the problem description allows me to use a tool that has
been successfully applied in the social choice context, that is, scoring rules,
to make the notion of weighting in the context of theory choice more precise.
I argue that a general scoring rule characterised by Gaertner and Xu (2012)
is flexible enough to illuminate, and solve, the problem of theory choice.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I briefly discuss Kuhn’s treat-
ment of theory choice (Section 6.2 ). Second, I introduce Okasha’s recon-
struction of Kuhn and his impossibility result (Section 6.3 ). Third, I discuss
the reactions in the literature to Okasha’s claim and locate my reply strat-
egy against this background (Section 6.4 ). Fourth, I introduce my claim that
Okasha’s analogy does not hold and substantiate this by providing a procedure
by which the aggregation process in theory choice can be performed (Section
6.5 ). Fourth, I explain what my solution reveals about the aggregation across
different scientists (Section 6.6 ).
6.2 Kuhn’s discussion of theory choice
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn lays out a picture of the de-
velopment of mature scientific disciplines that is characterised by two phases:
a normal scientific phase in which the scientific community acts based on a
shared paradigm that defines exemplars of problem solutions and a revolu-
tionary phase in which multiple paradigms compete (Kuhn 1962). The phase
in which both the Ptolemaic and the Copernican theory of the solar system
where used by different groups of astronomers is such a revolutionary phase.
This picture of the development pattern of scientific fields prompts a question:
How are choices made between these competing paradigms?
Significant parts of Kuhn (1962) are devoted to the question whether com-
peting paradigms can be compared at all. One of the most controversial claims
of Kuhn is that competing paradigms express incommensurable world views,
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that is, there is no common scale on which two paradigms can be compared
(Kuhn 1962, p. 147-150). Moving between incommensurable paradigms is
described by Kuhn as a “switch in visual gestalt”, which prompts scientists
to see the world differently (Kuhn 1962, p. 111). Kuhn also argued that this
gestalt switch does not happen solely due to epistemic reasons that speak in
favour of a new paradigm but also due to non-epistemic reasons, such as the
preference for the beauty of a theory (Kuhn 1962, p. 144, 151).
In a later article entitled Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice
Kuhn returns to the question of theory choice. He attempts to pin down more
precisely in what way epistemic and non-epistemic factors influence theory
choice. Kuhn argues that at least five values characterise a good scientific
theory. First, a good scientific theory should be accurate, that is, its conse-
quences should be in agreement with observational results. Second, a good
scientific theory should be consistent, that is, it should not contain logical
contradictions and be compatible with other scientific theories. Third, a good
scientific theory should have broad scope, that is, it should have a domain of
applicability that exceeds the phenomena the theory was initially supposed
to explain or predict. Fourth, a good scientific theory should be simple in
the sense that it unifies a broad set of phenomena under a few theoretical
assumptions. Fifth, a good scientific theory should be fruitful, that is, it
should disclose new phenomena or new relationships among already known
phenomena (Kuhn 1977, p. 321-322).
With respect to these values, I take Kuhn’s key claim for my discussion
to be the following: Given two (or more theories) and the epistemic values
of accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness, different scientists
can arrive at more than one ranking of the alternatives even if they agree that
the evaluation should be done solely with reference to these epistemic values.
This corresponds to saying that there is more than one algorithm to determine
the overall ranking of the alternative theories based on these epistemic values
(Kuhn 1977, p. 322, 326).
This formulation entails two important clarifications regarding what I take
to be the problem of theory choice. To start, I am setting aside two arguments
in Kuhn’s earlier writings. The first argument can be put as follows: Theories,
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more precisely paradigms, come equipped with standards for assessing theo-
ries. These standards can vary across different paradigms. Hence, there is no
unique way of choosing between paradigms (Kuhn 1962, p. 6, 141). The sec-
ond argument goes like this: Even if there are shared standards for assessing
paradigms, paradigms do not solve an identical set of problems. Accordingly,
if one chooses between two or more paradigms, one must weigh the impor-
tance of the problems against each other. Hence, there is no unique way of
choosing between paradigms (Kuhn 1962, p. 85, 103; Hoyningen-Huene 1993,
p. 242). Consequently, I only deal with the situation in which the set of
problems as well as the standards of theory evaluation are shared.6 If these
arguments are set aside, are there further reasons that Kuhn puts forward in
defence of the non-algorithmic nature of theory choice?
Kuhn provides the following two additional arguments. To start, epistemic
values can be interpreted differently by scientists who are involved in an eval-
uation process (Kuhn 1977, p. 322). Hence, it is possible that two scientists,
who are committed to the same set of epistemic values, come up with different
rankings of the alternatives under consideration (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p.
236). Furthermore, the epistemic values can be weighted differently by scien-
tists who are evaluating theories (Kuhn 1977, p. 322; Hoyningen-Huene 1993,
p. 236). The commitment to the same set of values does not entail or presup-
pose a commitment about their relative weight. Hence, it is again possible
that two scientists, who are committed to the same set of epistemic values,
come up with different rankings of the alternatives under consideration.
Furthermore, my formulation entails a particular view regarding the level
at which the problem of theory choice is located. To be more precise, is the
theory choice problem an issue on the level of individual scientists or the
scientific community? This is a tricky question since Kuhn’s remarks on this
give a mixed picture:
(...) it is the community of specialists rather than its individual
members that makes the effective decision. (Kuhn 1962, p. 200)
6I take it to be the case that Okasha (2011), as well as the replies in the literature,
which will be discussed below, share this focus. It is important to note that thereby
Kuhn’s discussion of methodological incommensurability is left aside.
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(...) shared values can be important determinants of group be-
haviour even though the members of the group do not all apply
them in the same way. (Kuhn 1962, p. 186, my emphasis)
How should one understand these remarks about decision making on the
group level and how are they related to the decision making of individual
scientists?
I follow Hoyningen-Huene (1993)’s interpretation here. According to him,
the relevant debate occurs on the level of the individual scientist. The choice
of an individual scientist is influenced but not determined by epistemic values.
The individual scientist chooses a preferred theory and invests her energy in
its development. Which theory comes out on top in the scientific community
is determined by a historical process consisting of the choices of individual
scientists (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p. 153-154). Subsequently, I first focus
on the choice situation of an individual scientist (Sections 6.4-6.5 ). Based on
my procedure for this situation, I then discuss the aggregation across different
scientists (Section 6.6 ).7
6.3 Okasha’s Arrovian reconstruction of Kuhn
Okasha treats each of Kuhn’s epistemic values (simplicity, accuracy, fruitful-
ness, consistency, and scope) as if it were an individual with a preference
ordering over the alternative theories. To be more precise, every epistemic
value can be viewed as a decision criterion n ∈ N (where N is the set of
relevant criteria) that can be expressed as a binary relation, Rn (e.g., “is at
least as simple as”, “has at least the scope as”), defined on the set of alter-
native theories X. Each binary relation, Rn imposes a weak ordering on X:
an ordering that is reflexive, transitive, and complete (Okasha 2011, p. 91).
Given this framework, Kuhn’s algorithm can be expressed as a theory
choice rule (Okasha 2011, p. 92). A theory choice rule is a mapping from the
7Note that Weber (2011) offers an alternative interpretation of Kuhn. He views Kuhn
as a social epistemologist (Weber 2011, p. 3), who treats the scientific community level as
the relevant decision making entity (Weber 2011, p. 7). Accordingly, Weber would reject
my two step approach to the choice problem.
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set of all logically possible combinations of weak orderings (R1, ..., Rn, ..., Rt)
to a single weak ordering R∗ which is the aggregate relation defined on the
set of alternative theories X and interpreted as ‘is at least as good as’.
According to Okasha, all five requirements that Arrow (1963) postulated
in his work on the non-existence of a social welfare function have to be met
by a theory choice rule (Okasha 2011, p. 92). To start, the aggregate rela-
tionship has to be a weak ordering, that is, the aggregate relationship has
to be transitive and complete. This is a requirement of collective rationality.
The postulate of an unrestricted domain (U) means that the theory choice
rule should yield an overall ranking R∗ for all logically possible combinations
of t-tuples of binary relations Rn (Okasha 2011, p. 92). The requirement
of the weak Pareto principle (P) states that if theory T1 does better than
another theory T2 with respect to all considered epistemic values 1, ..., n, ..., t,
then T1 should be preferred to T2 overall (Okasha 2011, p. 92). Arrow’s non-
dictatorship (D) requirement states that there is no epistemic value such that
if this value ranks, for all profiles of preference rankings, any T1 above any
other T2, T1 is ranked automatically above T2 in the overall ranking (Okasha
2011, p. 93). Finally, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (I) condition
requires that the overall ranking of any T1 and T2 depends only on how the
epistemic values rank T1 and T2 and not on how they rank other theories in
relation to T1 and T2 (Okasha 2011, p. 93).
Given this reconstruction of the theory choice problem, Arrow’s famous
impossibility result applies: For a finite number of epistemic values and at
least three alternative theories, there exists no theory choice function satisfy-
ing conditions U, P, D, and I (Okasha 2011, p. 93).
6.4 Responses to Okasha
Okasha’s paper has stimulated a variety of responses. The responses fall
into two broad categories: those who argue that Okasha’s description of the
theory choice situation is misguided and those who try to avoid the Arrovian
impossibility result by showing that at least one of Arrow’s conditions cannot
be applied in the case of theory choice. Below, I briefly discuss the key
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contributions and highlight some shortcomings of them. Importantly, these
shortcomings should not be read as knock-down arguments. Instead, they
should motivate the exploration of an alternative way of dealing with Okasha’s
impossibility result.8
6.4.1 The appropriateness of Okasha description of
the problem
A first potential escape route is to point out that Arrow’s impossibility result
requires three or more alternatives whereas theory choice problems are usually
binary. Kuhn’s own examples such as the choice between geocentrism and
heliocentrism or between the phlogiston and oxygen theory of combustion
involve only two alternatives. This escape route is brought up and discussed
by Okasha (Okasha 2011, p. 477-478).
I think Okasha is right in pointing out that this escape route is a dead end.
For example, in cases of model selection in climate science, a large number
of models is compared and evaluated. In cases of establishing an explanation
for a correlation between two variables x and y, multiple hypotheses need to
evaluated (i.e., x causes y, y causes x, and x and y are the effect of a common
cause) (Okasha 2011, p. 478). So, relevant choices in scientific practice likely
involve three or more alternatives.
Marcoci and Nguyen (2017) argue that Okasha describes the rationality
of science wrongly in an all or nothing manner. Scientific rationality has to
be seen as a graded notion allowing for rationality in degrees (Marcoci and
Nguyen 2017, p. 322). The basic idea is to ask whether an aggregation func-
tion that satisfies the Arrovian conditions of weak Pareto, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, non dictatorship and universal domain is normatively
acceptable on a profile by profile basis. An aggregation rule is normatively
acceptable with respect to a set of profiles if and only if it yields a transitive
and complete overall ranking (Marcoci and Nguyen 2017, p. 324). This way
8In this review, I do not include the papers that discuss the Arrovian impossibility result
with respect to the confirmation of empirical hypothesis. See Stegenga (2013), Lehtinen
(2013), and Cresto et al. (2017) for a discussion.
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of thinking about the problem opens up the possibility to argue that some
aggregation rules are normatively compelling for some profiles and yet not ac-
ceptable for others. With this concept of “minimal rationality” Marcoci and
Nguyen want to express the idea that the number of profiles for which a par-
ticular aggregation functions yields a normatively acceptable outcome is key
for assessing the rationality of this particular aggregation function (Marcoci
and Nguyen 2017, p. 326). They show that the number of alternatives and
theoretical virtues considered in a choice problem are crucial for the degree of
rationality of an aggregation function. For example, given three alternatives
and five epistemic values, pairwise majority rule yields an intransitive overall
ranking for only 7% of the possible profile combinations (Marcoci and Nguyen
2017, p. 328).
Marcoci and Nguyen (2017)’s proposal is interesting since it opens up an
alternative way of thinking about the rationality of science. In my view, one
question needs, however, to be addressed. As Marcoci and Nguyen (2017, p.
329-330) point out, the question of the threshold value at which it is warranted
to use a particular aggregation procedure remains open. Crucially, the merit
of their proposal depends on being able – at least in principle – to give such
a threshold value. It is not clear to me whether this should be, and, if so, can
be done in a context-depend manner.
6.4.2 The applicability of the Arrovian conditions
If one accepts Okasha’s problem description then one can solely get rid of the
Arrovian impossibility result by denying the applicability of one (or more) of
Arrow’s conditions in the case of theory choice.
The non-dictatorship condition
Weber (2011) argues that the non-dictatorship condition (D) must be given
up in the context of theory choice. According to Weber, fruitfulness must be
viewed as a dictatorial criterion amongst the epistemic values (Weber 2011, p.
6). Weber starts by pointing out that there is no reason why science should
be committed to weight all epistemic values equally. Although individual
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scientists’ choices are influenced by multiple (or all of) the five epistemic
values, the choice on the community level of a paradigm is determined by the
fruitfulness of the paradigms under consideration (Weber 2011, p. 7-8).
I do not think that Weber’s escape route is compelling, since, as I have
pointed out above, I see the theory choice problem as a two-step process. In
a first step, scientists make their choices and, then, the aggregate of these
choices leads to a result on the community level. I think it is implausible to
assume that there is an additional, ultimately relevant, mechanism that solely
operates on the community level.
The completeness condition
Bradley (2016) argues that the completeness condition, which is part of the
collective rationality condition regarding the all-things considered ranking of
alternatives, must be given up. He suggests viewing the epistemic values as
criteria that constrain theory choice but that do not determine its outcome.
Importantly, he does not see this as a shortcoming of scientific rationality
but as a natural feature of rationality more generally since rationality “‘can
be silent” (Bradley 2016, p. 6). To see this, consider a bet on a fair coin
toss. Since the probability of heads and tails coming up is exactly equal,
rationality does not determine what one should bet. However, rationality is
still constraining the acceptable bets since it would be irrational to accept
a bet on heads at shorter odds if a bet on heads at longer odds were avail-
able (Bradley 2016, p. 6). In the case of theory choice, the epistemic values
provide rational constraints in the form of non-complete orders of the alter-
natives under consideration (Bradley 2016, p. 2). The key constraint that
Bradley discusses is provided by the weak Pareto condition (P) that states
that if theory T1 does better than theory T2 with respect to all considered
epistemic values 1, ..., n, ..., t, then T1 should be preferred to T2 overall. Since
this Pareto condition is likely not satisfied, this constraint does not result
in a complete order of the alternatives under consideration (Bradley 2016,
p. 9-10). Within these partial orders, scientists make choices based on their
subjective interpretation of values and their endorsing of particular trade-offs
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between the values (Bradley 2016, p. 17-18).
I have one worry regarding Bradley’s proposal. As he himself points out
(see Bradley 2016, p. 10-11) one might ask how much the epistemic values
constrain theory choice. The weak Pareto condition might not be satisfied
and, hence, all the alternatives are on the table despite the fact, for example,
that a theory is just a little bit simpler than another that is empirically
much more accurate. Bradley suggests that even in this case there is a lot of
constraint given one takes into account that scientists have preferences over
alternatives. Having these preferences requires that these preferences satisfy
the properties needed for a representation theorem to apply (Bradley 2016,
p. 16-17). In my view, these further constraints do not address the question
that motivates the debate about theory choice. One is interested in whether
the intersubjective, epistemic values constrain the choice between alternatives;
not whether additional facts about individual scientists perform this function.
The universal domain condition
Morreau (2014, 2015) argues that the postulate of unrestricted domain (U)
should not be applied to theory choice. He argues that some epistemic values
can only deliver one profile of alternatives, and, hence, to require that a
permissible aggregation function yields a transitive and complete all-things-
considered ranking for all possible combinations of profiles is beside the point.
In particular, he claims that simplicity can only provide one profile of the
alternatives for metaphysical reasons: the simplicity ranking is determined
by the way the world is. To put it differently, if a theory is simpler than
another this could not have been otherwise (Morreau 2014, p. 9).9 He goes
on to claim that if unrestricted domain does not apply to the situation of
theory choice, then the threat of impossibility is avoided (Morreau 2014, p.
10).
Okasha (2015) offers a careful discussion of Morreau’s claims. I agree with
his general conclusion that although Morreau puts forward a convincing case
9Contrast this with the case of empirical accuracy. If the data had been different,
another theory might be more accurate than the one previously described as most accurate
(Okasha 2015, p. 12).
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for some domain restrictions to be relevant in the case of theory choice, these
restrictions are not sufficient to rule out the Arrovian impossibility result.
The assumption of universal domain is too strong to derive the Arrovian
impossibility result. To put it differently, even if universal domain is violated,
the space of profiles can still be such that there is no aggregation function
that satisfies the other Arrovian conditions (Okasha 2015, p. 11).
The independence of irrelevant alternatives condition
There are multiple contributions that suggest enriching the informational ba-
sis to avoid the Arrovian impossibility result. This amounts to giving up the
independence of irrelevant alternative condition (I). To recap, this condition
requires that the overall ranking of any T1 and T2 depends only on how the
epistemic values rank T1 and T2 and not on how they rank other theories in
relation to T1 and T2.
10
Okasha himself sees this as the most promising strategy to avoid the impos-
sibility result. Note that in Arrow’s framework, the information that is con-
tained in the rankings of individuals is fairly limited: First, it is assumed that
the rankings are purely ordinal, hence, they do not reveal anything about the
intensity of preferences; second, these rankings are interpersonally not com-
parable. Transferring these two points to the case of theory choice amounts
to claiming that the epistemic values only provide ordinal rankings and that
these rankings cannot be compared across different values (Okasha 2011, p.
98). Okasha suggests paying more attention to what kind of information is
provided by the epistemic values. In the simplest form, he suggests scor-
ing the alternative theories under considerations on a common cardinal scale
(Okasha 2011, p. 101). Although he argues that in the large-scale theory
comparisons that Kuhn had in mind (e.g., the choice between the geocentric
and heliocentric theory of the solar system) ordinal information is all that we
have, he suggests that in more local theory choices (especially in cases where
10The independence of irrelevant alternatives condition (I) can be decomposed into
two sub-conditions: the independence of irrelevant utilities (IIU) and the ordinal non-
comparability of utility (ONC). The conjunction of (IIU) and (ONC) is logically equivalent
to (I) (Okasha 2015, p. 3).
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statistical information about empirical accuracy is available) this enrichment
move might be defensible (Okasha 2011, p. 102-103).
Stegenga (2015) points out that the comparability requirements that are
needed to avoid the Arrovian impossibility result in the case of theory choice
are only rarely met. Okasha agrees with this assessment and, therefore, sees
his proposal only as a partially successful escape route (Okasha 2015, p. 5).
In a similar spirit, Bradley (2016, p. 13) remarks that it is not clear whether
a universal and objective measure for scientific virtues can be defined.
An alternative route to giving up the independence of the irrelevant al-
ternatives condition is suggested by Rizza (2014). He argues that Arrow’s
impossibility result disappears if one uses the correct information encoded in
the ordinal rankings supplied by voters. In the situation of three alternatives,
using sequences of three items instead of triples of pairs of alternatives as in-
put for the aggregation function avoids the potential for an intransitive overall
ranking (Rizza 2014, p. 1851). The reason for this is that the use of sequences
of triples mathematically rules out the possibility for intransitive all-things-
considered rankings (Rizza 2014, p. 1851). This translates to the situation of
theory choice and, hence, allows one to avoid Okasha’s impossibility result.11
6.4.3 Locating my reply to Okasha
Against the background of these positions in the literature, I can now state
more precisely how my solution strategy fits in. The response I develop re-
jects the analogy between social choice and theory choice. I argue that the
theory choice problem poses itself differently in scientific practice; the prob-
lem is best described in a cardinal context that allows an explicit weighting
of the epistemic values. The upshot is that theory choice outcomes are best
described as all-things-considered judgements. I devote the rest of this chapter
to motivate this switch in the problem description and to propose a concrete
method of weighting the different epistemic values.
11I will not engage with this suggestion here since this point is a purely mathematical
one regarding the characterisation of Arrow’s original result. Furthermore, Rizza does not,
according to my understanding, discuss the situation in which more than three alternatives
are considered. Hence, the generality of his escape route is not clear to me.
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Before I turn to this, let me clarify my solution strategy further by high-
lighting its normative status. Is my solution strategy meant to be a descrip-
tively accurate picture of theory choices in the sciences? Or is it a normative
proposal stating how theory choices should be done in the sciences?
I do not aim at providing a descriptively accurate account of theory choice
processes in the sciences. By this, I mean that scientists do not necessarily
form their beliefs and come to their judgements as specified in the aggre-
gation procedure outlined and defended below. In contrast, I understand
my procedure as a rational reconstruction of theory choice processes. To be
more precise, my procedure belongs in the normative domain to the extent
that it can be viewed as one of multiple possible prescriptive procedures to
arrive at an overall judgement in theory choice processes, and, hence, as a
normative standard to judge outcomes of theory choice processes. Therefore,
my proposal should not be viewed as normative in the sense that it is the
only aggregation procedure that can defensibly be adopted to arrive at ra-
tional theory choices. Rather, my proposal is normative in the sense that it
can serve as a benchmark to judge theory choice outcomes since it is one of
multiple defensible procedures to resolve instances of theory choice.
6.5 A new approach: Using scoring functions
over qualitative verdicts to establish com-
parability of theory choice criteria
In this section, I develop my reply strategy to Okasha’s impossibility result. I
begin by motivating an alternative description of the theory choice situation
that shows that preferences over theories are all-things-considered judgements
(Section 6.5.1 ). I then provide an analysis of these all-things-considered
judgements in a cardinal context. I argue that Gaertner and Xu (2012)’s
general scoring rule can illuminate these types of judgements (Section 6.5.2 ).
To show that their general scoring rule is applicable to the problem of theory
choice, I proceed in a stepwise fashion. First, I introduce the basic idea behind
the scoring rule with the help of a decision situation in a committee. Second,
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I flesh out the parallel between the decision situation in a committee and a
theory choice situation. I pay particular attention to the notion of context-
dependency, which is introduced through the general scoring rule. Third, I
provide a formal characterisation of the general scoring rule and comment on
the relation of the scoring rule to the Arrovian conditions.
6.5.1 Re-thinking the description of theory choice:
all-things-considered judgements
Let me return to Kuhn’s historically well-informed discussion. Kuhn (1977,
p. 323) argues that accuracy, as arguably the central epistemic value, is “by
itself seldom or never a sufficient criterion for theory choice”. This is because
competing theories are often accurate in different domains which necessitates
a judgement about which of the domains is more relevant. Kuhn gives the
following compelling example:
The oxygen theory (...) was universally acknowledged to account
for observed weight relations in chemical reactions, something the
phlogiston theory had previously scarcely attempted to do. But
the phlogiston theory, unlike its rival, could account for the metals
being much more alike than the ores from which they were formed.
(Kuhn 1977, p. 323)
This observation motivates his claim that multiple epistemic values are
relevant for choosing between competing theories (Kuhn 1977, p. 321-322).
Now, with respect to this set of relevant epistemic values, Kuhn claims that
scientists engage in some sort of weighting procedure: He claims that scientists
can differ about “the relative weights to be accorded to (...) [the] criteria
when several are deployed together” (Kuhn 1977, p. 324) and considers the
possibility of an “appropriate weight function (...) for their joint application”
(Kuhn 1977, p. 326). Kuhn gives the following reason for the necessity of
such weighting considerations:
(...) when [the epistemic values] are deployed together, they re-
peatedly prove to conflict with one another; accuracy may, for
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example, dictate the choice of one theory, scope the choice of its
competitor. (Kuhn 1977, p. 324)
These observations suggest that one should view preferences over scien-
tific theories as all-things-considered judgements. The all-things-considered
clause refers mainly to the epistemic values that influence the choice of sci-
entists.12 The prominent role of these all-things-considered judgements in
these weighting considerations already goes some way towards undermining
Okasha’s claim that there is an analogy between social choice and theory
choice. For the examples discussed by Kuhn suggest that consistency re-
quirements, that is, the consistency of aggregation rules with desiderata in
an ordinal social choice framework, do not appear as relevant input factors
for making theory choice decisions. However, to show that Okasha’s picture
is indeed misguided in important respects, I think it is necessary to sketch a
compelling alternative of theory choice. I turn to this task now.
6.5.2 Fleshing out the notion of all-things-considered
judgements
Talk about preferences over theories as weighted all-things-considered judge-
ments needs to be made more precise. How could one arrive at these all-
things-considered judgements in a rationally justifiable way? Can one give
a particular procedure to achieve this? If so, what is the relation of this
procedure to the Arrovian conditions? I address these questions in order.
Starting point: Decision making in a committee
Imagine that you are one of the members of a committee that must decide
between a number of research proposals for funding. Suppose that k propos-
als were submitted. Assume further that the chairperson of your committee
comes forward with the following procedure. She declares that there are m
categories (from excellent to fail with m − 2 categories in between), with
12Kuhn (1977) also makes clear that subjective factors related to a particular scientist
influence the choice. I return to the role of subjective factors in Section 6.6.
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rank scores from m to 1 attached to these categories. The chairperson asks
all members of your committee to allocate the k proposals to the m avail-
able categories. It is not required that every member comes up with a strict
ordering and that all categories must be filled by each committee member.
Furthermore, the chairperson announces that, as soon as each member has
assigned the k proposals to the m categories, she will count the rank numbers
assigned to each proposal and then construct a ranking over the k proposals
from the highest rank sum to the lowest. The proposal with the highest ag-
gregate rank sum is declared as the winner. More than one proposal may be
selected depending on the available budget. The procedure outlined in this
example is Gaertner and Xu (2012)’s general scoring rule.13
This aggregation procedure can be made fruitful for the case of theory
choice. Let me flesh out this analogy in more detail.
The analogy between the committee’s choice and theory choice
In the above scenario, replace the research proposals with alternative theories,
the members of the committee with Kuhn’s epistemic values, and the chair-
person with an individual scientist. Furthermore, consider a set of discrete
verdicts corresponding to the categories “very high”, “high”, “satisfactory”,
“just sufficient”, and “insufficient”.14 This yields the following set-up for the-
ory choice: A scientist considers the alternative theories through the lenses
of the epistemic values. For each epistemic value, she independently assigns
a qualitative verdict (e.g., “T1 is just sufficiently accurate”, “T2’s accuracy is
very high”) to the alternative theories. The five qualitative verdicts consti-
tute a discrete scale with rank scores. The overall ranking of the theories is
determined by the sum of rank scores of each alternative theory.
Drawing this parallel between the case of the committee and the problem
13Let me highlight the fact that Gaertner and Xu (2012)’s general scoring rule is not
identical to the Borda rule, since it does not presuppose a strict ordering of the alternatives.
I will say more about this when I present the formal characterisation of this general scoring
rule below.
14I will say more about the details of this scale. For the moment, the reader should not
be irritated by the fact that I specify an exact number of grades and choose a particular
formulation of the qualitative verdicts.
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of theory choice amounts to switching to a cardinal description of the theory
choice problem. Hence, I no longer solve Okasha’s challenge in the ordinal
context that he sets out. The key question therefore becomes: Why is one
justified in introducing this cardinal representation of the theory choice prob-
lem? In particular, how can one motivate the qualitative verdicts and their
expressions in rank scores?
The presence of a cardinal scale is, in my view, an accurate description
of theory choice situations for the following reasons. Theory choice does not
take place in a vacuum. Rather, scientists are evaluating competing theories
with respect to broad epistemic projects they are conducting in a discipline or
a sub-discipline. For example, in engineering such a broad epistemic project
could consist in building more efficient combustion engines. In molecular
biology, a broad epistemic project could consist in synthesizing new functional
germs. In astrophysics, a broad epistemic project could seeking to understand
the distribution of clusters of galaxies across the universe. These epistemic
projects define a particular assessment context with respect to which the
evaluation of competing theories takes place. Looking more closely at these
assessment contexts reveals an additional informational structure. To be more
precise, evaluating a theory in light of the epistemic values in an assessment
context allows, for example, to introduce statements about whether a theory
is just sufficiently simple, accurate, consistent, fruitful or broad in scope to
contribute to the realisation of a particular epistemic project. I assume that
the assessment context provides enough informational structure beyond the
ordinal information encoded in the epistemic values to assign a sufficiently
fine-grained set of qualitative verdicts. Crucially, I do not presuppose that
the epistemic values directly provide cardinal information. Rather, I assume
an additional step by the scientist which involves careful consideration of the
assessment context of a theory choice problem.15 This is the crucial step in my
15Note that the informational content of the assessment context (i.e., the broad epistemic
projects and its features) need to be distinct from the epistemic values. If this informational
content were identical to the Kuhnian epistemic values or could be rephrased in terms of
additional epistemic values, then, given my problem set-up, it would only provide ordinal
information and, hence, I would not be able to justify the move to a cardinal scale in this
way.
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analysis of the notions of all-things-considered preferences over theories: the
appropriate language of description of theory choice problems is the cardinal
language. However, to justify the use of this cardinal language, one needs
to see how the information from the epistemic values (ordinal information) is
combined with information about the assessment context of a theory to arrive
at cardinal statements in the form of rank scores.
To further motivate the plausibility of the move from ordinal information
encoded in the criteria of theory evaluation to a cardinal scale, reconsider the
case of the committee. The members of the committee also transfer their or-
dinal assessment of proposals into a cardinal scale. Following the previous line
of reasoning, they can do this by implicitly making assumptions about the re-
search setting at the university or in the discipline more broadly. Accordingly,
they are judging whether a research proposal is sufficiently well-structured or
original in view of the expectations of the profession, such as the prospect of
producing work that could be published in a peer-reviewed journal. These
considerations allow the committee members to ascribe qualitative verdicts
and ultimately rank scores which then can be aggregated into overall scores
for each proposal.
Notice the work that the qualitative verdicts are doing. The qualitative
verdicts stated in the rank scoring system impose a cardinal representation on
the preference orderings over the alternative theories.16 It is this constructed
cardinal representation that allows inter-criteria comparison. In order to make
the cardinal scores for each of the theories comparable across the set of criteria
and thereby to achieve inter-criteria comparability, the process of construc-
tion of the scale is of importance. To be fully transparent at this stage, my
procedure requires establishing a common language amongst the criteria of
evaluation.17
In order to clarify this construction of a common language, let me go back
16See Pivato (2014, p. 50) for a similar discussion of the possibility of imposing cardinality
onto a ranking of alternatives.
17Note that the idea to introduce qualitative verdicts and thereby establish a common
language or “grammar” was made by Balinski and Laraki (2007, 2010). Their proposal
of preference aggregation, called majority judgement, however, remains completely within
the framework of ordinal information and therefore systematically differs from my own
approach.
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to the committee and its members again. Each individual must transform
their ordinal preference relation over the alternative proposals into a cardinal
ranking with the requirement that if proposal x is at least as good as proposal
y, the cardinal rank or score attached to x is at least as high as the rank
assigned to y so that for all x, y ∈ X, the following relationship holds: xRy ⇔
s(x) ≥ s(y), where s(x) stands for the cardinal value or score attached to x,
and likewise for y. This is a very basic requirement in the sense that one must
neither lose nor distort ordinal information when one makes a transition from
the ordinal to the cardinal world. Furthermore, the cardinality of the chosen
ranking system implies that score differences among the different alternatives
are meaningful and comparable, so that for four alternatives, x, y, z, w, one
may come to the conclusion that sn(x)− sn(y) > sn(z)− sn(w), where sn(x),
for example, is the score assigned to alternative x by committee member n.
Note that any affine transformation of these scores with a common positive
scale factor over all n does not destroy this comparison of score differences.
Coming back to my problem of theory comparison, each scientist is as-
sumed to examine the given theories in the light of the set of criteria that are
relevant for the problem at stake. More precisely, each scientist starts for each
single criterion with an ordinal ranking over the theories to be evaluated and
then transforms this ranking into a sequence of cardinal scores according to
the relationship specified above. I assume that the scientist can translate the
ordinal into the cardinal information for every epistemic value in isolation.
Accordingly, assigning an alternative x a rank score with respect to simplic-
ity, for example, is independent from assigning x a rank score with respect to
accuracy, for example. This involves the assumption that the epistemic values
are independent of each other. I think that this is, first, in line with Kuhn’s
discussion and, second, even if there are (conceptual or empirical) dependency
relations between the epistemic values, these relations might not hold under
all possible interpretations of these values (that should be considered when
one discusses theory choice on this level of abstraction).
Since the qualitative verdicts establish the inter-criteria comparability,
let me motivate them further. First, the success of my solution does not
depend on the particular formulation of qualitative verdicts. I can allow for a
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more fine-grained or less fine-grained set of qualitative verdicts. In addition,
different formulations of the qualitative verdicts could be chosen for different
areas in science. However, the following requirements should be fulfilled by
a plausible set of qualitative verdicts: a) the qualitative verdicts need to be
framed in evaluative terms. The evaluative terms transport a substantial
meaning that can be made sense of in the context of theory choice (e.g., a
highly fruitful theory). Furthermore, using evaluative terms instead of going
directly for the rank scores implies the commitment to justify the ascription
of a particular evaluative term; b) the evaluative terms need to suggest a
natural ranking amongst them; c) the evaluative terms need to make sense
with respect to every epistemic value under consideration.
Second, let me provide some plausibility for the claim that my five quali-
tative verdicts “very high”, “high”, “satisfactory”, “just sufficient”, and “in-
sufficient” are indeed applicable to the five Kuhnian epistemic values. In my
view, it is fairly obvious that accuracy, scope, fruitfulness and simplicity can
be fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent. It is less obvious for consistency. Un-
der the heading of this epistemic value, Kuhn discusses internal consistency
(i.e., that a theory is free of any contradictions) and external consistency (i.e.,
that a theory does not contradict already accepted theories) (Kuhn 1977, p.
321). I accommodate internal and external consistency in my set of quali-
tative verdicts as follows: If the theory contains no contradictions and does
not entail contradictions with already existing theories, it receives the verdict
“very high”, otherwise it receives the verdict “insufficient”. Accordingly, I
treat “consistency” as a matter of binary choice. Importantly, I do not treat
the qualitative verdict “insufficient” as an eliminative verdict in the sense
that whenever with respect to one epistemic value an alternative receives an
“insufficient” verdict, this alternative is eliminated from the choice set. The
reason for this is that I, in line with Kuhn, do not share the intuition that one
of the epistemic values should be treated as a “killer” criterion. Accordingly,
even if a theory is insufficiently simple, let me say, but receives the best qual-
itative verdicts with respect to all other criteria such that the aggregate rank
score is the highest of all alternatives, the low grade in terms of simplicity
should be seen in relation to the high grades obtained from the other criteria.
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Third, the talk about theory choice problems in an assessment context
introduces a notion of context-dependency. Let me be clear what dependency
relations I have in mind here. In my framework, the graininess of the parti-
tion of the set of qualitative verdicts can vary between assessment contexts.
Furthermore, the prerequisites in order to assign the qualitative verdict of
“sufficient”, for example, to a particular theory can vary among the epistemic
values and may depend on the assessment context. What is important, how-
ever, is that if the scientist has come to the conclusion that two criteria are
sufficiently fulfilled with respect to any particular theory or across two or
more theories, then, simply said, “sufficient means sufficient”. Otherwise, the
inter-criterion comparability would not be given.
More on the notion of context-dependency
In this section, I provide further motivation for my proposal of shared qual-
itative verdicts in the context of theory evaluation. So far, I have argued
that the theory choice problem should be viewed in a cardinal context and
that qualitative verdicts can be imposed on all of the Kuhnian values. Now I
show that the set of qualitative verdicts allows for considerable flexibility by
spelling out the element of context-dependency. I do this in two steps. First,
I motivate the claim that the level of graininess of the qualitative verdicts
can vary among assessment contexts. Second, I argue that the prerequisites
in order to reach a particular qualitative verdict can change across epistemic
values and assessment contexts.
To start, think about the following two hypothetical examples of assess-
ment contexts. Martina, a particle physicist at CERN, the European Organi-
sation for Nuclear Research, evaluates two theories about the structure of the
decay of Higg’s Bosons. Tom, a sociologist, evaluates two theories about the
causes of the recent increase in immigration to the United Kingdom. Martina
and Tom are using the five Kuhnian values to reach an overall ranking of the-
ories. They impose a set of qualitative verdicts on their ordinal preferences
for each criterion. To do this, Martina and Tom might be using different sets
of qualitative verdicts. Martina might work, in light of the small differences in
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the content of the theories and the necessary precision of the predictive tasks,
with a five-item scale. In contrast, Tom might be using a three-item scale
that is appropriate for dealing with the recent aggregate data on immigration
flows.
Let me turn to the prerequisites to reach a particular qualitative verdict in
the same assessment context. Assume that Martina is using the following ver-
dicts: “very high”, “high”, “sufficient”, “just sufficient”, and “insufficient”.
When she assigns the competing theories to the qualitative verdicts, she re-
views the ordinal information provided by every epistemic value. Now, to do
this pairing of theories and verdicts it is, as I asserted earlier, it is absolutely
necessary that a qualitative verdict (e.g., “insufficient”) means the same for
every epistemic value. The prerequisites to reach a particular qualitative ver-
dict can, however, be quite different. With respect to accuracy, for example,
“high” could refer to a specific number of decimals at which the prediction
of a theory matches the data. With respect to simplicity, “high” could de-
note the fact that a theory allows stating the key differential equation for the
system under study in closed form. The same could be argued for the other
qualitative verdicts.
What about the prerequisites to reach a particular verdict in different
assessment contexts? Assume that Tom and Martina are using the same set
of verdicts, as specified in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, assume that
both of them attach the verdict “high” to one of their theories with respect
to accuracy. Since their application contexts (particle physics vs. sociology)
differ substantially, the reasoning behind the respective verdicts can differ.
Martina could interpret accuracy as a specific number of decimals at which
the prediction of a theory matches the data. In contrast, Tom could refer to
the fact that one of his theories is able to reflect qualitatively what people
have reported in narrative interviews.
A formal characterisation of the general scoring rule
Let me conclude my attempt to make the notion of all-things-considered
judgements more precise in a cardinal context, by providing a formal charac-
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terisation of Gaertner and Xu (2012)’s general scoring rule. Let X be the set
of scientific theories containing a finite number of elements. Let N be the set
of criteria deemed relevant with t > 1. Let E = 1, ..., E, with the cardinality
of this set being larger than one, be a set of given positive integers from 1 to
E. These integers will in most cases be assumed to be equally distanced and
are thought to represent qualitative statements thus constituting a common
language of evaluation, as outlined above.18
A scoring function si: X → E is chosen for each criterion i ∈ N , such
that, for all x ∈ X, si(x) indicates the score that criterion i assigns to x. Let
Si be the set of all possible scoring functions for criterion i. As explained in
the last section, the statement how well or how badly a theory fares in light
of a criterion must be inserted in the commonly given scale constituted by set
E.
Let P be the set of all orderings over X. A profile s = (s1, ..., st) is a list
of scoring functions, one for each criterion. An aggregation rule f is defined
as a mapping: S1x...xSt → P . Let S = S1x...xSt.
f is said to be an E-based scoring rule, to be denoted by fE, if and only
if, for any s ∈ S, and any x, y ∈ X, it is the case that:
x  y ⇔
∑
i∈n
si(x) ≥
∑
i∈n
si(y)
where= f(s). The asymmetric and symmetric parts of will be denoted
by  and ∼, respectively.19
I am now in the position to address the question as to how my reply
strategy relates to the Arrovian conditions (U, P, D, and I).
The general scoring rule does not restrict the set of possible binary re-
lations Rn over the alternative theories. Hence, unrestricted domain (U) is
satisfied. The weak Pareto condition (P) is also satisfied. If all epistemic
18In general, the required minimal level of graininess depends on the particular theory
choice problem at hand. However, if one criterion (i) ranks all alternative theories in a strict
order, then due to xRiy ⇔ si(x) ≥ si(y), the minimal level of graininess is the number of
alternative theories.
19This E-based scoring function can be characterised axiomatically in a fairly simple way.
See Gaertner and Xu (2012) for a formal characterisation.
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values find T1, for example, better than T2, then according to the assumption
that xRy ⇔ s(x) ≥ s(y) and xPy ⇔ s(x) > s(y), respectively, the Pareto
condition requires that T1 is better than T2 in the “world” of cardinal infor-
mation. Furthermore, the non-dictatorship (D) requirement states that there
is no epistemic value such that if it ranks T1 above T2, T1 is ranked automat-
ically above T2 in the overall ranking. This is satisfied by the general scoring
rule because the general scoring rule weights the rank scores of each criterion
equally.20 Finally, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (I) requirement
means that the overall ranking of T1 and T2 depends only on how the epis-
temic values rank T1 and T2 and not on how they rank other alternatives. The
proposed aggregation procedure satisfies condition I reformulated within the
cardinal context.21 Verbally, it requires that if two theories T1 and T2 receive
precisely the same rank scores from the different epistemic values in the case
of two separate evaluations, then the aggregate judgement over T1 and T2 is
identical between the two evaluations. Given this set-up, it is irrelevant for
the aggregate ranking of T1 and T2 how other theories are evaluated in the
two evaluations. Let me illustrate the cardinal version of the independence
condition with the help of a simple example. Consider the two evaluations
of three theories T1, T2 and T3 based on three epistemic values where the
ranks or scores in the left column are embedded in a simple integer-valued,
equally-spaced interval scale (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3).
According to the general scoring function, in the first evaluation T1 (with
an associated total rank score 6) is strictly preferred to T2 (having an asso-
ciated total rank score 5). These exact scores with respect to T1 and T2 are
retained in the second evaluation, and, therefore, the aggregate relations be-
tween the two theories are exactly the same despite the fact that an irrelevant
alternative (here T3) is positioned differently in the two evaluations.
20The scoring rule allows attaching different weights to the epistemic values. One way
to account for this difference is to divide a criterion (e.g., “fruitfulness”) into two sub-
criteria (e.g., “fruitfulness with respect to the discipline” and “fruitfulness with respect
to neighbouring disciplines”). In this way, the initial criterion gets a higher weight in
the summation procedure. Ascribing different weights might be in order if one recognises
different types of values within Kuhn’s epistemic values as Douglas (2013) suggests.
21A discussion of the reformulated version of the independence requirement in the context
of the utilitarian rule can be found in Gaertner (2013, p. 125-126).
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4
3 T1 T3 T3
2 T2 T1 T2
1 T3 T2 T1
0
Table 6.2: Evaluation 1
4 T3 T3
3 T1
2 T2 T1 T2
1 T2 T1
0 T3
Table 6.3: Evaluation 2
Finally, it seems to me that the method proposed is not only distinct from
but also superior to the Borda rule. While the latter rule requires that each
and every criterion ranks the alternative theories in a linear order, such a high
degree of uniformity is not demanded by the method proposed here. Different
criteria can rank or rather assign scores to the given alternatives in completely
different ways as explained previously. I consider this as an advantage since
the single criterion has more flexibility to express to what degree or extent it
finds itself represented among the various theories under consideration.
6.6 Aggregation across different scientists
What I have described in the last section essentially is an aggregation proce-
dure that allows resolving theory choice problems of a single scientist. Differ-
ent scientists will normally come up with different orderings over the theories
to be evaluated. Kuhn (1977, p. 325) writes that “every individual choice
between competing theories depends on a mixture of objective and subjective
factors, or of shared and individual criteria”. He goes on to say:
(...) I have conceded that each individual has an algorithm and
that all their algorithms have much in common. Nevertheless,
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I continue to hold that the algorithms of individuals are all ul-
timately different by virtue of the subjective considerations with
which each must complete the objective criteria before any com-
putations can be done. (Kuhn 1977, p. 329, my emphasis)
According to my proposal, each and every scientist can rely on his or
her own scoring function in order to generate an ordering over alternative
theories. Additionally, different scientists could choose different degrees of
graininess with respect to qualitative verdicts. One person could rely on three
verdicts, for example “high”, “sufficient” and “insufficient”, another person
could decide on only two verdicts, say “high” and “insufficient”. If this is the
case, the two scientists generate different rankings of the theories, as in the
following example.
Consider Anna and Peter, two scientists who evaluate two theories T1 and
T2 with two different sets of qualitative verdicts (see Tables 6.4 and 6.5).
Verdicts Rank scores Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3
high 3 T1
sufficient 2 T2 T2
insufficient 1 T2 T1 T1
Table 6.4: Scientist Anna’s evaluation of two competing theories T1 and T2.
Verdicts Rank scores Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3
high 2 T1 T2 T2
insufficient 1 T2 T1 T1
Table 6.5: Scientist Peter’s evaluation of two competing theories T1 and T2.
Notice that in terms of purely ordinal information, Anna and Peter reveal
the same preference ordering. Using the scoring procedure, Peter strictly
prefers T2 over T1 whereas Anna is indifferent between T1 and T2.
As can be seen, Anna and Peter assign T1 and T2 to different qualitative
verdicts. The reasons for their disagreement in the assignment of qualitative
verdicts might be that Anna and Peter interpret the qualitative verdicts dif-
ferently and/or that they interpret the epistemic values in a different manner.
224
All this can happen. One person may never assign the grade “very good”
– because for this person “good” is the best ever. Another person may be
easily satisfied and, therefore, assign the grade “very good” quite often. As I
stated before, once the grades have been assigned, they must be taken at face
value. One should assert that the grade “good” of one person is equivalent to
the grade “very good” of another person. One simply lacks this information.
Such statements could become acceptable only under special circumstances
where one has detailed information about the personality and psychology of
different persons, which normally is not the case.
Nevertheless, once an overall verdict among a group of different scientists
is found necessary, there is need for a mechanism that aggregates across indi-
vidual evaluations. The procedure put forward in this chapter establishes, for
each evaluating person, an ordinal ranking over the set of alternative theories
at stake. Various methods are available to aggregate these orderings, all of
which violate at least one of Arrow’s requirements. The Borda rule is one
candidate, approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1983) would be a second,
plurality voting a third, Condorcet’s pairwise majority voting rule a fourth.
I shall now offer some considerations for why the Borda rule might be an
appropriate procedure for aggregation across different scientists.
To start, notice that it does not make sense to use Gaertner and Xu
(2012)’s general scoring rule at this stage. To do so would be asking the sci-
entists to use a set of qualitative verdicts to transform their ordinal rankings
into cardinal information. However, this would amount to saying that the
scientists need to go back to their individual assessment of the alternative
theories instead of taking the outcome of this analysis at face value. Fur-
thermore, the Borda method has an advantage in relation to plurality and
approval voting, namely, its aggregation procedure uses a lot of positional
information that both plurality and approval voting ignore. While the plu-
rality rule restricts itself to using information on the top element within each
person’s evaluation only so that the ranking of all other options is ignored,
approval voting implicitly constructs two indifference classes, the set of ac-
ceptable options and the set of unacceptable alternatives, with no further
differentiation in either set. Finally, the Borda method might be preferred
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to Condorcet’s pairwise majority voting since the former guarantees that one
never receives a cyclical ranking of the alternative theories on the level of the
scientific community.
6.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have engaged with Okasha’s impossibility result regard-
ing multi-criteria theory choice to address my fifth research question: What
should one do if one faces a situation of non-robust evidence from multiple
evidential sources? I showed that one is not always in the epistemic position
where one can suspend one’s judgement. I have argued that such situations
can be characterised by four features: a) alternative options have radical dif-
ferent outcomes given different states of the world, b) one cannot suspend
judgement due to the time sensitivity of the choices, c) there is sparse infor-
mation about the decision-relevant states of the world, which prohibits (or at
least makes it difficult) to use standard decision theoretic tools, and d) the
evidence, which could help resolve the factual issue about what the relevant
future state of the world is for the decision maker, consists of or is underlied
by models or theories. In these situations, theory or model choice is a sensible
step to take.
I have put forward a procedure for making such theory or model choices.
I have argued that preferences over theories are best described as weighted
all-things-considered judgements. These all-things-considered judgements can
be analysed in a cardinal context. Moving to a cardinal context allowed me
to rely on Gaertner and Xu (2012)’s general scoring rule to put forward a
procedure for making theory choices. Finally, I have argued that my solution
can capture Kuhn’s statements about the role of subjective factors in the
theory choice process. I have suggested the Borda rule as a suitable method
of aggregating the rankings across different scientists.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
This thesis started with two episodes from medical and social policy-making. I
highlighted the fact that, until the late 19th century, medicine did not provide
effective treatments for many diseases. Something similar held true for inter-
ventions in the housing market of late Victorian United Kingdom, which wres-
tled unsuccessfully with the consequences of rapid industrialisation. To be
effective, policy interventions should be based on the best available evidence
about the domain in which one is intervening. Evidence-based policy-making
addresses the task of improving the effectiveness of policy interventions via
evidence.
One of the key issues that this approach to policy-making faces is that
a large amount of potentially conflicting evidence from different sources can
be relevant to a particular problem. Robustness analysis emerged as a tool
to deal with this situation of evidential diversity. I have strengthened the
case for the use of robustness analysis in evidence-based policy-making by
answering open research questions on this inference technique. The starting
point consisted of a review of the current state of the philosophical literature
on robustness analysis. The review revealed the need to address the following
five questions about robustness analysis:
1. Do measurement and derivational robustness analysis exhaust the set
of useful types of robustness analysis?
2. What is the value of derivational robustness analysis if not the entire
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relevant model space is covered by the available models?
3. What should one do if the model results are non-robust, that is, the
model derivations are not in agreement?
4. How should one conceptualise the relation between expert knowledge
and the evidence basis when one applies the framework of measurement
robustness?
5. What should one do if one faces a situation of non-robust evidence from
multiple evidential sources?
In response to these questions, I have articulated and defended five claims.
I now summarise these claims and locate my contribution within the philo-
sophical debate on robustness analysis.
Based on an analysis of toy models from a range of scientific disciplines,
I argued that the stability of model results across different (types of) target
systems – what I called predictive stability – is a further category of robustness
considerations. I provided a formal inference scheme for this type of robust-
ness analysis. I showed that this inference scheme differs from derivational
robustness analysis by being directly about the relation of model results and
target systems as well as by not requiring a change in the model assumptions.
Furthermore, I argued that predictive stability is distinct from a key tenet
of confirmation theory, which holds that diverse evidence better confirms a
hypothesis than uniform evidence, because it solely postulates the presence
of a model result in target systems and does not in itself raise the issue of
confirmation. Taken together, I think this substantiates the need to expand
the taxonomy of robustness analysis provided by Woodward (2006).
With respect to the second research question, I argued that derivational
robustness analysis has value even if less than the entire relevant model space
is covered. Its value consists in the fact that it provides the resources to assess
in a structured way how much of the relevant possibility space is covered by
a model. As my case study of Hunter and Williams’s automated evidence
aggregator showed, this fact can be used to formulate preference relations
over automated evidence aggregation procedures and, hence, can serve as an
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evaluation criterion of automated evidence aggregators. My analysis suggests
re-thinking the point of application of derivational robustness analysis. In
contrast to seeing it as an ex post tool for checking the stability of model
results, as has been the focus of the literature on the confirmatory import of
this inference technique, derivational robustness analysis can be employed ex
ante in the process of model construction or, as shown in the case study, of
algorithm design.
I went on to argue that, with respect to the third research question, even
in cases of a lack of derivational robustness models can provide a form of
conceptual learning or introduce a potentially valuable modelling technique. I
drew this conclusion based on a distinction between learning from and learning
with a toy model as well as on a detailed analysis of Hotelling’s model of
minimal differentiation. The conceptual learning from this non-robust toy
model consists in the fact that one sees what different sets of assumptions
imply, and, hence, one ends up with a better grasp of a conceptual scheme.
The point about the modelling technique consists in the claim that toy models
can show how a modelling technique can be applied fruitfully to a new question
or a new domain. I argued that both of these insights are only of limited use
for economic policy-making, since they do not provide the relevant knowledge
about causal relationships that licences policy-interventions. Hence, I urged
economic policy-makers to be more transparent about the epistemic goals that
they seek to achieve with such toy models.
With respect to the fourth research question, I argued that expert knowl-
edge can only under special circumstances be viewed as a separate evidential
mode that stands on a par with other evidential modes, such as observations
or a body of theoretical knowledge, in measurement robustness considera-
tions. My engagement with the IPCC uncertainty framework showed that
expert knowledge – in the form of individual expert judgement or collective
expert agreement – is a necessary type of knowledge for addressing questions
that arise when one applies the measurement robustness framework; ques-
tions such as whether evidential modes are independent and whether they are
of high quality. My two claims make the relation between expert knowledge
and measurement robustness analysis transparent and, thereby, open it up
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for further scrutiny. A spin-off from the discussion of the IPCC framework is
my suggestion to improve the framework, that is, to give up the bifurcation
between evidence and expert agreement, to provide further categories for the
assessment of the available evidence, and to employ tools from social choice
theory and multi-criteria decision analysis to aggregate these categories.
Finally, I argued that in specific decision situations in which an epistemic
agent faces conflicting evidence from different evidential sources, selecting a
theory or a model, which underlies or constitutes a subset of the conflicting
evidence, is a reasonable step to take and I provided a procedure to make this
choice in a rationally defensible way. The procedure suggests a way of seeing
theory or model choices in a cardinal context. Once this cardinal context is
established, one can apply scoring to make the choice. Scoring rules allow the
aggregation of information from multiple criteria that are deemed relevant for
the choice problem. My proposal rejects Okasha’s analogy between theory
choice and social choice and shows that theory choice in a scientific context
is best accounted for in a weighting and scoring framework.
Taking a step back from the details of these five claims and the case studies
that back them up, reveals two central insights about robustness analysis as
a tool for evidence-based policy-making. First, the facts that hypotheses are
robust model results or are supported by a varied set of evidence bear impor-
tant epistemic weight in the context of evidence-based policy-making. The
conditions that need to be in place such that derivational and measurement
robustness confirm hypotheses can be met in policy domains. My answers
to research questions one and four have complemented the already existing
arguments for the epistemic import of robustness by providing a new set of
relevant variations, that is, variation across different types of target systems,
and by showing how expert knowledge should be combined with evidential
claims. Second, however, my analysis points to the fact that when robustness
reasoning is applied to policy questions, often the conditions for the confir-
matory import of robustness are not met: not the entire relevant model space
is covered, the model results are not robust, or different evidential modes are
not in agreement. I characterised and motivated such situations along my
research questions two, three, and five. I argued that even in these three
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cases, the inference technique of robustness analysis yields fruitful insights for
evidence appraisal. In particular with respect to this latter insight, my the-
sis strengthens the case for the use of robustness analysis in evidence-based
policy-making.
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